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ABSTRACT 
 This Article proposes a “modular” conception of environmental 
regulation and natural resource management as an alternative to 
traditional approaches. Under traditional approaches, agencies tend 
to operate independently, and often at cross-purposes, using relatively 
inflexible regulatory tools, without significant stakeholder input, and 
without institutional mechanisms capable of adapting to changing 
conditions over time. Modularity, by contrast, is characterized by a 
high degree of flexible coordination across government agencies as 
well as between public agencies and private actors; governance 
structures in which form follows function; a problem-solving 
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orientation that requires flexibility; and reliance on a mix of formal 
and informal tools of implementation, including both traditional 
regulation and contract-like agreements. The Article frames the 
enterprise of environmental regulation and resource management as 
an exercise in designing governance institutions capable of managing 
multiple and seemingly incompatible demands over the long term. 
This approach departs from the traditional legal framing of such 
environmental conflicts as shorter-term and zero-sum questions of 
jurisdiction, authority, entitlement, and prohibition.  
 To illustrate modularity, the Article presents a detailed case study 
of the CalFed Bay-Delta Program, a multiagency effort to address 
competing demands on the water resources in the San Francisco Bay 
Delta. The story of CalFed illustrates many features of the modular 
ideal identified in the Article, and shows concretely how such an 
approach can achieve both procedural and substantive policy 
innovation while also producing measurable environmental 
improvements on the ground. The case study anchors the elaboration 
of the modular conception and its constituent elements presented in 
the latter part of the Article. Finally, the Article analyzes why the 
modular ideal is so hard to achieve in practice, yet it concludes that 
there is no alternative to moving toward modularity given the complex 
nature of the environmental and natural resource problems that we 
face. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, debates about reforming environmental regulation 
and natural resource management have focused largely on two 
important normative questions: First, which level of government 
ought to regulate or manage? And, second, using which tools?1 In its 
simplest form, the first question presents a choice between federal 
versus state dominance of environmental regulation and 
management; the second presents a choice between command and 
control or market instruments. But of course, it is not, nor has it ever 
been, that simple. 
Regulating environmental harms and managing fragile 
environmental resources require much more than assigning authority 
to a federal or state agency, and then choosing between, for example, 
a trading scheme and a technology-based standard. There is rarely a 
single tool, or a lone agency at either the federal or state level, that is 
capable of producing the desired environmental benefit by itself, 
especially now that the most easily captured environmental gains 
have been obtained through the first wave of regulation. It seems 
 
 1. Although each of these questions implicates the other, they are indeed distinct: 
conceivably, one can favor a strong federal role together with market mechanisms, or greater 
state autonomy coupled with prescriptive regulation. 
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increasingly indisputable, after decades of environmental regulation 
and management, that success with every environmental problem, 
including habitat conservation, air pollution control, water allocation, 
hazardous waste remediation, and wetlands restoration, requires not 
only a suite of complementary regulatory tools and the coordination 
of multiple levels of government, but also a wide variety of informal 
implementation mechanisms and the ongoing participation of key 
stakeholders.2 This is a tall order, and it calls for a new way of 
thinking. 
As one step in that direction, we propose a “modular” 
conception3 of regulation and resource management. We use 
modularity to convey the idea of provisional and functional 
rearrangement of units. We find it useful to imagine pollution 
regulation and resource management, like furniture, computer 
systems, and Lego, as alternative configurations of tools, structures, 
and relationships. We identify six central constituents of modularity. 
First, a modular approach seeks to overcome regulatory fracture 
through flexible coordination within and across government, and 
between public agencies and private actors. Second, modularity 
involves government structures in which form follows function, such 
that institutional design can be consciously tailored to policy goals. 
Third, modularity encourages “agreement based” decision making in 
addition to, and sometimes instead of, strict adherence to more 
traditional regulatory or managerial practices. Fourth, modular 
regulation facilitates “social learning” through its collaborative 
processes. Fifth, modularity encourages and depends upon an 
adaptive process, which in turn depends heavily on generating 
 
 2. We mean to include a variety of tools: traditional permitting schemes that implement 
government-established limits on the emission of effluents; tradable permit schemes, in which 
the regulator’s role is limited to capping emissions and making the initial allotment of permits; 
quasi-contractual systems like Project XL (in which the EPA negotiates project agreements that 
afford firms regulatory flexibility in exchange for improvements over the regulatory baseline), 
or habitat conservation plans in which the “regulation” takes the form of an agreement between 
a firm, an agency, and (perhaps) other stakeholders; and informational systems, in which an 
agency demands information disclosures, which then lead to third-party responses that affect 
firm behavior. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 193–94 
(2000) (describing quasi-contractual systems of environmental regulation). 
 3. Throughout this Article we describe our modular idea as a “conception” or “approach” 
rather than a “model.” We are not trying to build a model capable of predicting future events. 
And our approach is not, in an empirical sense, falsifiable. We are seeking instead to describe a 
normative ideal, and to offer examples of existing arrangements that, to some extent, illustrate 
it. We use the modular conception to frame and give meaning to developments that might 
otherwise seem disconnected or idiosyncratic. 
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relevant information and integrating it into decision making. Sixth 
and finally, a modular approach promotes accountability by 
supplementing traditional procedural checks with a variety of 
informal controls and broad stakeholder participation. We think of 
modularity as both a descriptive and a normative concept. It describes 
how some environmental initiatives actually work, and it suggests 
how many more might be improved. 
In its most idealized formulation, modularity supposes that both 
the tools and the governance structures with which we approach 
environmental regulation and resource management can be built, 
unbuilt, and rebuilt—an optimistic but, we hope, compelling 
normative view. Modularity entails configuring and reconfiguring the 
component parts of the regulatory system, and deploying the actors 
operating within it, without necessarily replacing existing structures 
with something wholly new. This is pragmatic, because it leaves a 
relatively small institutional footprint and disrupts existing 
institutions as little as possible in the quest to solve evolving 
problems. 
Framing the challenge of environmental regulation and 
management in this way—as, essentially, a matter of conscious 
design—is quite different from the traditional legal approach, which 
focuses on questions of jurisdiction and authority, entitlement and 
prohibition. This is not to suggest that the formal legal structure and 
its assignment of background entitlements are irrelevant. Indeed, as 
we will show, that structure constrains behavior in important ways, 
establishes crucial minimum floors, and provides a backdrop against 
which modularity can arise. Yet, the traditional legal framing of 
environmental regulation and resource management offers a limited 
and limiting perspective: it focuses mostly on abstract questions of 
who has the authority to do what to whom and on peak-level 
moments like the initial legislative delegation of regulatory authority 
to an agency, and the subsequent standard setting in agency 
rulemakings. Mostly, the traditional legal perspective ignores the 
messy business of implementation and the complicated world of 
interagency interaction. From a traditional perspective, the goal is not 
to rethink the component parts of this regulatory terrain. Rather, one 
takes that terrain as one finds it, merely trying to game the system to 
maximum advantage. 
Conversely, the goal of modularity is to let the solutions to 
environmental problems determine institutional arrangements as 
much as possible. It requires focusing, first, on defining the problem 
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that gives rise to conflict; second, on identifying the range of plausible 
solutions; and third, on implementing those solutions against the 
background of the existing legal regime. Existing legal rules and 
institutions can both help and impede these tasks. They may provide 
the authority necessary to take action, and their limitations may 
generate the impetus for developing new approaches. Yet the existing 
rules and institutions may need to change to accommodate these new 
approaches, and the kind of change imagined here—to laws, rules, 
habits, and cultures—can be costly and painful. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of modularity are worth the price. 
Imagine an important watershed that provides habitat for 
endangered species of salmon and also supplies water to both 
agricultural and urban consumers. Most opportunities for modularity 
arise in contexts like this one in which there are multiple demands on 
a resource and the need for effective long-term management is 
intense.4 The conflicting demands on the resource will likely result in 
battles over water allocation and water quality issues. A traditional 
legal perspective might ask, “How much water are the salmon, as 
opposed to the farmers and urban residents, entitled to under 
applicable laws and regulations?” Then agencies with jurisdiction 
over fish and wildlife would battle agencies with authority over water 
supply and water quality standards, while interest groups would 
strategically launch lawsuits challenging the decisions of them all. 
From a modular perspective, by contrast, the relevant question 
is, “What do we need this watershed to do?,” and to provide an 
answer, we would bring the competing agencies and warring 
stakeholders, with their divergent perspectives and varied expertise, 
together. Then, against the background of the existing legal regime 
and the entitlements it has already established, this group would try 
to strike agreements and configure institutions to implement a range 
of mutually agreeable solutions. We expect that this would be an 
iterative process, evolving over time and adjusting to new 
information. 
In conjuring this attractive image, we are not suggesting that 
deep and enduring value conflicts over precious resources—which 
 
 4. We do not limit our concept of modularity to the context of resource management 
alone. For our purposes, the traditional distinction between natural resources law and 
environmental law (i.e., resource management versus pollution control) is not especially useful. 
We are concerned about situations in which pollution issues (e.g., water quality) and traditional 
resource management issues (e.g., water allocation) arise together. 
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implicate not only economic interests but also ways of life—can be 
transformed into jolly cooperative exercises free of all rancor. We are, 
however, proposing that parties who are used to oppositional tactics 
can cooperate for specific purposes when the incentives for doing so 
are great enough and when the alternatives to cooperation are deeply 
unsatisfying. And we are suggesting that when structured properly, 
this cooperation can lead to substantive policy innovation and 
generate novel institutional forms. These efforts can be fragile, but 
they can also be surprisingly successful when measured against the 
limitations of traditional approaches. 
Some of the features we include in our concept of modularity 
have been recommended already, by ourselves and others, as 
normatively desirable aspects of a superior approach to natural 
resource management.5 For example, we build on arguments that call, 
in various contexts, for collaborative problem solving, adaptive 
management, greater interagency coordination, and increased 
stakeholder participation.6 We build as well on arguments for, and 
 
 5. These include interagency and intergovernmental coordination; dynamic and flexible 
decision making; and collaborative problem solving among diverse parties. 
 6.  See, e.g., PHILIP BRICK ET AL., ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, EXPLORATIONS IN 
COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION AND THE AMERICAN WEST 160–235 (2001) (describing a 
“collaborative” approach to resource management as local place-based politics, focusing on the 
western watershed movement); DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE 
123–36 (1992) (proposing local participatory processes for resolving traditional conflicts over 
resources in the west); JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING 
COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 47 (2000) (providing case studies of collaborative resource management efforts 
and analyzing what makes them successful); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem 
Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 193–94 (2002) (defining 
the characteristics of “collaborative ecosystem governance”); see also Charles Sabel et al., 
Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3, 6–7 
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rodgers eds., 2000) (describing a “rolling rule regime” whereby local 
units of interested stakeholders replace central command regulation by collaboratively setting 
their own environmental targets and the means to achieve them, while providing regulatory 
agencies with periodic reports and updates so the agencies may benefit from any lessons learned 
on the ground). As the proponents of, respectively, “collaborative governance” and 
“ecopragmatism,” we ourselves have elsewhere argued for elements of a modular approach. See 
DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 182–83, 187–88 (1999) (advocating innovative 
regulatory contracts between state and federal regulators and dynamic rather than static 
regulation); Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models 
of Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 68–81 (2000) (examining the self-
regulation model, the governance model, and the bargain model); Jody Freeman, Collaborative 
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21–33 (1997) (proposing a 
normative model of collaborative governance). For example, Freeman thinks of collaboration—
with its emphasis on negotiation, multilateralism, adaptation, and provisionalism—as something 
of a precursor to a more expansive concept of modularity. Yet her theory of collaborative 
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experiments with, a more negotiated and consensus based approach 
to traditional regulations and permits.7 Yet despite over fifteen years 
of experimentation, these trends remain undertheorized.8 The 
modularity concept offers a comprehensive normative framework 
into which ongoing watershed and ecosystem management initiatives 
might fit, and against which their success might be measured. 
Modularity is partly a matter of attitude and disposition. 
Modular thinking changes the questions one asks. For example, legal 
scholars and lawyers typically approach environmental and natural 
resource conflicts with questions about authority, jurisdiction, 
standards, and rules. But modularity requires more than knowing 
about background entitlements. A modular approach enlists lawyers 
 
governance did not sufficiently address the need for interagency cooperation within 
governments, and coordination across multiple levels of government, both of which modularity 
requires. Her early theory of collaboration focused primarily on negotiated approaches to 
environmental standard setting and permitting (processes dominated typically by a single 
agency or by a federal and state agency working together) and relatively less on resource 
management involving many agencies and multiple claims on an environmental resource. See 
Freeman, supra, at 33–66 (providing examples of negotiated standard setting and permitting). 
Collaboration seems to be a prerequisite to modularity, but it is not the same thing. Nor did this 
earlier work explore in sufficient depth how new institutional structures might evolve out of, 
and be layered onto, existing arrangements without supplanting them. 
For his part, Farber has taken a favorable view of what he has called the “bargaining 
model” of environmental regulation, arguing that bargaining among interested stakeholders 
could both open room for creative cooperation and also reserve enough of the adversarial 
procedure of government regulation to keep negotiated agreements within the bounds of 
acceptable protections. FARBER, supra, at 76–79. The concept of modularity builds on the 
bargaining approach because it makes negotiation among stakeholders a core feature. Yet it 
goes further in elaborating a complex institutional system in which governments play a strong 
and indispensable role, potentially satisfying Farber’s demand for cabining “deals” to ensure 
accountability. See id. at 77–79 (expressing concern for the lack of accountability present in 
“deals with individual sources”). 
 7. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 60, 75–121 (2000) (reviewing empirical research on 
negotiated rulemaking); Freeman, supra note 6, at 33–40 (describing the process of consensus-
based regulatory decision making). 
 8. See, e.g., WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 6, at 23–66 (offering a number of case 
studies as a means of judging the effectiveness of collaborative management). In 1995, the 
Council on Environmental Quality published a report arguing for an “Ecosystem Approach” 
characterized by federal agency coordination, partnerships with nonfederal stakeholders, 
flexibility for adaptive management, regional science planning bodies, and coordinated 
ecosystem budgets, among other things. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY INTERAGENCY 
ECOSYSTEM MGMT. TASK FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS & 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 6–7 (1995) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). This Report might 
have served as an impetus to developing a more comprehensive theory of ecosystem 
management and a spur to federal experimentation with concrete initiatives, but by all accounts 
it appears not to have had much of an impact.  
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in the delicate, context-sensitive and intensely value-laden project of 
institutional design. How do we solve these conflicting problems? 
How do we satisfy this collection of stakeholders? What mechanisms 
do we need to implement this strategy? Whose expertise and support 
do we need? And how do we build in accountability? Answering 
these questions is as much a political exercise as a legal one. It is 
simultaneously substantive and procedural. 
In Part I, we describe some of the dominant debates in 
environmental law and natural resource management. The underlying 
assumptions that inform them, and the sheer amount of intellectual 
space they occupy, makes it hard to recognize modularity when it 
arises, let alone to pursue it as a normative goal. Nevertheless, there 
are trends within these debates that point toward modularity. For 
example, the traditional environmental federalism debate has 
centered on whether federal or state governments should play the 
lead role in environmental regulation. Yet the debate seems to have 
lost its “either-or” quality in recent years, and is yielding to a richer 
discussion about how different levels of government, including local 
governments and regional bodies, can best share responsibility for 
regulation and management.9 In addition, the list of potential 
“regulators” and “managers” seems to have expanded beyond 
government actors. Depending on the context, nonprofit and for-
profit private actors might play important roles. This is a crucial step 
in the direction of modularity because it expands the universe of 
players that might be enlisted in decision making about resource 
conflicts. Similarly, the debate over regulatory tools contains the 
seeds of modularity. In its simplest formulation, this debate focuses 
on whether market mechanisms are superior to prescriptive 
techniques. Yet it seems increasingly clear that this either-or choice is 
too narrow. The real question is how best to mix these various 
measures, and how to adapt them optimally in different contexts. This 
kind of context-based attention to tool choice and regulatory design is 
characteristic of modular thinking. 
 
 9. We note, however, that the federal versus state focus may return in the near future. 
States are increasingly taking the lead in environmental regulation as the federal government 
enjoys a period of relative repose, and this inversion appears to be attracting scholarly attention. 
Consider, for example, California’s efforts to regulate greenhouse gases against the wishes of 
the Bush administration. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282–85 (2003) (describing California’s greenhouse gas 
legislation and its implications for federalism). 
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In Part II, we illustrate modularity with an example: the CalFed 
Bay-Delta Program in California, which is a long-term plan to 
improve water management and to restore the ecological health of 
the Bay-Delta water system near San Francisco. CalFed is a 
multistakeholder, multiagency, regionally focused approach that 
depends for its success on the kind of flexibility and provisionalism 
that we think of as modular. Though CalFed is not a perfect 
illustration of the normative modular ideal, it serves as a compelling 
and suggestive example of modularity principles. 
Having provided a concrete illustration, we go on in Part III to 
elaborate the theory of modularity and to distill its essential features. 
We argue that modularity involves engaging multiple agencies and 
stakeholders in an ongoing problem-solving exercise. It allows 
regulation and management to increase in scale and scope without the 
encumbrance of bloated administrative agencies. At the same time, it 
is less utopian than proposals to replace the regulatory state with 
volunteerism or with a network of local environmental bodies. 
Finally, in Part IV, we discuss a host of obstacles to the development 
and diffusion of modularity. These obstacles are organizational, legal, 
cultural, financial, and political. 
We view modularity as an important development in addressing 
environmental and natural resource problems, but we do not wish to 
romanticize it or present it as a panacea.10 Nevertheless, modularity 
has both a theoretical and practical payoff. From a theoretical 
perspective, it captures a moment of maturation in both 
administrative law and environmental law,11 which has yet to be 
 
 10. We recognize that many environmental problems and natural resource conflicts are 
intractable and likely to be enduring. Modularity cannot guarantee success in their resolution, 
but it can increase the chances of doing better. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges 
over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 851 
(2003) (discussing the obstacles encountered by movements for environmental protection). 
 11. In general, scholarly thinking about environmental regulation and natural resource 
management depends heavily on administrative law conceptions of what regulation consists of 
and what agencies may legitimately do. Environmental statutes are implemented, after all, by 
administrative agencies, and subject to administrative law constraints. See ROGER W. FINDLEY, 
DANIEL A. FARBER AND JODY FREEMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
79 (6th ed. 2003) (introducing the administrative law boundaries for federal agencies when they 
are implementing environmental statutes). That is, we take for granted in environmental law 
many of the foundational assumptions of administrative law. But traditional administrative law 
assumptions, and traditional governance procedures and structures, make it difficult for 
modular structures to emerge. So thinking in a modular way requires not only thinking about 
environmental conflicts differently, it also requires a willingness to think “outside of the box” 
when it comes to the administrative process. 
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named and fully described. In this moment, traditional forms of action 
and institutional structures12 are giving way to a “problem focus” that 
calls for new arrangements, new strategies and new capacities.13 We 
believe, in addition, that modularity can produce concrete results. 
That is, modular systems offer the potential for real, measurable 
improvements in environmental regulation and management, 
including healthier resources that can better withstand the stresses 
imposed on them by human activity. Modular institutions can also, we 
believe, generate better-informed, more adaptive, and sufficiently 
accountable decisions that wind up satisfying more stakeholders more 
of the time. Modularity may not be perfect, but it has the potential to 
be better than the traditional approach. 
I.  CURRENT DEBATES 
As noted earlier, two of the most keenly debated issues in both 
environmental law and natural resource management are the 
appropriate locale of regulatory authority and the optimum choice of 
regulatory tools. The debates play out differently in the two fields, 
and pollution agencies differ from resource agencies in important 
ways, but the basic issues are common to both. These debates are 
important, but the way they are framed can be limiting. Among other 
things, their framing tends to take for granted a certain type of 
regulatory structure, in which a designated agency makes discrete 
choices from some preexisting menu of regulatory tools to deal with a 
previously identified problem. Even “regulatory reform” measures 
like cost-benefit analysis often presume the existence of such a 
discrete, centralized process; they want to modify the terms of 
engagement but not the structure of decision making. In contrast, 
modularity focuses on coordinated action both among multiple 
agencies and across levels of government. One goal of that 
coordination is to combine expertise and to enlist more perspectives 
in the design and deployment of regulatory instruments. In short, the 
 
 12. Of course, existing structures and frameworks perform a crucial function as the default 
against which novel arrangements emerge. On occasion, the default regulatory regime can 
create crisislike conditions in order to trigger the kind of cooperation on which modularity 
depends. See infra notes 171 and 317 and accompanying text. 
 13. We are trying to articulate what that moment looks like, even as it is happening. See 
Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 225–26 (arguing that ecosystem governance should not be so easily 
dismissed by legal scholars); Freeman, supra note 6, at 31–34 (making a similar argument about 
the need to recognize the emergence of collaborative experiments). 
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existing debate begins by assuming a certain type of structural rigidity 
that we wish to challenge. 
A. Who Should Regulate? 
There is a lively debate in both environmental law and natural 
resource management over the relative efficiency and comparative 
effectiveness of federal versus state regulation. The most visible 
scholarly discussion of this issue in the pollution context has taken the 
form of an ongoing disagreement between Professors Revesz and 
Engel, with the former offering a theoretical account of why state 
regulation will not necessarily lead to a much feared “race to the 
bottom,” and the latter insisting, based on empirical evidence, that 
such a race is inevitable.14 Scholars have long debated this issue, 
drawing typically on evidence and arguments about the relative 
expertise, institutional capacity, and vulnerability to interest group 
pressure of the federal and state governments.15 
In the field of natural resource management, the state-versus-
federal conflict is even more acute. Disputes between levels of 
government over who should control land and water use planning are 
frequently even more volatile and visible than those between, for 
example, state regulatory agencies and the Environmental Protection 
 
 14. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211–27 
(1992) (arguing that competition among states should not lead to a race to the bottom, and even 
if it did, federal environmental responses are misplaced); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the 
National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and 
State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1546–61 (1995) (providing evidence that state 
competition has resulted in a race to the bottom and arguing for stronger federal regulation); 
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2341, 2341–45 (1996) (distinguishing externalities from a race to the bottom and finding a role 
for the federal government to regulate externalities); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental 
Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race,” And Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 271–81 
(1997) (defending federal standards, as supplemented with region-based, problem-specific, state 
or local regulatory decision making); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 554–56 (1997) 
[hereinafter Race to the Bottom] (responding to Engel and arguing that if federal intervention is 
to work, it needs to be broader in scope than current environmental regulation). 
 15. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1283, 1301 (1997) (discussing the states’ capacity to regulate the environment); Richard L. 
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 553, 578 (2001) (arguing that “plausible public choice theories” do not lend credence to 
the superiority of federal regulation); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National 
Good in a Federal State, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 212–13 (1997) (arguing that conceptualizing 
environmental protection as a national good leads to federalization). 
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Agency (EPA) over air quality.16 In both contexts, though, many of 
the arguments are the same—for example that local control will lead 
to higher-quality and more legitimate decision making. Both the 
proponents of the “place-based” politics of the western watershed 
movement and of local control over pollution standards rely on this 
argument.17 
Of course, the debate over whether state or federal governments 
should take the lead in environmental regulation or resource 
management does not turn solely on arguments about their relative 
efficiency and effectiveness. It also presents a constitutional question 
about which level of government is authorized to regulate. Both 
scholars and the governments themselves disagree over this. State and 
federal agencies regularly challenge one another’s jurisdiction, both 
informally and in lawsuits.18 Although the balance of federal and state 
power struck in the environmental arena is frequently called 
“cooperative federalism,”19 the relationship between the two levels of 
government is often deeply contentious. 
In fact, federal and state agencies engage in an ongoing power 
struggle over almost every environmental or natural resource 
program—air and water pollution, endangered species protection, 
wetlands regulation, and water and energy supply, to name a few 
 
 16. See generally WILLIAM L. GRAF, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION AND THE SAGEBRUSH 
REBELLIONS (1990) (describing the Sagebrush Rebellion and Wise Use movement, which were 
precipitated by western frustration with federal control over public lands). Disputes over 
resources may be more intense because they tend to involve tradeoffs among competing goals 
or multiple uses, whereas the pollution context presents fewer tradeoffs. There, the state and 
federal agencies are pursuing the same goal—regulation of air quality. Instead, the debate 
concerns which level of government should set the relevant pollution standard and which can 
best achieve it. 
 17. See, e.g., BRICK, supra note 6, at 160–235 (emphasizing local place-based politics as 
relating to the western watershed movement); DANIEL KEMMIS, THIS SOVEREIGN LAND: A 
NEW VISION FOR GOVERNING THE WEST 177–233 (2001) (proposing to shift authority over 
federal public lands to regional entities); Revesz, Race to the Bottom, supra note 14, at 536–37 
(arguing for a presumption in favor of decentralized regulations because they better reflect 
states’ differing preferences and circumstances). 
 18. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992) (considering the 
constitutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 after 
New York claimed that its Tenth Amendment rights had been violated). 
 19. See, e.g., Markus G. Puder & John A. Veil, Overfiling in the Cooperative Federalism 
Balance: A Search Forever Incomplete and Incompletable, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 120 
(2004) (noting that cooperative federalism envisions “novel collaborative relationships between 
the federal government, the states and tribal authorities, and the citizen”). 
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examples.20 States often resist federal interference with their 
discretion in implementing federal environmental laws.21 The federal 
government, in turn, fights hard to retain its preeminent position.22 
This is true in both the pollution and natural resource contexts. For 
example, states have historically resisted federal efforts to exert 
greater control over public lands, and have argued that they, rather 
than the federal government, “own” wildlife within their boundaries.23 
Of course, challenges to the authority of each level of 
government come not just from each other but also from interest 
groups seeking to weaken environmental regulation generally.24 
 
 20. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 469 
(2004) (holding that the EPA can override state determinations of technology standards for 
purposes of granting permits in Prevention of Significant Deterioration areas). 
 21. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 
1183, 1199–1216 (1995) (detailing California’s resistance to transportation control plans under 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) in the 1970s). 
 22. Federal reluctance to allow California to independently regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions is a highly visible recent example of this phenomenon. In 2002, California’s legislature 
passed Assembly Bill No. 1493, ch. 200, §§ 2–3, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 200 (West) (codified at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42823, 43018.5 (2003)), which required the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) to establish emission standards for carbon dioxide (CO2). See Danny 
Hakim, California Backs Plan for Big Cut in Car Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2004, at A1 
(reporting CARB’s adoption of the new rules, which are to be phased in over eleven years). For 
potential challenges to the rules on preemption grounds, see Carlson, supra note 9, at 299–310. 
The Bush administration has issued a series of decisions indicating that it disapproves of 
California’s decision to regulate CO2 emissions. See Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, 
EPA General Counsel, to Marianne Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator, EPA’s Authority to 
Impose Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change under the Clean Air Act 1 
(Aug. 28, 2003) (claiming that CO2 is not a “pollutant” under the CAA, which California is 
entitled to regulate under the exception in section 209 of the Act), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2_general_counsel_ opinion.pdf; see also Carlson, supra note 9, at 
292–93 (2003) (explaining that the administration may refuse to grant the state a waiver under 
the CAA, which is required for California to set air pollution standards that differ from federal 
standards). 
 23. Until the late nineteenth century, natural resources were subject to state law. This 
changed when the federal government began to exert its authority over public lands pursuant to 
the Property Clause of the Constitution. JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
AND POLICY 145–46 (2004). In the 1970s, the Western states reacted to the expansion of federal 
control by mounting the “Sagebrush Rebellion,” a political and legal movement that sought to 
transfer federal lands to state control. Id. at 154–55. On federal efforts to intrude upon state 
control of wildlife, see id. at 329. 
 24. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (involving a local government agency challenge to an Army 
Corps regulation exerting jurisdiction over an isolated pond under its authority to issue permits 
to fill wetlands and holding that the regulation was beyond the agency’s authority under the 
Clean Water Act); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 901–02 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the EPA overstepped its authority under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act when it overfiled the state agency’s enforcement efforts). 
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Indeed, both levels of government are vulnerable to constitutional 
challenges when they regulate.25 In recent years, as the federal 
government’s Commerce Clause power has come under greater 
scrutiny by the Supreme Court,26 a variety of environmental statutes 
and agency regulations have been challenged as beyond the federal 
government’s legitimate reach.27 Likewise, state efforts to take the 
lead in some areas have been thwarted by interest group challenges 
asserting, among other things, federal preemption.28 In the end, the 
“who ought to regulate” question in environmental law consists of a 
theoretical debate about the relative effectiveness and efficiency of 
federal versus state power, and a legal dispute (between levels of 
government and between them and private stakeholders) over the 
constitutionality of one or the other level of government’s asserted 
authority.29 
There are costs to this stark “either-or” framing. The federalism 
debate overlooks real-world environmental problems that clearly 
require interagency coordination, not regulation by one level of 
government or the other. The distribution of regulatory authority 
over environmental resources is much more diffuse than the 
federalism debate reflects. Regulatory power is often divided among 
a multiplicity of state and federal agencies, each with their own 
narrow statutory mandates, missions, organizational structures, and 
cultures.30 Fragmentation, even among agencies at the same level of 
 
 25. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (involving a challenge 
to state legislation on takings grounds). 
 26. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School 
Zones Act exceeded Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause). 
 27. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171–72 (holding that an Army Corps’ rule that extended the 
definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act to include intrastate waters used as 
habitat by migratory birds exceeded authority granted to the Corps under the CWA); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 
U.S. 927 (1998) (holding that an application of the Endangered Species Act prohibition against 
the taking of endangered species was a proper exercise of Commerce Clause power to regulate 
channels of interstate commerce). 
 28. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 
1117 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 309 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that state regulations on 
purchasing and leasing vehicles by fleet operators were not preempted by the Clean Air Act). 
For potential challenges to California’s new carbon dioxide regulations on preemption grounds, 
see Carlson, supra note 9, at 299–310. 
 29. See Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered 
Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 3 
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 193, 195 (1996) (questioning whether there are 
alternative models of federalism which might enhance the control of public domain lands). 
 30. See infra note 41. 
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government, can create enormous coordination problems.31 For 
example, whereas one agency may have primary authority over 
wetlands, another will have responsibility for endangered species; a 
third will have authority to build water power projects; and still 
another will be in charge of pollution standards.32 Even in cases in 
which a single agency has centralized authority over related 
programs, federal and state regulatory statutes still tend to divide 
environmental regulation by media, such as air, water, and solid 
waste, which can make it difficult for even a single agency to develop 
a comprehensive regulatory or management strategy.33 
Although this fragmentation makes environmental regulation 
more manageable in some respects, and though it can help to foster 
the development of expertise, it also can be counterproductive. 
Environmental regulation of one medium frequently creates spillover 
effects into others. For example, fuel oxygenates like methyl tertiary-
butyl ether (MTBE), which are intended to reduce tailpipe emissions, 
have been found to leak from underground storage tanks and 
contaminate water supplies.34 In these situations, addressing pollution 
in one medium can create new problems in another. And some 
environmental statutes address only part of a larger problem. For 
example, the Endangered Species Act focuses on species at risk of 
extinction. A superior approach would protect the habitat on which 
species depend, with biodiversity as the larger goal. Given the 
incompleteness of federal statutes, it is no surprise to hear reformers 
argue that environmental regulation and resource management must 
be more “holistic.”35  
 
 31. See CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY 
COOPERATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 1–26 (2003) (describing fragmented 
jurisdictions and the challenges of institutional cooperation). 
 32. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000) (giving the 
Departments of Interior and Commerce authority over protecting listed species); Clean Water 
Act of 1977 § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (requiring the EPA to establish effluent standards for 
discharges of water pollution from point sources); Clean Water Act of 1977 § 401, 33 U.S.C.  
§ 1341 (2000) (giving the Army Corps of Engineers authority to issue permits to fill wetlands). 
 33. In the environmental and natural resource context, Congress typically adopts 
legislation on a medium-specific basis. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1531–1544 (2000); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000). 
 34. Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 
281–82 (2004). 
 35. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Expanding Matrix, 
22 ENVTL. L. 77, 87–88 (1992) (arguing that pollution control should be holistic). The 
“multimedia” or “integrated pollution control” strategies popular in the early 1990s emphasized 
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Nevertheless, consistent with their statutory mandates, most 
environmental agencies are organized to perform specific functions 
rather than to deal with cross-cutting issues, or to manage areas like 
watersheds or ecosystems that contain a variety of problems.36 In 
some instances, federal agencies are officially tasked with ensuring 
“multiple use” of the nation’s resources (e.g., forests), which in theory 
suggests that they should balance conflicting goals. The historical 
practice of these agencies, however, has been to manage primarily for 
extraction and exploitation. And the efforts of the environmental and 
resource management agencies can be frustrated by the 
prodevelopment mission of other agencies. For example, the United 
States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and the Army Corps of 
Engineers (COE) have historically competed to dam the nation’s 
rivers and serve their respective client stakeholders by providing 
flood control and irrigation. They have been slow to modify their 
behavior even in light of increasing evidence of devastating 
environmental harm.37 These agencies have developed distinct 
cultures and attitudes that have proved resistant to change. Not 
surprisingly, such historical patterns make it difficult to coordinate 
agency action. 
Budgeting practices also pose an obstacle to coherence in 
environmental policymaking and management. Environmental and 
resource management agencies use their budgetary authority to fund 
their own priorities (often through different congressional 
committees), rather than to support activities that might be in the 
interest of a larger, more comprehensive program. This is partly the 
fault of a federal budgeting regime that funds individual agencies and 
not cross-cutting initiatives of a larger scope. In general, every aspect 
of the federal budget process—from how Congress appropriates 
 
the limitations or consequences of fragmented regulatory programs. See generally Peter J. 
Fontaine, EPA’s Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the Environmental 
Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (1993). For contemporaneous theoretical 
perspectives, see generally Integrated Pollution Control: A Symposium, 22 ENVTL. L. 1 (1992). 
 36. For example, the Endangered Species Act requires the Departments of Interior and 
Commerce to take numerous steps to protect listed species but does not directly and 
comprehensively enable these agencies to address more complex issues of preserving 
biodiversity. Dale D. Goble, The Property Clause: As If Biodiversity Mattered, 75 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1195, 1199 (2004). For an overview of what the ESA does and does not cover, see 
RASBAND ET AL., supra note 23, at 342–410. 
 37. See, e.g., MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 176–221 (1993) (recounting the history 
of competition between the COE and the USBR over federal dollars to build large water 
projects for, respectively, flood control and water supply). 
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dollars, to how its oversight committees supervise agencies, to how 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees agency 
spending—is primarily oriented toward single agency projects.38 
The distribution of regulatory authority over the environment is 
further complicated by the disaggregation of power among multiple 
levels of government. Here the federalism debate, which focuses on 
the state-versus-federal conflict, misses a great deal of complexity. 
The federal government may possess the legal authority to regulate 
one aspect of a particular medium (e.g., water quality), and the state 
may possess legal control over another (e.g., water allocation).39 Yet 
when it comes to day-to-day implementation of regulatory 
prerogatives (for example, translating regulatory standards into 
permits, or putting management plans into operation), the division of 
power is even more complicated. Local agencies like municipalities, 
counties, and districts may retain practical, if not legal, power to 
determine outcomes because they implement programs on the 
ground.40 So even though federal agencies theoretically have 
 
 38. As required by the Budget and Accounting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1104(e) (2000), each 
agency submits a budget request to the President. These requests are processed by OMB, which 
makes budgeting decisions for each agency. THE U.S. FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: AN 
OVERVIEW AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS, 14–15 (G.I. Maltese ed., 2000). These processes result 
in a Presidential budget focused on single agency projects. See Office of Management and 
Budget, Overview of the President’s 2006 Budget (2005) (listing FY 2006 budget highlights, 
which are predominantly single-agency projects), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/pdf/overview-06.pdf. On the congressional side, Congress passes authorizations for specific 
agency programs, and appropriations proceed through House and Senate Appropriation 
Committee subcommittees, each of which has jurisdiction over specific agencies. THE U.S. 
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS, supra, at 16–17. 
 39. The Clean Water Act authorizes the federal government to establish effluent 
standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000), and to administer the National Pollution Elimination 
Discharge System, which requires all point sources of water pollution to obtain permits, 33 
U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). States generally have control over their water supplies, however. A. DAN 
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 1:1 (2004). For example, California 
operates a water conveyance system known as the State Water Project that pumps water to 
urban and agricultural users from reservoirs in the Bay Delta near San Francisco. The State 
Water Resources Control Board allocates water rights in the state and the state Department of 
Water Resources manages the State Water Project. David Nawi & Alf W. Brandt, CalFed Bay-
Delta Program: From Conflict to Collaboration 8 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
 40. For example, though the Clean Air Act delegates the design of State Implementation 
Plans (SIP) to states (pursuant to EPA approval), states often further delegate the task of SIP 
planning to local air pollution control districts. See Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 
(describing SIP requirements); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40000–41357 (West 1996 & 
Supp. 2005) (authorizing and delineating various air pollution control districts that have primary 
responsibility for controlling air pollution caused by nonvehicular sources, including stationary 
sources). Similarly, implementing the requirements of the Clean Water Act often falls to 
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paramount authority under the major federal regulatory schemes, 
practical imperatives lead them to negotiate for the cooperation not 
only of state but also local governments. And of course none of these 
jurisdictions—state, federal, or local—may map well onto the 
boundaries of a given environmental problem because, as is well 
known, meaningful environmental units from an ecological 
perspective cut across jurisdictional boundaries.41 
Thus, the division of responsibility for environmental regulation 
and natural resource management by media, among agencies at the 
same level of government, and among different levels of government 
can be extremely complex. The different mandates, cultures, 
management structures, and budgetary priorities of the variety of 
agencies involved in environmental regulation and natural resource 
management can present, to put it mildly, significant challenges for 
coordination.42 Yet the traditional debate in environmental and 
natural resource law over whether the federal or state government is 
constitutionally entitled to regulate, and which is better situated to do 
so, seems so narrowly focused as to elide most of this complexity. The 
tendency to cast things in federal-versus-state terms makes it more 
difficult to focus on even modest first steps, such as how federal and 
state agencies might work together more constructively.43 
 
regional or local bodies. For example, the CWA is implemented in California by a system of 
Regional Water Quality Control Boards, which issue and enforce regulations within their 
jurisdiction. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 13200–13286.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005). 
 41. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 212–17 (arguing that traditional levels of government 
are poorly matched to the task of ecosystem-based governance). 
 42. Agencies have cultures and personalities based on their historical mandates and the 
disciplinary training of their staff. See DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & JEANNE NIENABER, CAN 
ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, AND 
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 8–62 (1979) (contrasting cultures of the Army Corps of Engineers 
and the Fish and Wildlife Service). 
 43. It is one thing to call for interagency coordination, as many environmental scholars do, 
and another to work out the incentives, mechanisms, and instruments necessary for it to happen 
both more regularly and more effectively. Agencies tend to defend their statutory turf, protect 
their budgets, and advance the interests of their constituencies to enhance their power. But 
doing this does not necessarily enhance their effectiveness as regulators or managers. See, e.g., 
Jonathan Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK 39, 56–58 (1998) 
(noting that regulatory agency specialization based on congressional mandates and funding 
concerns limits the ability of such agencies to address any risks their regulations may create 
when such effects fall outside their regulatory scope). There appear to be relatively few formal 
mechanisms of interagency coordination in the federal government, although there are many 
informal ones. See Jody Freeman & J.R. DeShazo, Public Agencies as Lobbyists 58–59 (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing empirical evidence and 
theoretical support for the claim that interagency lobbying can be an effective mechanism of 
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B. Prescriptive Regulation vs. Market Mechanisms 
Environmental law and natural resource management feature 
another important debate over the preferred tools of environmental 
regulation—a debate that pits traditional “command and control” 
regulation (referred to here as prescriptive regulation) against market 
mechanisms, which are thought to be more efficient. Emissions 
trading schemes are the most common form of market mechanism in 
environmental regulation thus far. The most familiar example is the 
acid rain program in the Clean Air Act (CAA).44 Emissions trading 
schemes allocate pollution rights within an industrial sector or 
geographic region based on the theory that firms that can reduce their 
emissions at a lower cost will be encouraged to do so by a market 
mechanism in which they can sell their excess allocation to firms for 
which such reductions would be more expensive. This presumably 
accomplishes the ultimate regulatory goal (which government still 
establishes) in the most efficient way.45 
In contrast, prescriptive regulation usually requires that all firms 
in a given industrial sector reduce emissions equally. Such an 
approach is too costly, the argument goes, because it fails to account 
for the marginal cost of compliance among differently situated firms.46 
Uniform regulation is widely thought to be intrusive, interfering with 
the industrial process by mandating the adoption of particular 
technologies regardless of the peculiarities of different industrial 
processes. Another related criticism of prescriptive regulation, 
especially at the national level, is that it is too “centralized” and 
coarse grained to respond adequately to differences in local 
conditions, let alone to the diversity of local preferences regarding the 
 
legislative control over agencies). There are numerous obstacles to agency coordination, as we 
have seen most graphically in recent years with our national security-related agencies. The 
creation of a new Department of Homeland Security was meant to overcome obstacles to 
coordination among the FBI, CIA, and NSA, but creating new agencies is only one way to 
tackle the problem and often not the best. See Thomas Cmar, Office of Homeland Security, 39 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 464–74 (2002) (questioning the power and effectiveness of the Office of 
Homeland Security). We discuss the obstacles to coordination in more detail at infra Part IV.A. 
 44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2000). 
 45. See generally Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy 
Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 472 
(Robert N. Stavins ed., 2000) (discussing the relative efficiency of prescriptive regulation and 
market mechanisms). 
 46. See generally Tom H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, 
in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 373 (Robert N. Stavins ed., 2000) (reviewing emissions 
trading and emissions charge programs that minimize the differential cost of compliance). 
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degree of pollution control that is appropriate given its costs. 
Centralized top-down regulation is thought to inhibit the kind of 
policy and institutional innovations that come only from local 
knowledge and experience.47 
Prescriptive regulation is also widely believed to inhibit 
technological innovation because firms required to reduce emissions 
to the same level have no incentive to develop new technologies that 
could reduce emissions even further below the agency standard.48 
Another more practical concern is that much of the information most 
relevant to prescriptive regulators is in the hands of industry, 
including information about the costs of controlling emissions, 
operational details about industrial processes, and rates of 
compliance.49 Unless ordered to do so, industry has little incentive to 
reveal this kind of information fully.50 Without this information, 
agencies will find implementation difficult. And prescriptive 
regulation requires procedures, such as rulemaking, that tend to be 
slow, cumbersome, conflict ridden, and, therefore, costly.51 The pace 
of rulemaking makes it difficult to respond to rapid changes in 
technology or new information. 
In view of this critique, the standard advice of economists is to 
move toward a system of market-based incentives.52 Already, there 
are proposals to extend emissions trading to pollutants other than 
sulfur dioxide, as in the Bush administration’s Clear Skies initiative,53 
as well as to carbon, as recent legislation proposes.54 Other proposals 
 
 47. A thorough discussion of these issues can be found in Richard Stewart, A New 
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 27–38 (2001). 
 48. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing 
the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289,  
290–91 (1998). 
 49. See id. at 316 (providing an example of one EPA mechanism that allows industry to 
make unverifiable claims about compliance). 
 50. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory 
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 278–79 (2004). 
 51. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (1982). 
 52. The argument for economic incentives is made in Stewart, supra note 47, at 94–127 
(discussing a series of advantages that stem from market-based incentives). 
 53. Clear Skies Act of 2003, H.R. 999, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Representative 
Barton (R-TX)); Clear Skies Act of 2003, S. 485, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Senator 
Inhofe (R-OK)). Proposals for mercury trading schemes are found in Title IV, Part A, Sec. 403 
of both the House and Senate versions. 
 54. Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Senator 
Lieberman (D-CT) and Senator McCain (R-AZ)); Climate Stewardship Act of 2004, H.R. 4067, 
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go beyond the air context to address different settings and harms. 
Examples include watershed-based effluent trading and wetlands 
mitigation banking.55 Moving further in the direction of market 
approaches would also presumably require making greater use of a 
wider range of mechanisms, including effluent taxes, deposit-refund 
systems, and user fees such as those levied in “Pay-As-You-Throw” 
waste collection systems.56 
Advocates of prescriptive regulation argue two things in 
response to the critique just described: first, that many of the 
assumptions about the uniformity, inflexibility, and high cost of 
prescriptive regulation are either wrong or overstated; and second, 
that prescriptive regulation is still necessary as the backbone of the 
regulatory system because market mechanisms are risky and 
frequently do not deliver on their promise.57 Indeed, although some 
market experiments are reputed to be enormous successes (e.g., the 
CAA’s Acid Rain program), the empirical record on their 
performance is, in fact, mixed.58 Advocates of conventional 
 
108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Representative Gilchrest (R-MD) and Representative Olver 
(D-MA)). 
 55. See William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for 
Private Land Use Control, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 33–34 (2004) (explaining wetlands mitigation 
banking); Envtl. Prot. Agency, WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY 1 (2003) (noting that 
“[m]arket-based programs can achieve water quality goals at a substantial economic savings”), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingpolicy.html. 
 56. See James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of 
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609–14 (2000) (reviewing market-based approaches 
to environmental regulation); Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive 
Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 687–95 (1990) 
(explaining the “pay-as-you-throw” approach). 
 57. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los 
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 283–87 
(1999) (proposing a series of urban air pollution trading programs); Vivien Foster & Robert W. 
Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J. L. & 
ECON. 19, 21–44 (1995) (discussing how prescriptive regulation relates to environmental 
markets and emissions trading in Los Angeles); Gary Polakovic, Innovative Smog Plan Makes 
Little Progress, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2001, at B1. 
 58. The sulfur dioxide trading program has been criticized for, among other things, setting 
the initial cap too low, allocating emissions and exemptions to powerful “special interests,” and 
failing to anticipate the affordability of low sulfur coal which led to relatively few auction 
purchases of sulfur in the early years. For an overview of such criticisms, see FINDLEY, FARBER 
& FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 378–79. For criticisms of the Regional Clean Air Incentives 
Market (RECLAIM) emissions trading program in Southern California, see Salzman & Ruhl, 
supra note 56, at 687 n.236. 
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prescriptive regulation argue that despite its imperfections, command 
and control has delivered significant environmental gains.59 
Even those favorably disposed to market mechanisms in theory 
will concede that significant problems of design and enforcement can 
in practice inhibit their ability to deliver environmental benefits. For 
example, political considerations tend to dominate the initial 
allocation of entitlements in market regimes (as was the case with 
allocation of units of sulfur dioxide pollution in the acid rain 
program), which can undermine their purported efficiency.60 Markets 
can be too narrowly or broadly drawn, and prices can be set 
inaccurately. To establish an effluent tax or design an emissions 
trading system, the government must establish a shadow price—a 
price that reflects the real costs of pollution61—but the unavailability 
 
 59. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act—both highly prescriptive regulatory 
statutes that consist of health and technology based standards—are widely acknowledged to 
have produced considerable environmental gains. See, e.g., Frona M. Powell, The Supreme 
Court Rejects The New Nondelegation Doctrine: Implications For The Administrative State, 71 
MISS. L.J. 729, 738 (2002): 
The Clean Air Act is one of the most important environmental statutes and its 
successes have been well-documented. In the three decades after its adoption, the 
EPA reports that air pollution has been cut by 33% and acid rain by 25%, that cars 
are 95% cleaner, that chlorofluorocarbons that were depleting the ozone layer are 
being phased out, and that emissions of the six worst air pollutants dropped 33% 
from 1970 to 1997 despite a 31% increase in the United States population. The EPA 
estimates that the benefits to human health, welfare and the environment have 
outweighed its costs forty to one. 
(footnotes omitted); see also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Wastewater Management, 
Water Pollution Control: 25 Years of Progress and Challenges for the New Millennium 1–2 
(1998) (describing how, because of the Clean Water Act, thousands of cities have received 
federal funds to build wastewater treatment facilities to ameliorate pollution in the nation’s 
waterways), available at http://www.abuse.com/environment/npdespub/pubs/25PROG.PDF. 
 60. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 
320–24 (1995) (reviewing the political process that led up to the passage of the 1990 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act). 
 61. This is most obviously true for an effluent tax, where the shadow price determines the 
level of the tax. But it is also true for cap-and-trade schemes. To pick the appropriate cap, the 
government needs to assign a shadow price to pollution to compare costs and benefits at 
different possible cap levels. See Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through 
Ecosystem Service Districts, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 353 (2001) (“In general, the optimal 
management strategy or set of strategies is the one that maximizes the value of the output of 
[environmental] services at shadow prices.”). Justice Breyer has summarized the debate: 
“Since the price of product A does not reflect an important social cost that it imposes 
(in this case pollution), why,” the economist asks, “not simply raise A’s price through 
a tax to reflect the harm?” “But wait,” the classical regulator replies, “no one knows 
how much to raise the price. It is no easier to decide the amount of tax than to decide 
how much smoke the maker of product A should be allowed to emit. So why not just 
tackle the problem through standards?” 
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 271 (1982). 
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of a market benchmark makes this a difficult undertaking. This, of 
course, is the problem with public goods like the environment: the 
ostensible market justification for intervening in environmental 
regulation in the first place is that the market is unable to price 
environmental harms properly. In addition, the more the system is 
tailored to local conditions, whether by adjusting the effluent or 
emissions tax to account for variations in harm, or by establishing a 
system of “exchange rates” for permits,62 the more cumbersome the 
system becomes.63 
Trading schemes can falter because of difficulties both in valuing 
environmental commodities and ensuring that trades involve 
commensurate goods. It may be especially challenging to devise 
market approaches to natural resource management rather than 
pollution, because natural resources, like ecosystems, perform 
functions that may be enormously difficult to value and to trade. As 
Professors Salzman and Ruhl put it, trading schemes raise problems 
of incommensurability and nonfungibility.64 Markets can also create 
“hotspots” of concentrated pollution, which can disproportionately 
affect subpopulations, leading to claims of distributional inequity.65 
Again, to the extent that the market regime is tailored to address such 
distributional concerns, some efficiencies may be lost. 
Finally, market mechanisms generally require some easily 
monitored indicator that can be subject to trading or tax. This may be 
 
 62. For example, if pollution has different impacts in different locations, the regime cannot 
allow permittees to exchange permits based on the amount of discharge. In this instance, the 
regime must include some kind of indexing, e.g., allowing a permit for one ton of sulfur dioxide 
in Location A (where the impact is high) to be exchanged for two one-ton permits in Location B 
(where the impact is lower). Hence the idea of exchange rates. 
 63. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 56, at 616–38 (examining a number of measures of 
exchange and currency design strategies, as they relate to environmental trading markets 
(ETMs)). 
 64. See id. at 634 (“[I]n analyzing the trading of nonfungible commodities one need look no 
farther than the cost-benefit and risk debates.”). 
 65. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental 
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 129–30 (1999) 
(“[O]lder, heavily polluting industries may find that it is more cost-effective to continue 
polluting and to buy pollution rights than to install new technologies to reduce pollution.”); 
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and 
“Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 269 (1997) (noting distributive justice problems that are 
created when hazardous waste disposal facilities are disproportionately located in minority or 
poor communities); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional 
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 848–49 (1992) (adding that many 
states are beginning to consider distributional factors, including Texas, which now “requires 
landfill permit applicants to include socio-economic information concerning the proposed site”). 
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feasible for some pollution problems (as with sulfur dioxide, which is 
emitted by a fairly small number of power plants) but it is more 
difficult to implement in other contexts in which there are large 
numbers of sources or in which the emissions rates are hard or 
expensive to monitor. This is the case with the pollutants that 
contribute to ground level ozone. 
And so the debate goes. Framing the debate between 
prescriptive versus market based regulation in either-or terms echoes 
the dichotomous nature of the federalism debate. In reality, both 
environmental law and natural resource management rely on a mix of 
mechanisms. Moreover, neither kind of instrument is as “pure” as the 
two poles of the debate would suggest: virtually every market 
mechanism of environmental regulation depends on some prescribed 
government limit, such as setting a cap, in the emissions trading 
context, beneath which trades occur. And in all of these regimes, the 
government—either Congress through legislation or agencies through 
regulation—plays a crucial role in monitoring and adjusting the rules 
to respond to new events or information. 
Similarly, prescriptive regulations, such as technology-based 
standards, are not as uniform and rigid as some would suggest.66 Most 
standards are performance standards that firms can achieve in any 
way they choose (although admittedly, the easiest assurance of 
compliance is to adopt whatever technology the relevant agency used 
to set the standard).67 Most importantly, prescriptive regulation 
always relies to some extent on adjustments in light of economic 
realities—both in the initial phase of level setting, when the 
regulatory agency takes account of industrial processes and capacities 
in choosing the standard, and later, when agencies negotiate 
particular permits.68 There is also considerable flexibility in the 
enforcement process, when agencies must determine whether firms 
 
 66. See Jason Scott Johnston, Tradeable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, in 
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF 
EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 12, 
on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the highly negotiated and nonuniform standard-
setting process under both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act). 
 67. See id. at 14 (explaining the system in California that “gives the discretion to local 
regulators to approve alternate compliance methods proposed by companies”). 
 68. See id. at 11 (describing EPA’s process of “securing technical analyses from engineering 
and economic consultants who sample actual industry practices and pilot projects”); id. at 12 
(explaining that at the permitting stage, “firms have an incentive again to argue against the 
application of the general standard to their particular facility”). 
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are out of compliance and what must be done in response.69 The so-
called “command and control” system is infused with negotiation and 
accommodation. To label it “uniform,” “rigid,” and “centralized,” 
although rhetorically powerful, is somewhat misleading.70 In practice, 
levels established by regulation frequently operate more like targets 
than like strict requirements.71 There are market-driven limits, in 
other words, to the extent to which government both “commands” 
and “controls” firm behavior. 
The point is this: twenty years of experience suggests that it is 
impossible to declare a clear winner in this debate. Whether an 
instrument works optimally depends on a variety of factors, some of 
which are easier to predict and control than others. These include: the 
sophistication of the market participants; the size and diversity of the 
market; the vulnerability of the environmental “good” or “service” to 
accurate valuation; the vulnerability of the regime to political rigging 
in the allocation process; and the potential for gaming, shirking, and 
cheating by the regulated entities, among other things. The challenge 
now is to mix and match instruments in a way that is sensitive to the 
contexts—political, economic, geographical—in which they are 
deployed, and to remember that no matter how well-designed 
regulatory or management tools might be in theory, for their success 
they each require effective implementation and monitoring.72 
 
 69. See id. at 17 (noting that state and local regulators exercise some discretion in the 
enforcement process). 
 70. A number of commentators have overstated these features of prescriptive regulation. 
See Bruce Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1333, 1335 (1985) (describing Best Available Technology regulatory requirements as 
“uniform”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1237–38 
(1995) (comparing command-and-control to “a centralized power”); Stewart, supra note 15, at 
213 (describing “centralized Federal command-and-control regulation” as suffering from 
“excessive rigidity”); Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 343 
(1990) (comparing the state of the regulatory system in the U.S. to the Soviet attempt at 
centralized management of the economy); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems 
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE  
L. J. 1196, 1211, 1219 (1977) (arguing that centralized Federal regulation is necessary because 
“structural factors” hinder decentralized efforts and observing that Federal regulation is often 
uniform). 
 71. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance 
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299 n.10 (1999). 
 72. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, “No Net Loss”—Instrument Choice in Wetlands 
Protection, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LESSONS FROM 
TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., forthcoming 2005) 
(manuscript at 2, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing two kinds of failure: failures of 
instrument design and failures of implementation). 
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Two other, closely related debates in environmental regulation 
consume a great deal of scholarly oxygen and require mention here. 
The first is a dispute over the role of cost-benefit analysis (CBA);73 
the second is a disagreement over the role of risk assessment.74 
Advocates of CBA and risk assessment argue that these analytical 
tools are indispensable to sound environmental policy in a world of 
limited resources in which not all risks can be abated.75 Yet critics 
argue that these tools are limited because many environmental risks, 
harms, and benefits cannot be meaningfully quantified.76 Both sides of 
 
 73. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 
1984–2002 (1998) (criticizing Professor Morrall’s cost-benefit analysis methodology for its 
treatment of low risk estimates and discounting of future benefits, and for its narrow focus on 
singular, rather than multiple, regulatory benefits; Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s 
Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2341–44 (2002) (criticizing Professor Sunstein’s reliance on EPA 
cost-benefit calculations and peer review by biased experts); McGarity, supra note 34, at 336 
(pointing out the EPA’s concern that the costs of requiring double-walled gasoline storage tanks 
would outweigh any benefits; therefore, the regulations permit the use of cheaper, less reliable 
single walled tanks that result in widespread MTBE groundwater contamination); John F. 
Morrall, A Review of the Record, REG., Nov.–Dec. 1986, at 25 (calculating the costs of risk-
reducing regulations per life saved and finding regulations designed to limit exposure to 
hazardous materials the least cost effective); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 165–81 (2001) (responding, in part to Heinzerling and that of other “first 
generation” cost-benefit analysis critiques and arguing that cost-benefit analysis is necessary to 
expose poor prioritization, excessively costly tools and inattention to the unfortunate side 
effects of environmental regulation); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 
2255, 2357–61 (2002) (arguing that EPA cost-benefit analysis is an improvement over the 
“intuitive toxicology” of ordinary people); Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving 
Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 370–72 (1995) (analyzing the 
costs of various life-saving interventions, effectively replicating Professor Morrall’s results). 
 74. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End In Itself: The Role of Risk-
Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1644–48 (1995) 
(providing moderate support for EPA risk assessment, so long as congressional policy principles 
are made clear and risk standards are set with consideration of the costs and feasibility of 
compliance); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in 
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2004) (distinguishing between risk 
assessment and risk management); John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 382, 398–402 (1995) (supporting the role of risk assessment and comparative risk 
measurement in helping to provide a more efficient allocation of scarce government resources 
to where they are most effective); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A 
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 585–94 (1992) 
(arguing that risk assessment is a poor vehicle for reforming environmental law because it fails 
to provide a meaningful metric with which to compare conflicting types of risk). 
 75. John Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda For Congress, in RISKS, COSTS, AND 
LIVES SAVED 192–93 (R. Hahn ed., 1996); F. Henry Habicht II, EPA’s Vision for Setting 
National Environmental Priorities, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 37 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994). 
 76. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35–40 (2004) (suggesting that the widespread use 
101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC 12/12/2005  3:09 PM 
822 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:795 
the debate seem to assume that this is necessarily an either-or choice. 
Our own view is that in practice, formalized decision tools like cost-
benefit analysis and risk assessment can be helpful in some contexts 
but difficult to apply, or of limited use, in others. And in all cases, 
they are best viewed as sources of information rather than techniques 
that ought, in and of themselves, to determine outcomes. Choosing 
the level at which to set a standard, or prioritizing some regulatory 
targets over others, always requires a delicate weighing of economic 
and noneconomic considerations. 
From a modular perspective, however, the debate over these 
tools has another weakness: it tends to focus attention on peak 
moments of centralized decision making when agencies first establish 
regulatory priorities or set standards. Yet these instances of agency 
action, although important, are only a small part of what agencies do. 
By contrast, modularity focuses attention on designing institutions 
and tools for implementation. Even if they are useful guides, tools 
such as CBA and risk assessment may need to be adapted, 
supplemented or, in some cases, foregone, in a modular system. 
C. Beyond the Traditional Administrative Process 
The tools debate also seems to overlook the complex 
relationship between the choice of regulatory instrument and the 
design of the process in which that choice is made. By this we mean 
that decision makers and decision making processes—the “who and 
how” of environmental regulation—can shape the “what” of 
environmental policy. Some policy tools seem more likely to emerge 
when traditional decision making institutions yield to unconventional 
forms. The example we describe in Part II, the Environmental Water 
Account (EWA), eluded policy makers for years, and emerged only 
in the context of unprecedented interagency coordination and 
stakeholder consultation. We think it unlikely that this policy 
innovation would have emerged in a traditional administrative 
process. Why is that so? 
The debate over prescriptive versus market mechanisms in 
environmental law has difficulty even posing this question, partly 
because both sides seem to take as a given the traditional regulatory 
process with the lone administrative agency as its central actor—a 
 
of cost benefit analysis, while appearing value neutral, really adopts and entrenches the 
normative perspective of economics). 
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perspective that can limit the options for regulatory design. Those 
who favor prescriptive regulation may wish to preserve the traditional 
functions of the regulatory agency with minor reforms, whereas those 
who favor market mechanisms may wish to severely limit or eliminate 
these functions. Yet framing the choice in these terms leaves 
undeveloped possibilities for reconfiguring the administrative 
apparatus. 
This third option is modularity’s focus. In other words, although 
it is important to choose the right regulatory tools, whether 
prescriptive requirements, market mechanisms, or other instruments, 
it is equally crucial to design the optimal institutional arrangements 
for deploying them. In fact, the two tasks—procedural design and 
substantive policy—are intertwined. Modularity invites imaginative 
thinking about how to bundle agencies and stakeholders together in 
unusual governance structures for particular purposes. Clinging to a 
traditional conception of the agency as centralized decision maker 
makes this exercise harder. 
From a modular perspective, then, tools, procedures, and 
governance structures cannot be easily separated. Innovation in one 
may spur innovation in the other. As we explain below, interagency 
coordination and stakeholder consultation can lead to new policy 
ideas. The implementation of those new ideas may call for a new 
governance structure, which in turn can help to create an institutional 
setting conducive to generating still more policy innovation. This may 
not always happen, but it will sometimes. The point, for now, is that 
this cyclical, reinforcing relationship among policy instruments, 
procedures, and governance structures does not even surface in the 
traditional tools debate in environmental law. 
This discussion leads squarely to the role of the administrative 
agency in environmental regulation and natural resource 
management. In much of environmental law scholarship, the vision of 
the agency, borrowed from administrative law, is of a hierarchical, 
stable bureaucracy exercising delegated power subject to the 
elaborate set of accountability devices that has come to be called 
administrative law.77 Agencies are imagined to exercise delegated 
power in a top-down manner, promulgating rules, making plans, and 
pursuing projects from a position of authority and frequently in an 
 
 77. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–48 
(2000). 
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adversarial posture.78 The expert regulator/manager at the top of this 
hierarchy is presumed to be capable of identifying the most important 
regulatory and management problems, and of gathering sufficient 
information about them (from agency staff and stakeholders) to 
prescribe effective solutions. These solutions are presumed, 
moreover, to be translatable into legally enforceable commands.79 In 
this traditional view, the typical regulatory agency promulgates rules, 
issues guidance, monitors compliance, adjudicates violations, and 
imposes penalties. The typical resource management agency uses 
regulatory and other administrative tools to allocate resources among 
client stakeholders and competing uses, often doling out valuable 
benefits while trying simultaneously to conserve the underlying 
resource. Relationships are bilateral between the agency and the 
regulated entity or client stakeholder.80 
From this traditional perspective, information is important but 
used primarily to justify and defend decisions that must be made in 
the short term. Yet this perspective misses the importance of 
developing a useful information base to assist implementation over 
the longer term.81 In the context of environmental regulation and 
resource management, the need to integrate scientific and economic 
considerations into bureaucratic decisions over time is acute. 
Scientific research, in particular, often occurs over a longer timeline 
than agency decision making. And once an agency has promulgated a 
 
 78. Professor Freeman has made this point before in the administrative law context. See id. 
at 658 (noting, in the administrative law context, the existence of this conception of regulation, 
but adding that “agencies across a variety of regulatory contexts need regulated entities and 
independent expert organizations to assist them with implementation”). The rules might 
concern conventional prescriptive regulations, or they might establish or implement market 
mechanisms, but in either case they are created through a similar process. 
 79. For this view of the expert regulator, see Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 200 (“This 
approach assumes, in general, that there are definitive ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers to every 
question, and the challenge for the regulator is to study the problem until she decides she has 
enough information to prescribe a fixed rule, and then to make it stick.”). This presumes too 
much certainty given the “chronic information deficit” with which environmental regulators 
must operate. Id. at 201. 
 80. See Babcock, supra note 29, at 83 (commenting on administrative agencies and the 
formalistic administrative process). Agencies that rely more heavily on adjudication to create 
policy (which is not generally true of environmental agencies, with the exception of some state 
level boards that set policy through permitting decisions) operate in an even more bilateral, 
hierarchical, and formal way. 
 81. Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce 
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1634 (2004) (providing 
that economic theory suggests that producing new information will be optimal only if its 
expected value is greater than the costs of its production). 
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rule or initiated a project or plan, the need for information only 
grows. Effective implementation requires information; stale science 
or poor data will lead to bad judgments. The traditional 
administrative law perspective, however, does not recognize this as a 
priority because it focuses inordinately on peak level moments of 
highly centralized agency decision making. For example, when 
proposing “major” rules, agencies must perform cost-benefit 
analyses82 and, in cases where agencies will significantly impact the 
environment, they must produce environmental impact statements as 
well.83 Both exercises can produce a vast amount of documentation 
and consume considerable resources. The information generated can 
be used by proponents and critics of the rule or project to argue for or 
against it in the kind of dispute familiar to administrative and 
environmental lawyers. Equally important, however, is whether 
regulators and managers use the information in implementation. 
Modularity places a priority on designing structures and processes 
that can produce, evaluate, and integrate useful information into an 
ongoing decision making process, once the high visibility moments 
and disputes have passed. 
The traditional constraints on administrative action are 
embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),84 a variety of 
“sunshine” laws,85 and organic statutes that occasionally enhance the 
APA’s procedural protections.86 The APA itself reflects a fairly 
formal understanding of regulation and management: decisions are 
assumed to be made by a single administrative agency and there are 
only two primary modes of action, rulemaking or adjudication. 
Although informal exchanges occur frequently between stakeholders 
 
 82. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (requiring cost-benefit analysis 
for major agency rules). 
 83. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000) (requiring that when federal agencies propose action that 
may affect “the quality of the human environment” they must include in the proposal “a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on the environmental impact of the proposed 
action”). 
 84. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 85. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000) (requiring openness to the public about the decision making 
processes of the federal government); see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511 (2000) (regulating 
publication of the Federal Register); id. §§ 2204–2207 (providing rules for access to presidential 
records). 
 86. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2000) (creating a hybrid rulemaking 
procedure that enhances the APA’s notice and comment procedure by including a “docketing” 
requirement that EPA must observe when it promulgates air regulations). 
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and agencies, opportunities for public participation once a formal 
decision-making process has begun are limited and highly 
structured.87 The affected parties may comment during informal 
rulemaking or participate more fully in any formal proceedings.88 And 
the primary means of redress if a stakeholder is dissatisfied with  
the outcome is a lawsuit seeking judicial review of the agency’s 
decision.89 
Although this description of the administrative process is 
accurate, it is also superficial. For example, the two primary modes  
of agency action—rulemaking and adjudication—fail to capture  
the variety of roles that agencies can play and the range of  
postures they can assume. The image of the lone agency engaged  
in an authoritative and highly formalized decision making process like 
standard setting largely misses the mark, at least in the  
environmental and natural resource context, within which  
agencies often behave in ways that are as collaborative and 
negotiated as they are authoritative and directive. Some of the  
most intractable environmental problems require agencies with 
different missions and orientations to cooperate and coordinate, and 
to use instruments that are nowhere referenced in the text of the 
APA. 
For example, agencies like EPA, the Fish and Wildlife  
Service (FWS), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
USBR, and COE convene and oversee a variety of complex  
processes for implementing environmental regulation and managing 
environmental resources. Many of these efforts are regional 
ecosystem or watershed management initiatives that require 
coordination and cooperation on an unprecedented scale.  
Examples include the Chesapeake Bay Program,90 the Great Lakes 
 
 87. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (requiring only “an opportunity to participate in the 
rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation”). 
 88. See id. §§ 556–557 (explaining the procedures required for formal adjudications). 
 89. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 190 (discussing how “judicially imposed reforms opened 
the administrative process to public scrutiny and both balanced and structured private 
influence”). 
 90. The Chesapeake Bay Program is a regional partnership that has led and directed the 
restoration of the Chesapeake Bay since 1983. The Chesapeake Bay Program partners include 
the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; the District of Columbia; the Chesapeake 
Bay Commission, a tristate legislative body; the EPA, representing the federal government; and 
participating citizen advisory groups. CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, OVERVIEW OF THE BAY 
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Program,91 the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan,92 the 
Long Term Management Strategy (LTMS),93 Coastal America,94 
 
PROGRAM, at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/overview.htm (last modified Mar. 14, 2001) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
 91. EPA’s Great Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO) “brings together federal, state, 
tribal, local, and industry partners in an integrated, ecosystem approach to protect, maintain, 
and restore the chemical, biological, and physical integrity of the Great Lakes.” U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, GREAT LAKES NATIONAL PROGRAM OFFICE, at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/ 
about.html (last updated June 16, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). It operates 
through the use of grants, interagency agreements, and contracts. Id. 
 92.  
The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan provides a framework and guide to 
restore, protect, and preserve the water resources of central and southern Florida, 
including the Everglades. It covers 16 counties over an 18,000-square-mile area, and 
centers on an update of the Central & Southern Florida (C&SF) Project [which] 
includes 1,000 miles of canals, 720 miles of levees, and several hundred water control 
structures. 
THE COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN, at http://www.evergladesplan.org/ 
about/rest_plan.cfm (updated June 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). “Development 
of the Plan . . . was led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District and the 
South Florida Water Management District . . . . Many other federal, state, tribal and local 
agencies were active partners in developing the Comprehensive Plan.” THE COMPREHENSIVE 
EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN, THE DEVELOPMENT TEAM, at http://www. 
evergladesplan.org/about/rest_plan.cfm (updated June 2002) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal).  
 93.  
A new cooperative effort by state and federal agencies, ports, environmental and 
fishing groups, and others was launched in January 1990 to develop a Long-Term 
Management Strategy (LTMS) for dredging. . . . The LTMS Project is led by an 
Executive Committee of the Corps of Engineers’ South Pacific Division Commander, 
the EPA’s Regional Administrator, the Chairs of the San Francisco Bay Regional 
Water Quality Control Board and the San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission, and a State Coordinator. 
SAN FRANCISCO ESTUARY PROJECT, COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
PLAN, at http://www.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/sfep/reports/ccmp/ccmp3dw.html (last updated July 
12, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 94.  
Coastal America was established [in 1992] as a unique partnership among federal, 
state, and local governments and private alliances to collaboratively address site-
specific coastal environmental problems. [Between 1992 and 1994], more than 20 
federal agencies and more than 100 non-federal partners have become involved in 
Coastal America projects around the U.S. coastline, restoring wetland habitat and 
fish passage and protecting critical areas for endangered species and other wildlife. 
[As of 1994], more than $30 million had been committed to Coastal America with 
over 60 projects in 20 States. 
COASTAL AM., TOWARD A WATERSHED APPROACH: A FRAMEWORK FOR AQUATIC 
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION, PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT (Jan. 1994), at 
http://www.coastalamerica.gov/text/pubs/consensus/twatoc.html (last updated Oct. 23, 2001) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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Partners for the Environment,95 and our case study, CalFed.96 Such 
initiatives usually require extensive negotiation among and between 
levels of government and feature long-term plans or agreements to 
take certain actions and fund specific activities. They rely, to a greater 
or lesser extent, on stakeholders such as environmental groups, 
farmer’s associations, urban organizations, local governments, and 
business councils, and they depend on a host of informal agreements 
in addition to familiar regulatory tools such as regulations and 
permits. 
The agencies involved in processes such as these never entirely 
shed their skins as authoritative regulatory entities. Indeed, their 
specific statutory mandates provide them needed leverage to behave 
more informally and to negotiate agreements when parties might 
otherwise refuse to come to the table. And, of course, they still set 
standards, issue rules, authorize permits, impose penalties, allocate 
benefits, and build projects.97 Yet their roles are more varied than the 
traditional administrative law conception described above would 
suggest: the agencies are significantly involved in planning, 
coordination, facilitation, negotiation, and funding. These more 
“managerial” functions are relatively informal. They only rarely 
require compliance with federal and state Administrative Procedure 
Acts, because they rarely produce a promulgated rule or formal 
adjudication. As a result, much of this activity is relatively invisible, 
difficult to monitor, and invulnerable to judicial review. 
The prevailing model of administrative agency action in 
environmental law, as in administrative law generally, is too 
 
 95. Through Partners for the Environment, the EPA works with more than 11,000 
organizations who willingly set voluntary environmental goals and commitments like conserving 
water and energy or reducing greenhouse gases, toxic emissions, solid waste, indoor air 
pollution, and pesticide risks. Partners include small and large businesses, citizens groups, state 
and local governments, universities, and trade associations. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
VOLUNTARY PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS, at http://www.epa.gov/partners (last updated June 8, 
2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 96. CalFed is a multi-agency driven comprehensive planning process for addressing a 
variety of water management and water quality issues arising in the Bay Delta near San 
Francisco. See infra Part II. 
 97. Nor should they shed this authority. It may be necessary to create a background threat 
against which alternatives might arise. We note that in the Bay-Delta process described in Part 
II, the existing statutory scheme created a crisis that helped to precipitate a modular approach. 
See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Delta-Bay Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 341, 342–50 (1996) (describing how a protracted Bay-Delta water allocation conflict 
over California water quality standards was addressed by an agreement between California and 
the EPA). 
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formalistic to capture this complexity. Modular thinking, then, 
requires something different. In both administrative and 
environmental law, the work of reimagining the agency’s role is just 
beginning. There are, to our knowledge, two leading proposals for 
rethinking the regulatory agency’s role in environmental regulation. 
The first suggests that voluntarism and self-regulation could largely 
replace agency functions.98 This perspective stresses the potential for 
firms and private individuals to take the initiative in controlling 
environmental harms instead of grudgingly complying with agency 
directives. Firms might do this, for example, by adopting 
environmental management systems that require “continuous 
improvement” or by committing themselves to private industry 
codes.99 This will occur, in theory, because industry faces strong 
market incentives to improve their environmental performance.100 
 
 98. See Dennis A. Rondinelli, A New Generation of Environmental Policy: Government- 
Business Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,891, 10,895 (2001) 
(explaining how a reorientation of environmental policy from command-and-control regulation 
to a collaborative approach between the government and the private sector will provide 
administrative cost savings for the government and more competitive opportunities for the 
private sector). Advocates of voluntarism can point to some successes, see, e.g., John R. 
Ehrenfeld, Cultural Structure and the Challenge of Sustainability, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 234–42 (Ken 
Sexton et al. eds., 1999) (reviewing ten environmental codes of practice, from Total Quality 
Environmental Management (TQEM) to Design for Environment (DFE), that companies have 
implemented to promote sustainability). The voluntarist vision, however, has come under fire 
for relying on overly optimistic beliefs about corporate commitments to environmental 
performance in the face of high costs and the pressures of the market. See Rena I. Steinzor, 
Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Control, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 157–58 (1998) (criticizing academic and professional literature that 
“provide[s] anecdotal, unduly cheerful conclusions about what will inspire corporate 
participation in reinvention initiatives” and discussing a McKinsey & Company survey that 
“rais[ed] intriguing questions about the difference between [corporations’] public expressions of 
support and concrete action”). 
 99. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 154–72 (1998) (providing a thorough review of the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association’s Responsible Care program and arguing that it can make a contribution to 
environmental protection if used as part of an integrated strategy in conjunction with other 
programs and actors). The Responsible Care program was adopted in response to Bhopal and 
the increased disclosures about toxic releases required by federal law. It stresses pollution 
prevention, linked to a program akin to “total quality management” for increasingly rigorous 
control of accidents. Although the program is ambitious, the results are as yet unclear. Id. 
 100. Consumers may favor “green” firms, putting market pressure on firms to avoid 
environmental misconduct. See Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, An Experiment in Voluntary 
Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 28 J. ENV. ECON. & MGMT 
271, 272 (1995) (“[R]ecent survey evidence indicates a willingness on the part of consumers to 
pay slightly more for environmentally clean products.”). Investors may also disfavor firms with 
environmental violations. See James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market 
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Indeed, there are a number of examples of industrial self-regulation, 
many of which are promising.101 
The second reformist view, advanced by Professors Dorf and 
Sabel and called “Deliberative Democratic Polyarchy,” is more 
 
Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 38 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98, 109 (1995) 
(“These results indicate that the day the Toxics Release Inventory data were officially released 
and articles appeared with information about facility omissions, those companies with TRI 
omissions did experience negative, statistically significant abnormal returns.”); Madhu Khanna 
et. al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 243, 244 (1998) (“There is evidence that investors are paying increasing 
attention to environmental compliance records of companies.”); Shameek Konar & Mark A. 
Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic 
Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 112 (1997) (“‘Green consumers’ may decide to 
boycott products of high polluting firms or otherwise look for alternatives.”). Disclosure 
requirements could help catalyze these effects. Konar & Cohen, supra. Firms might also be 
motivated by a desire to avoid the potential for future tort liability, or they might attempt to 
head off potentially onerous government regulation by creating a favorable environmental 
record. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 22–34, 90 (1992); see John W. Maxwell et. al., Self-Regulation and 
Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J. L. & ECON. 583, 
589–90 (2000) (“present[ing] a three-stage model of voluntary pollution control”). Moreover, at 
least some of the time, environmental protection will lower production costs because it leads to 
more efficient production processes. But cf. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, 
Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 592 (2002) (arguing that firms are not black 
boxes and “[o]ur current use of incentives fails to recognize that a firm’s internal structure and 
processes can affect its response to external regulation in significant and unpredictable ways”). 
 101. One example is the EPA’s 33/50 program, which is a voluntary scheme to reduce 
emission of toxic chemicals by 33 percent in the first phase and 50 percent in the second phase. 
Emissions for the chemicals in question fell twice as much as those for other toxics chemicals. 
See Arora & Cason, supra note 100, at 275 (“Between 1990 and 1991 the releases and transfers 
of 33/50 program chemicals fell by 21% while the releases and transfers of non-33/50 chemicals 
fell by only 8%.”). For additional examples of self-regulation programs, see John R. Ehrenfeld, 
Cultural Structure and the Challenge of Sustainability, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: 
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 234–42 (Ken Sexton et al. 
eds., 1999) (highlighting ten self-regulation programs, such as Eco-Efficiency and The Natural 
Step). Perhaps the most successful mechanism to promote industry initiatives has been the 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI is triggered by a government mandate that firms 
report toxic emissions, but it contains no regulatory requirements. Still, information disclosure 
appears to have led to substantial voluntary reductions in some pollutants. See Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, 
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 287–88 (2001) (“Since TRI reporting began in 
1988, reported releases of TRI-listed pollutants have dropped by nearly half . . . [and] most 
observers, including TRI-reporting firms, credit TRI with playing a central role in driving 
improvements in pollution performance.”); see also Archon Fung et. al., After Backyard 
Environmentalism: Toward a Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 AM. 
BEHAV. SCI. 692, 697 (2000) (noting that TRI, although only an environmental regulation in the 
minimal sense of requiring various disclosures, actually has important disciplinary effects on 
private polluters because “TRI data often lead to efforts at informal regulation by community 
groups aimed at securing commitments to improve pollution performance”). 
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complicated. It suggests that federal and state agency functions might 
be all but replaced by networks of local decision-making entities 
governed by participatory democracy and directed only marginally by 
higher levels of government.102 Deliberative polyarchy contemplates a 
“form of democracy that results when a polity makes public choices 
by means of tiered governance councils—councils that organize 
service provision with the collaboration of local citizens, and pool 
their experience to inform their separate decisions.”103 
The primary purposes of agencies in deliberative polyarchy are 
to assist state and local governments in benchmarking, and 
experimentalism generally, especially in connection with activities 
carried out under congressional authorizations; to set—again by a 
variation of benchmarking—regulatory standards for market actors; 
and to undertake such changes in their own activities and 
organization as cumulative self-scrutiny indicates will further these 
purposes.104 
Some agencies will provide services directly, such as administering 
public lands, and these agencies will have to “organize and coordinate 
local benchmarking evaluation” of their activities.105 But regulatory 
agencies as we know them now would be thing of the past. For 
example, rather than setting pollution standards, the EPA would 
“coordinate industry, state, and local efforts to establish a rolling 
best-practice requirement.”106 
Both reformist ideas just described have something to offer. It 
makes sense to foster voluntarism and self-regulation wherever 
possible. Sometimes a regulatory agency can and should take a back 
seat to industrial initiative. Yet the prospect that voluntarism will 
 
 102. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287–88 (1998). Professors Dorf and Sabel propose 
and define “directly deliberative polyarchy” as a model of: 
linked systems of local and inter-local or federal pooling of information, each 
applying in its sphere the principles of benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and 
error correction, so that actors scrutinize their initial understanding of problems and 
feasible solutions. . . . The system in which citizens in each locale participate directly 
in determining and assessing the utility of services local government provides, given 
the possibility of comparing the performance of their jurisdiction to the performance 
of similar settings, we will call directly deliberative polyarchy. 
Id. 
 103. Id. at 320. 
 104. Id. at 345. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 396. 
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functionally replace federal and state agency regulation seems slight. 
Surveys show that business leaders are proenvironmental in the 
abstract, and yet their support for the environment does not 
necessarily translate into concrete business decisions.107 And business 
leaders often do not view environmental regulations as having the 
same legitimacy as laws designed to protect the integrity of the 
marketplace.108 Moreover, although firms may try to control their 
environmental impact to avoid tort liability or to reap the public 
relations benefits of being perceived as “green,” these incentives may 
not be enough to ensure compliance.109 None of this means that self-
regulatory initiatives that improve environmental performance do not 
occur, or that firms are inevitably untrustworthy partners in 
governance systems.110 But it seems quixotic to think that voluntary 
action by businesses will be enough to eliminate the need for 
regulation or government enforcement. 
Deliberative polyarchy’s localist deliberation model is both 
vaguer and more promising in many regards than the self-regulation 
approach. It takes significant steps away from the formalistic view of 
 
 107. Steinzor, supra note 98, at 157–58. Professor Steinzor calls attention to a probing study 
of corporate culture by Professor Robert Jackall in the 1980s. See generally ROBERT JACKALL, 
MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988). The study found that in a 
highly stressful environment, middle managers could not afford to take a long-term view, but 
focused instead on dealing with more immediate business issues. Steinzor, supra note 98,  
at 159–61. 
 108. PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
POLLUTION 8–10 (1991). As studies by Professor Robert Kagan and others have discovered, 
there is considerable diversity in the reaction of corporate management to environmental issues, 
depending on corporate culture. Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the 
Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67 (Keith 
Hawkins & John M Thomas eds., 1984). 
 109. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of 
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1195 (1998). This skepticism about self-
regulation finds support in two elementary economic principles. The first is that firms are 
rational maximizers of profits, rather than charitable institutions. Hence, to the extent that 
managers attempt to implement public-spirited impulses, the shareholders will take steps to 
bring them back under control. The second is that environmental harms are externalities, which 
do not affect the firms’ profitability. This is, in fact, the key economic justification for 
environmental regulation. Putting these two principles together, basic economics teaches us that 
firms will largely ignore environmental considerations as they seek to maximize their profits. 
 110. For a recent effort to appraise this approach to regulation, see Cary Coglianese & 
David Lazer, Management-Based Regulatory Strategies, in MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: 
SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, AND DOWNSIDE 201–19 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye eds., 
2002) (noting the potential of management-based regulation and arguing that government 
policies should take into account firms’ incentives so that they take seriously the idea of 
managing to reduce social harm). 
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the administrative agency in an effort to reflect the reality of 
implementation, yet deliberative polyarchy nevertheless runs into 
considerable practical difficulties. Among other things, it proposes to 
delegate most substantive decision making authority to local units 
without an explanation of how those units will overcome collective 
action problems that impede cooperation. The theory also lacks an 
explanation of how those local units will be made sufficiently 
accountable to broader state and national constituencies that 
inevitably will be affected by environmental decisions.111 
 
 111. A key difficulty with deliberative polyarchy is the impossibility of devising satisfactory 
administrative units. Deliberative polyarchy is compatible with the idea that different problems 
may have variable scales: “[t]he dimensions of effective government will change according to 
the particulars of the problem of governance; ‘local’ actors, whatever their limitations, know 
best when ‘local’ is improperly sized.” Dorf & Sabel, supra note 102, at 343. Thus, Congress 
would give the states “responsibility for determining the jurisdiction—local, statewide, regional, 
or jurisdictions wholly distinct from ordinary political boundaries—to be established to treat the 
problem.” Id. But it is unclear how this could work when a single decision has effects at many 
different levels. For example, the decision whether to build a new segment of an interstate 
involves questions of national transportation policy (Should we be trying to foster other modes 
of transportation to decrease dependence on foreign oil?), regional policy (If roads are to be 
built, how will they affect air pollution in the region? What areas are most in need of additional 
roads?), urban planning (How will the road affect existing neighborhoods?)—plus some issues 
whose geographic scale is harder to define, including equitable factors (depending on which 
groups will be impacted by the road) and environmental preservation (if the road will cross 
environmentally sensitive areas). There is no “right” size for the jurisdiction to address this 
problem. The problem affects many different geographical groups, each with its own interests 
and values. This is probably typical of most significant environmental issues. 
Deliberative polyarchy deals with this problem by delegating it to existing local 
governments—essentially states and municipalities. This postpones, but does not solve, the 
problem of designing a structure that will be responsive to these various constituencies. In any 
event, it assumes that local governments will be willing to cooperate, and this may not be true 
except when a problem affects them all similarly. For instance, midwestern states have no 
incentive to join a group to solve the problem of acid rain, a problem which largely imposes 
costs on Eastern states. Similarly, local communities are likely to regard interstate construction 
as a necessity that ought, however, to take place somewhere else. NIMBY (Not In My Back 
Yard) presents a familiar difficulty in environmental law. Of course, it is not impossible to 
overcome these difficulties: the very existence of the federal Constitution is to some degree 
testimony to the contrary. But deliberative polyarchy leaps over a potentially severe collective 
action problem in its localistic approach. Even if appropriate nontraditional units can be 
formed, accountability remains a problem. It seems unlikely that citizens can be expected to 
participate directly and control dozens of overlapping units. It is optimistic enough to hope that 
participatory democracy can work even in existing structures of local government, without also 
assuming that air pollution authorities, water basin authorities, habitat conservation plans, 
interstate water allocators, and others will all be directly responsible to the people at large. 
Thus, deliberative polyarchy leaves unanswered the question of how to make these 
nontraditional government units accountable. If accountability is to flow from existing bodies of 
government, nontraditional entities must be designed to be accountable to them. 
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In addition, deliberative polyarchy envisions an idealized form of 
participatory democracy that seems somewhat utopian. And it 
appears that deliberative polyarchy is based on a model of decision 
making in nonpolitical private institutions (that is, firms) that function 
quite differently than public sector institutions. Among other things, 
firms devoted to profit making have fewer conflicts about 
organizational goals than public sector institutions, which must 
balance efficiency and fairness in the context of numerous political 
and legal constraints. One can imagine a benchmarking and “rolling 
rule” regime that functions effectively in for-profit firms simply 
because management, facing no internal opposition, orders that it be 
so. It seems less likely, however, that such an approach could work 
effectively in the public sector (at least without substantial oversight 
to ensure that the goals chosen, and the means used for achieving 
them, respond adequately to competing political imperatives).112 
Finally, deliberative polyarchy seems to rely on a kind of 
effortless jet propulsion: local benchmarking and evaluation will be 
continuous, resulting in superior outcomes from everyone’s 
perspective, with little more than steering by higher levels of 
government. But the theory does not account sufficiently for interest 
group politics which could result in some fits and starts. Although we 
favor benchmarking as a tool, and think that agencies could help to 
facilitate more of it, we simply need more assurance that deliberative 
polyarchy would be effective in resolving environmental resource 
conflicts. 
Most important from our perspective is that both voluntarism 
and deliberative polyarchy depend, ultimately, on a rather anemic 
view of the administrative state. The goal of both proposals is for 
federal agencies to disappear, or to perform the mildest of 
 
 112. For example, the engineers who design innovative missile systems know that their goal 
is to produce a missile with certain qualities; they do not simultaneously have to decide if 
building the missile is more important than alternative programs such as health care, or whether 
disarmament talks would be better than new weapons programs, or whether designing the best 
possible missile is more important than fair treatment of the participating engineers. 
Political democracy is quite different. Political decisions are not just about means but also 
about ends, and different affected groups will have varying interests and values, resulting in 
divergent views about tradeoffs between competing goals even when the goals themselves are 
not controversial. Whatever decision is made will not be to the liking of some groups, and, 
except in utopian fantasy, not every individual who is affected will be able to directly participate 
in the decision. Thus, political democracy is about value choices, accountability, and 
representation, and like all other forms of politics, it is about power: the ability to do things that 
affect some people in ways they object to. 
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coordinating functions, and for state agencies to yield their functions 
largely to local institutions. We think this is neither realistic nor 
desirable. Local environmental problems have larger implications, 
and solutions will often have both economic and environmental 
spillovers that must be addressed on a larger geographical scale than 
the county. 
In proposing modularity, we do not envision agencies operating 
solely in their idealized traditional form. Nor do we expect agencies, 
as the self-regulation approach would have it, to assume the role of 
cheerleader for private self-regulation. And we are skeptical about 
the possibility that federal and state agency functions can be replaced 
by local deliberative processes. Instead, we imagine federal and state 
agencies with statutory mandates as permanent components of the 
regulatory system, but components that often act only as parts of 
combinations. A combination may be short-term or long-term; it may 
include other agencies at the same level of government or agencies 
from other levels of government. It may include private firms and 
NGOs. Moreover, we imagine agencies using a broad portfolio of 
implementing instruments, including a range of informal agreements 
(e.g., records of decision; memoranda of understanding; interagency 
agreements; annual work plans) in addition to the more familiar and 
formal regulatory instruments, such as rules. What we have in mind, 
above all, is a sense of institutional provisionalism, flexibility, and 
coordination.113 
D. The Building Blocks of Modularity 
For all their limitations, the debates we describe here can be seen 
in a different light: each one, in its own way, seems to be moving in 
the direction of a different approach, one that is more capable of 
accommodating the complexity of environmental problems. For 
example, the recent scholarship on more decentralized resource 
management initiatives, including ecosystem-based governance 
systems and collaborative multistakeholder programs, necessarily 
enlarges the federalism debate by expanding it to include both more 
 
 113. Although the subject is too large to explore in this Article, this transformation in 
environmental governance raises great challenges for a system of review that increasingly 
focuses on “final” agency decisions. There is a risk that courts will either become irrelevant 
(because the flux of agency actions evades the requirements for review) or obstructive (because 
they review specific decisions in isolation without considering the broader modular context). 
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levels of government and a wider group of stakeholders.114 This 
literature focuses in particular on regional and local solutions, and on 
the important role that can be played by key stakeholders, especially 
members of the affected local communities who live near and use the 
resource in question. 
The tools debate has evolved as well. Though it originally took 
the form of a pitched battle over whether assigning “pollution rights” 
is legitimate, fair, and even moral,115 it seems that both sides have 
softened in recent years. To us the right question now is not whether 
to use markets or prescriptive rules, but when and where to use which 
tools, and in what combination to procure a sufficient environmental 
benefit at an acceptable cost. And regardless of the tool chosen, it 
seems increasingly clear that careful attention to design on the front 
end and monitoring on the back end will both be crucial.116 Market 
proponents have, it seems, succeeded in legitimizing their favored 
policy instrument—cap and trade programs are here to stay. But 
proponents of prescriptive regulation have not lost entirely either. 
The traditional standard-setting and permitting process continues to 
be the backbone of environmental regulation. Our modular approach 
builds on recent trends in this debate, in which the task for regulators 
 
 114. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1807 
(2002) (arguing that the election of a regional legislature would be likely to “generate 
negotiations over, and support for, a regional agenda,” including in the context of 
environmental issues); Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 217–18 (identifying the emergence of 
vertical and horizontal coordination across governments in the Chesapeake Bay and other 
initiatives in order to overcome the absence of a preexisting regional authority); id. at 234–35 
(claiming that the legal literature has tended to be dismissive of collaborative ecosystem 
management but admonishing lawyers and legal scholars to “get over it” because “something is 
happening here, something very big, and something quite unconventional by the standards of 
the now familiar past”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of 
Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 555 (2002) (identifying new challenges to environmental 
lawyers presented by the emergence of regional and local collaborative environmental decision 
making); Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Robert W. Adler, New Directions in Western Water Law: 
Conflict or Collaboration?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15, 16 (2000) (exploring 
possible directions for water law in the West based on collaborative decision-making 
opportunities). See generally Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 
ENVTL. L. 973 (1995) (discussing ecosystem-based management in the context of watersheds). 
 115. See Drury, supra note 57, at 269–72 (discussing the system of “polluter pays” arising out 
of Superfund); Michael J. Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
1997, at A23 (arguing that “turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes 
the moral stigma that is properly associated with it”). 
 116. See generally MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LESSONS 
FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., forthcoming 
2005) (reflecting the evolution of the tools debate as described here). 
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is to design the right array of tools for particular problems in specific 
contexts. 
And finally, there are trends in administrative law that point in 
the direction of a more modular conception of the agency, a 
conception in which the agency is not a lone monolith, but is 
embedded in a network of relationships with other agencies—
relationships that must be coordinated, managed, and steered.117 To 
do this, agencies will sometimes act in traditionally authoritative and 
formal ways, and sometimes in less formal and more negotiated ways. 
And all of this will occur under conditions of radical uncertainty, 
which call for a spirit of provisionalism. 
II.  CALFED: A CASE STUDY IN MODULARITY 
A. The CalFed Story 
Before offering a more theoretical discussion of modularity, we 
find it useful to provide an example that illustrates many of its 
features. For this we turn to a process called CalFed, a multiagency 
regional effort to overcome the longstanding conflict over the 
immensely valuable water resources in the Bay-Delta area in 
Northern California.  
1. The Delta.  A few facts will help to convey the value of this 
water source. The Bay-Delta area, where the San Francisco Bay 
meets the two biggest rivers in California, is home to seven hundred 
and fifty different plant and animal species, which thrive in its unique 
blend of fresh and salt water.118 The Delta also provides 40 percent of 
the state’s drinking water supplies and produces seven million acre-
feet of water to irrigate approximately 45 percent of the state’s crops, 
some of the most productive agricultural land in the world.119 In 
 
 117. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344–45 (2004) (explaining how the 
governance model incorporates local initiative and central control). 
 118. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 10, available at 
http://calwater.ca.gov/AboutCalfed/AnnualReport2004/Annual_Report_2004.pdf. 
 119. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 344; Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 4. Our account of 
the CalFed process draws heavily on Nawi & Brandt’s informative article, and on another 
account by one of the key participants, Elizabeth “Betsy” Rieke, who served as Assistant 
Secretary for Water and Science in the Department of Interior (DOI) for two important years 
during the CalFed negotiations and who is universally credited with having shepherded the 
process along. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 341 (arguing, among other things, that the Clean 
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addition, densely populated and dry southern Californian cities 
depend heavily on the water supply pumped from this region. The 
Delta has been called the “hub”120 and the “heart valve”121 of 
California’s complicated water distribution system. From this area, 
two pumping systems, the Central Valley Project (CVP), which is 
federally controlled, and the State Water Project (SWP), which is 
state controlled, deliver water to agricultural and urban communities. 
By the time the CalFed process began in the early nineties, the 
health of the Bay-Delta ecosystem had been declining for years under 
the stress of the area’s dual roles: providing habitat for a variety of 
species, some endangered, and producing a crucial water supply for 
the famously thirsty state.122 Several species of fish, including Chinook 
salmon and steelhead trout, were in decline or endangered; water 
supplies were increasingly unreliable; water quality was below 
drinking water standards; and the Delta levee system had significant 
vulnerabilities to flooding.123 For years, the key warring 
constituencies—environmentalists, urban water users, and 
agricultural water users—had fought to obtain a greater share of the 
resource.124 Despite their collective interest in the health of the 
resource, one or the other stakeholder had managed to block every 
initiative aimed at resolving competing demands in a constructive 
way.125 The conflict came to a head over whether the state would 
comply with federal demands that it adopt water quality standards 
pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA) in order to ensure sufficient 
freshwater for vulnerable fish populations protected under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). The standards would have imposed 
salinity and flow limits on the Delta, which in turn would have 
 
Water Act (CWA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA) can be made more effective even 
without statutory changes). Our analysis also draws heavily on interviews with Patrick Wright, 
the Former Director of the Bay-Delta Authority, and on his unpublished personal notes 
analyzing CalFed, which he was kind enough to share with us. Notes of Patrick Wright 
[hereinafter Wright Notes] (unpublished document, on file with the Duke Law Journal). For 
several helpful conversations, we also thank Mary Nichols, Director of the Institute of the 
Environment at UCLA, who served as Secretary of Resources in Governor Gray Davis’s 
administration during a crucial period in the CalFed process. 
 120. Rieke, supra note 97, at 343. 
 121. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 4. 
 122. Id. at 4–7. 
 123. Id. at 5. 
 124. Rieke, supra note 97, at 342. 
 125. Id. 
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reduced the amount of water that could be diverted for urban and 
agricultural uses.126 
In addition, for years there had been conflict over the amount of 
water diverted from the north to the south of the state. Southern 
farmers and cities proposed building a peripheral canal to divert 
water around the Bay Delta instead of through it, which northerners 
saw as simply an effort to export more water. In 1982 a statewide 
referendum on the proposal was defeated with significant northern 
opposition.127 
2. Regulatory Fracture.  This longstanding conflict was 
exacerbated by a fractured regulatory environment in which nearly 
two dozen federal and state agencies shared regulatory or 
management responsibility for some aspect of the Bay-Delta system. 
And they continue to share these responsibilities. For example, the 
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) sets statewide water 
quality standards, but the standards must be approved by the federal 
EPA pursuant to the CWA.128 The state Department of Water 
Resources (DWR) manages the state water conveyance system (the 
SWP), whereas the USBR has authority over the federal system (the 
CVP). This means that the federal and state government each control 
the water rights for water conveyed through their respective facilities. 
The state also contains a complex water delivery system controlled by 
powerful water districts like the Metropolitan Water District in Los 
Angeles, which purchase and allocate water locally. 
In addition, the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) 
is responsible for administering the state’s endangered species 
 
 126. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 5–6. 
 127. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 346 (“Northeners saw the canal not as an improvement but 
as a means to move ever-increasing amounts of water from north to south, to the detriment of 
both northern economies and the health of the Bay-Delta.”). 
 128. It is at least arguable that the federal government does not possess regulatory authority 
over salinity standards under the CWA, because these water quality standards related to flow 
levels necessary to sustain endangered fish, and not pollutants that are normally regulated by 
the EPA under the CWA. During the pre-CalFed conflict, the EPA sought to exert its authority 
and argued publicly that it was not limited to pollutant-specific parameters, even though 
privately agency officials thought they might lose in court. See id. at 354–55 (noting how agency 
officials “tentatively concluded that the authority to reallocate water supplies from California 
water users to the environment has vested not in EPA but in the State Board”). At the time, the 
federal government sought to use its leverage, both under the CWA and under the listing 
provisions of the ESA, to press California to take the lead in crafting a solution to the Delta 
conflict. Interview with Patrick Wright, Former Director, California Bay-Delta Authority 
[hereinafter Wright Interview] 1–2 (July 12, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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legislation, while the FWS in the Department of Interior (DOI) and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) share responsibility for implementing the federal 
ESA. And finally, COE has some authority over wetlands under the 
Clean Water Act and also implements flood control projects that 
affect the Delta.129 
Before the CalFed process, there was no governmental 
mechanism for coordinating activities across these agencies, or for 
including stakeholders in Delta-related decision making in an ongoing 
way. For the most part, agencies were reactive and defensive, 
blocking the initiatives of their competitor agencies and trying to 
protect their own constituencies.130 The federal-state relationship 
reached a low in the early 1990s when then-Governor Pete Wilson 
refused to allow the State Water Board to set water quality standards 
for the Bay Delta (as required by the Clean Water Act), arguing that 
the federal government was interfering with the state’s prerogative to 
allocate water resources by listing species on a piecemeal basis under 
the ESA. Again, listings would have required pumping reductions at 
both the CVP and the SWP in order to protect the fish, which would 
have limited water diversions for agricultural and residential use. The 
Governor claimed, partly in response to political imperatives,131 that 
federal enforcement of the ESA was wreaking havoc with the state’s 
water supply. As a result, the conflict reached a stalemate.132 
3. The Origins of CalFed.  The first step toward a more 
elaborate multiagency effort to better manage this resource began 
with a federal interagency agreement. In 1993, after two years of 
negotiation, representatives of EPA, NMFS, FWS, and USBR signed 
an “Agreement of Coordination on California Bay/Delta Issues” that 
 
 129. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 9. 
 130. See Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 1. 
Stakeholders were in gridlock for two decades because the agricultural, urban and 
environmental stakeholders could block each other but neither had enough clout to 
get their agenda enacted. The environmentalists could block new dams for twenty 
years but the existing dams were still killing the fish, and there was nothing they could 
do but invoke the Endangered Species Act. 
 131. Rieke describes policy insiders as suggesting that Governor Wilson was bowing to 
pressure from the agricultural sector, whose support he needed for his 1994 reelection 
campaign. Rieke, supra note 97, at 347. 
 132. See id. at 346–48 (stating that it was not until December 15, 1994, that “peace ha[d] 
broken out in California’s long-running water wars”). 
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committed the agencies to an ecosystem-based, and therefore more 
comprehensive, approach to the bundle of issues in the Delta. 
In the abstract, an agreement like this sounds unremarkable. 
However, at the time and in the context, it represented a dramatic 
departure from business as usual.133 Until CalFed, the SWRCB was 
the primary institution for resolving water-related conflicts in the 
state. The Board is a quasi-judicial independent agency that makes 
many of its policy decisions based on evidence submitted by parties.134 
Adjudicatory proceedings before the Board tend to exacerbate 
adversarial relationships among the parties. In this context, there is 
no tradition of parties working together to solve problems, nor is 
there any incentive for them to do so. Following the Agreement, the 
federal agencies—which now called themselves “Club-Fed”—began 
to act collectively, holding joint briefings and press conferences and 
participating together, as a united front, in state level workshops and 
hearings.135 
The Agreement’s most remarkable feature was its coordinated 
approach. The agencies agreed to identify collectively decisions that 
would impact the Bay Delta, to coordinate the timetables of those 
decisions, and to convey clearly the collective impact they would have 
on the system.136 They agreed to cooperate, moreover, on specific 
regulatory initiatives. For the first time, they published an integrated 
set of regulatory proposals in the Federal Register.137 To appreciate 
 
 133. Wright Interview, supra note 128, 1–2. 
 134. See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 112–13 (1986) 
(stating that the Board operates in a quasi-legislative capacity for establishing water quality 
standards and in a quasi-judicial capacity for determining water rights); Norman K. Johnson & 
Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing 
Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 379 (1989) (“The 
California Water Resources Control Board is an independent quasi-judicial body whose 
regulatory authority includes jurisdiction over the State Water Project and all other 
appropriators.”); California Environmental Protection Agency, State Water Resources Control 
Board, Procedures Governing Adjudicative Proceedings before the State Water Resources 
Control Board and California Regional Water Quality Control Boards 1 (Oct. 2, 1998) (“An 
adjudicative proceeding is a hearing to receive evidence for determination of facts pursuant to 
which the [Board] formulates and issues a decision. . . . Rulemaking and information 
proceedings . . . are not adjudicative proceedings and are subject to different procedures.”), 
available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/WRINFO/docs/procedures_govern_adjudicative_ 
proceedings.pdf. 
 135. Rieke, supra note 97, at 361. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin 
River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. 4,664 (Jan. 24, 
1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). 
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the difficulty of doing this, imagine the different time lines and 
political pressures under which agencies normally operate. 
Regulatory priorities are usually affected by a host of conditions, 
including court-imposed deadlines, congressional oversight, and 
political direction from executive branch appointees. These 
influences, together with the different statutory mandates and 
budgetary constraints that shape agency behavior, can lead agencies 
to approach interconnected problems in a rather uncoordinated way. 
Yet in this case, the four agencies committed to work together. Betsy 
Rieke, the assistant secretary of Interior most responsible for the 
negotiations, claims that each of the federal agencies “took 
responsibility for solving the whole problem we jointly faced, not just 
their agency’s portion of the problem.”138 
What difference did this make? Traditionally, the EPA sets 
water quality standards (either on its own or by approving state 
standards), whereas wildlife agencies independently list endangered 
species and designate their critical habitat. The problem with this 
divided approach is that species survival and recovery can depend on 
water quality, including not only pollutants discharged from point 
sources but also salinity and flow criteria. Here, the EPA might never 
have coordinated with FWS had they not been facing the prospect of 
litigation over whether the CWA authorized them to set these salinity 
standards. Given that likelihood, however, the EPA approached FWS 
“with the idea of establishing a set of salinity standards that would 
serve as both the EPA promulgated standards under the CWA, and 
as the critical habitat designation under the ESA.”139 Under the new 
interagency agreement, the four agencies decided, for the first time, 
to issue regulations simultaneously.140 Again, this may seem like a 
small step, but the logistics of doing so are quite significant. 
Moreover, the wildlife agencies were at the time under court-ordered 
deadlines to list species. Delaying the listings required them to take 
both a legal and political risk.141 
 
 138. Rieke, supra note 97, at 360. 
 139. E-mail from Patrick Wright, Former Director of the California Bay-Delta Authority, to 
Jody Freeman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School [hereinafter Wright E-mail] 5 (Oct. 20, 
2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 140. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 1. 
 141. By all accounts the political leadership of Betsy Rieke, an Assistant Secretary of 
Interior, was crucial in convincing the agencies to sacrifice their own short-term interests and 
coordinate efforts. Id. at 1–2. See Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 14 (referring to Rieke as 
“the mother of CalFed”). 
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The next step toward what would ultimately be the larger CalFed 
Program was a 1994 Accord among federal and state agencies and 
crucial stakeholders, reached just before an EPA deadline for 
imposing water quality standards on the state. In 1992, Governor 
Wilson had formed a State Water Policy Council from a collection of 
state agencies with authority over the Delta.142 This Council, 
representing the state, and Club-Fed, representing the united front of 
the four key federal agencies, signed the 1994 framework agreement 
and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that established a plan 
to cooperate for three years on two key issues: establishing new water 
quality standards, coordinating water delivery from the state, and 
federal water projects to ensure sufficient freshwater for the fish.143 
The agreement also institutionalized a long-term planning entity, 
which ultimately became the CalFed Bay-Delta Program. The entity 
was charged with initiating a comprehensive planning process for the 
Bay Delta, to be overseen by state and federal water officials and key 
stakeholders. 
4. CalFed’s Three Phases.  Over the ensuing five years, a dozen 
federal and state agencies, together with stakeholder groups, 
negotiated a comprehensive agreement regarding the conflicts in the 
Bay Delta.144 The process was divided into three stages. During  
Phase I, concluded in 1996, the agencies and stakeholders, helped by 
CalFed staff, defined the issues confronting the Bay; developed initial 
principles; and devised early versions of solutions.145 After public 
comment and agency review, the initial scope of the negotiations 
 
 142. Catherine Hudzik, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Collaboration in Water Resources 
Planning in California: A Case Study of CalFed 34 (2003) (unpublished M. L. Arch. thesis, 
University of California at Berkeley), available at http://www-iurd.ced.berkeley.edu/ 
pub/abstract_ wp200306.htm. 
 143. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 14. The Accord came about because of a number of 
factors: the political leadership of people like Assistant Secretary Rieke; the willingness of 
interest groups, frustrated with gridlock, to try a collaborative approach; looming deadlines for 
ESA listings; and progress negotiating contentious scientific issues related to water quality, 
which laid the basis for further consensus. Id. at 4–5. 
 144. The key agencies on the federal side were the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), FWS, USBR, the COE, and the DOI. On the state side they were: 
DWR, DFG, the SWRCB (State Water Resources Control Board), and the California 
Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA). A number of other federal and state agencies 
played lesser roles. However, eighteen agencies (both cabinet and subcabinet level) did sign the 
MOU in 2000. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROG., Programmatic Record of Decision 1 (Aug. 28, 
2000), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/Archives/GeneralArchive/rod/ROD.pdf. 
 145. Id. at 15. 
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broadened to include a wide range of Delta-related issues, which 
were then grouped into seven categories: ecosystem restoration; 
watershed management; water quality improvements; water transfers; 
water storage; levee system integrity; and water use efficiency 
measures.146 
During Phase II, the CalFed and agency staffs prepared a 
comprehensive programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS), 
as required by both federal and state law.147 The agencies consulted 
with stakeholders through the Bay-Delta Advisory Council (BDAC), 
a body created to provide public input into the CalFed agencies’ 
decision making.148 In addition, stakeholders continued to consult with 
agency officials informally, through numerous meetings around the 
state. The EIS process helped agencies plan the specific actions that 
would be necessary to implement the Record of Decision (ROD)—
the collection of commitments that the agencies would make to 
address the multitude of issues in the Bay Delta. As Phase II ended, 
Gray Davis replaced Pete Wilson as Governor of California. In the 
background of this transition, negotiations continued, but the 
Department of Interior’s curtailment of pumping from the SWP and 
CVP, triggered by court orders, threatened to derail the process. At 
this point, the key players from the state and federal agencies met 
privately for several months to come to agreement on central key 
issues.149 
The result, finally reached in 2000, was the ROD—a single 
coordinated plan for addressing the full complement of water 
management and allocation issues in the Bay Delta. All twenty-three 
state and federal CalFed agencies signed a MOU regarding 
implementation of the ROD in August 2000. Phase III, now 
underway, involves implementing the ROD. 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2000) 
(requiring agencies to issue environmental impact statements); California Environmental 
Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,002 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005) (forbidding public 
agencies from approving projects that do not include means to mitigate environmental effects 
caused by that project). 
 148. The BDAC was formally chartered as an advisory body and is subject to the 
accountability requirements under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92–463, § 3(2)(C), 86 Stat. 770, 770 (1972), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
app. § 3(2)(C)(2000). 
 149. Patrick Wright recounts this history. Patrick Wright, Fixing the Delta: The CalFed Bay-
Delta Program and Water Policy Under the Davis Administration, GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 331, 
337 (2001); Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 15–16. 
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5. The CalFed ROD.  The CalFed ROD adopts an integrated 
approach to simultaneously address all of the issues and interests that 
have an impact on the Delta. This is a dramatic departure from the 
historical pattern, in which parties would simply fight for more of the 
resource, and progress would be made sequentially, if at all.150 The 
commitment to integration and coordination of agency activity is 
expressed not merely in the abstract, but in concrete plans, some of 
which will be described below. Aside from integration and 
coordination, the most important animating principle of the CalFed 
ROD is balanced implementation: in principle, as soon as, or soon 
after, progress is made on one program objective, progress must also 
be made on the others.151 The goal is to ensure that no single priority 
dominates decision making. Needless to say, balanced 
implementation is crucial to maintaining stakeholder support for the 
process. 
For each of the seven categories, the ROD adopts specific 
measures. For example, it commits CalFed agencies to expand storage 
capacity at existing reservoirs and to increase pumping, which 
addresses the needs of agricultural and residential consumers. The 
agencies also agree to restore the Delta ecosystem through increased 
flow and fish passage improvements, which addresses the concerns of 
environmentalists. In a similar effort at balance, the ROD requires 
agencies to invest in treatment technologies to improve water quality 
and also to fund improvements to shore up the integrity of Delta 
levees.152 These examples illustrate the ROD’s comprehensiveness. 
In addition to its substantive commitments, the ROD also creates 
new cooperative institutions to undertake coordinated joint decision 
making. It establishes a process for implementation under which one 
or more federal and one or more state agencies will share 
responsibility for leading implementation of each program element. 
This has prompted internal changes within the participating agencies, 
which have hired program staff to support them in their planning, 
coordination, monitoring, reporting, and public outreach. The MOU 
on implementing the ROD also established a “Policy Group” of 
representatives from all 23 agencies. That group would become the 
ongoing vehicle for discussing priorities, work plans, and budgets to 
ensure that implementation proceeded in a coordinated fashion. 
 
 150. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 17. 
 151. Id. at 22. 
 152. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 18–21. 
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Members were to review agency decisions for consistency with the 
ROD and make specific recommendations back to the agencies. 
Another key principle of the ROD is a commitment to the use of 
independent and credible science as a basis for decision making. 
Among other things, the ROD provides for appointment of a Lead 
Scientist and an Independent Science Board to integrate science into 
all aspects of the Program.153 This approach to science was meant to 
overcome a history of adversarialism among stakeholders, in which 
science was used “more for its combat potential than for its analytical 
qualities.”154 In the early stages of the CalFed process, each side would 
advance the science that supported its position, or simply sit back and 
attack the other side’s science as biased. Even agency scientists had 
come to be viewed as advocates for one position or another. As a 
result, credibility on all sides was extremely weak. According to 
Wright, “to put it bluntly, no one in the environmental community 
has ever trusted the information generated by the water agencies 
(DWR and USBR), and no one in the water community trusts the 
data or conclusions of the fishery agencies.”155 Thus the main function 
of the Independent Science Board would be to develop credible 
sources of information that would inspire confidence among both 
agencies and stakeholders. 
The CalFed ROD also establishes a detailed process for 
soliciting and implementing stakeholder input. As noted above, it 
institutionalizes the BDAC,156 which provides an opportunity for a 
wide variety of stakeholders to participate in the implementation 
process. Participating groups include environmental organizations, 
Native American Tribes, farmers’ associations, and agricultural and 
urban water agencies. Though different stakeholders have exerted 
more or less influence at different times in the CalFed process, 
collectively, they have been a consistent presence.157 At key moments, 
stakeholders have stepped up to break logjams and generate policy 
solutions. In some cases they have even supplied necessary funding.158 
 
 153. Id. at 21. 
 154. Id. at 26. 
 155. E-mail from Patrick Wright to Jody Freeman [hereinafter Wright E-mail] (July 14, 
2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 156. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 157. As Nawi & Brandt put it, “Stakeholders have stood squarely in the middle of both the 
conflict and the resolution.” Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 23. 
 158. For example, to overcome an impasse in the negotiation of the 1994 Accord among the 
four federal agencies, an environmental group compromised on a water quality standard 
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Mary Nichols, the former Secretary of Resources in the Davis 
administration, described the dynamic between BDAC and the 
agencies in these terms: 
At the last meeting of that group, we had presentations from 
members of the advisory committee to the agencies instead of the 
other way around. So it’s no longer the advisory committee 
stakeholders sitting back with their arms folded critiquing what the 
agencies are doing. It’s the advisory committee members who have 
been doing a lot of work between meetings coming to the agencies 
and telling agencies what they think ought to be done. It’s a totally 
different dynamic, very healthy.159 
6. The Environmental Water Account.  There are a number of 
specific examples of stakeholder contributions to policy, but none as 
significant as their role in the development of the Environmental 
Water Account (EWA). At first glance, the EWA is a quantity of 
water set aside specifically to compensate water users when their 
allocation must be reduced to protect endangered species.160 Though 
the concept sounds simple, the EWA is perhaps the most interesting 
policy innovation to come from CalFed. It merits a thorough 
description not only because it represents a new approach to 
managing the Bay-Delta water supply, but because it resulted from an 
unusually collaborative process. 
The EWA is potentially much more than a compensatory water 
account. Its purpose is to maximize both efficiency and flexibility in 
managing the water supply so that, in the end, more gets done with 
less water in response to superior information about where and when 
it is needed most. This requires operational decisions in what is, 
essentially, real time, and it depends on the ability to effectively 
gather and process good data about the likely effects of operational 
changes in water management and delivery.161 Ideally, improved water 
 
proposal, and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California provided $10 million per 
year for three years for ecosystem restoration. Id. 
 159. See id. at 25 (quoting Mary Nichols, former California Secretary of Resources). 
 160. Of course, environmentalists do not believe this is properly viewed as compensation, 
because they do not think the other users were legally entitled to their existing entitlement. The 
question of what ought to be the appropriate baseline entitlement has been a contentious issue 
throughout the CalFed process. 
 161. Alf W. Brandt, An Environmental Water Account: The California Experience, 5 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 426, 427–28 (2002). With the EWA, says Wright: 
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management could allow operators to go beyond what the traditional 
regulatory regime would envision. For example, they might be able to 
do more than merely ensure endangered species “survival,” which is 
the minimum required under the ESA. They could instead provide 
for species recovery, and even improve the aquatic environment for 
other species that are not yet listed.162 
Prior to the development of the EWA, the practice was for the 
wildlife agencies, pursuant to their authority under the ESA, to set 
seasonal limits on the amount of water that could be diverted for 
urban and agricultural uses. These limits were set according to 
biological opinions that determined the amount of water necessary to 
support protected species. The impact on the water supply of such 
limits could be dramatic: if too much water was being pumped out of 
the Delta, the pumps would need to be shut down, which could wreak 
havoc with agricultural and urban water supplies. But shutting the 
pumps down in this way is hardly an ideal approach to supporting the 
fish, a problem the EWA was designed to address. As Brandt 
explains, 
[s]etting seasonal pumping restrictions by biological opinion under 
the ESA generally does not allow for a response to constantly 
changing hydrologic and fishery conditions. Only when project 
operations exceed ESA take limits do the fishery agencies seek 
additional pumping reductions, and, at that point, the reductions are 
often substantial, and are too late to prevent the excess [killing of 
fish]. With an EWA as collateral, the fishery agencies can call for 
early and moderate pumping reductions that minimize both the take 
of listed species and the need for subsequent, substantial pumping 
reductions.163 
Ideally then, water allocation would proceed flexibly in response 
to the changing needs of fisheries and the ecosystem as a whole, 
instead of in response to the specific regulatory requirements issued 
 
You have a block of water waiting and if the fish are coming in March, you spend half 
the assets in March. People are actually tracking the fish as they come down. Before 
CalFed, pumps might be shut down in the middle of growing season with serious and 
sudden repercussions, and not necessarily in response to the real needs of the fishery. 
Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4. Doing this with maximum effectiveness requires 
enormous amounts of data about, for example, “endangered fish in the Delta and upstream 
tributaries, hydrology, and project operations.” Hudzik, supra note 142, at 41. 
 162. Brandt, supra note 161, at 434. 
 163. Id. at 434. 
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by fish and wildlife agencies, as was historically the case.164 To 
accomplish this, the EWA requires close coordination between so-
called “project” or “water” agencies like USBR and DWR, which are 
responsible for acquiring, storing, and delivering water to users, and 
so-called “management” or “fisheries” agencies like FWS and DFG, 
which are responsible for protecting endangered fish. Traditionally, 
these agencies would never be enlisted in allocating water together. 
Yet the potential benefits of pooling their expertise are significant. As 
Nichols puts it, 
By getting the right people from the federal and state water agencies 
and fisheries agencies together in one room, CalFed was able to get 
them to talk to each other about what each of them really needs. 
The great breakthrough was when they realized that they didn’t all 
need the same amount of water all the time. By taking water from 
the reservoirs only when it’s actually needed to irrigate crops, and 
leaving water in the rivers when the fish are actually there, it turns 
out that the same total volume of water can be allocated based on 
real time information, and each drop can be used much more 
efficiently. The engineers and biologists started talking about the 
time value of water. They came up with this new approach because 
people who don’t normally interact got together to try to solve a 
problem. You can’t do this by setting a standard. The conventional 
regulatory process can’t do this.165 
The success of the EWA depends on two things: the 
development of water assets (i.e., “growing” the water supply by 
acquiring water from existing water holders or from more efficient 
use of water projects) and the management of that supply 
simultaneously for environmental, agricultural, and urban needs. The 
conflicting demands on the Bay-Delta water supply had historically 
made doing this virtually impossible. 
The events that led to the EWA merit recounting because they 
perfectly illustrate the collaborative and adaptive learning process—
and the institutional innovation to which it can lead—that we think of 
as modular.166 When the federal-state Accord was signed in 1994, it 
 
 164. Id. at 433. 
 165. E-mail from Mary Nichols, Secretary of California Resources Agency, to Jody Freeman 
(July 13, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). In this setting, “time value” refers to the 
time-bound nature of water uses, rather than to economic discounting. 
 166. Our account relies heavily on the detailed account of the Ops Group and the EWA by 
Catherine Hudzik. Hudzik, supra note 142, at 37–54. 
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created the CalFed Operations Coordination Group (Ops Group), 
consisting of the project agencies responsible for managing pumping 
from the SWP and CVP and the management agencies responsible 
for protecting fish and wildlife. The Ops Group was charged with 
implementing the new water quality standards, which meant 
coordinating water operations to ensure protection of the fish. 
Although these agencies had already begun to engage in informal 
consultation, the creation of the Ops Group formalized their 
relationship. They began to meet monthly, to use the same 
information, and to make real-time operational decisions—for both 
water supply and environmental protection—together.167 
The Ops Group consisted of high-level agency staff and some 
key stakeholders from environmental groups and local Water 
Districts.168 It was assisted by two subgroups that fed it information 
and data. One was the Data Assessment Team, which consisted of 
agency staff from the management and operational agencies, plus 
stakeholder representatives. The Team met weekly, analyzed 
technical data and made recommendations to the Ops Group about 
modifying project operations. The second was the so-called “No 
Name” Group, which met on an as-needed basis. This group served as 
an informal conduit for stakeholder input to the agencies and for 
agencies to in turn funnel information to stakeholders.169 According to 
Connick and Professor Innes, “The idea was that information on 
fisheries, water quality and flows could be evaluated quickly using the 
distributed intelligence of the diverse agency and stakeholder 
members.”170 
The Ops Group encountered some obstacles, in part because of 
ongoing litigation and ESA listings that put limitations on what it 
 
 167. Id. at 40. 
 168. The environmental stakeholders included the Bay Institute, Environmental Defense, 
and the Natural Heritage Institute. The Metropolitan Water District was the key water user 
involved. Id. at 38. 
 169. Id. at 41. 
 170. Sarah Connick & Judith E. Innes, Outcomes of Collaborative Water Policy Making: 
Applying Complexity Thinking to Evaluation, 46 J. ENVTL. PLANNING & MGMT. 177, 189 (2003). 
Using up-to-the-minute monitoring data, these groups managed the situation on a 
day-to-day basis. The resource managers made key decisions at the lowest levels 
possible, elevated unresolved issues quickly and kept all the agencies and 
stakeholders informed. The decision making was quick and effective, and the process 
provided a much more nuanced response than the agencies could have provided 
working independently with inflexible guidelines. 
Id. at 190. 
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could do operationally. And not all of the potentially relevant 
stakeholders participated regularly. Some lacked the expertise to do 
so, and others did not buy into the process. By the late nineties the 
group seemed to be at an impasse over the essential conflict: how to 
adequately protect the fish without depleting the water supply for 
other uses. And this was a time of crisis. The Delta pumps were shut 
down because of ESA listings right in the middle of growing season, 
which caused a political firestorm of statewide headlines and 
legislative hearings.171 It was in this context that the EWA emerged. 
The idea was initially envisioned at a high-level meeting of key 
CalFed players by David Fullerton of the Metropolitan Water 
District. What happened next merits quoting at length: 
In this room were all the chiefs of all the water agencies and the 
fisheries agencies. Then he [Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of Interior 
under the Clinton Administration] looked at Mike Spear, the 
regional head of the Fish and Wildlife Service, because the biggest 
issue was Delta Smelt at the time, and Tim Quinn [of the 
Metropolitan Water District], the biggest gun in the water supply 
side, and he said, “Do you two guys represent the rest of these 
guys?” They looked around and said yeah . . . and he said, “Okay, 
I’ll tell you what I’m gonna do.” He looked at Mike and Tim and 
said, “There’s a room at the side over there, and you two guys are 
gonna go in there. I’m gonna give you 20 minutes, and you’re gonna 
come out of there and tell us whether we have an impasse and we 
ought to quit, or you’ve got a way to solve this and you think we’ve 
got a process, a way to solve it. You can take anybody in there you 
want to, but you’re going to come out and tell us whether we quit 
now and just fight.” . . . One of them’s got the Endangered Species 
Act on their side, the other side’s got 2,500,000 people drinking—
and they did, they went off.172 
What Quinn and Spear proposed, after being sent off to confer by 
Secretary Babbitt, was the EWA. The Ops Group and its subgroups 
then developed the concept in over a year of meetings. 
The EWA is not the only example of CalFed’s institutional 
innovation. The program has spawned what might be called 
“submodular” approaches as implementation of the ROD has 
proceeded. One good example is the South Delta Fish Facilities 
Forum (SDFFF), which is comprised of representatives from the 
 
 171. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 2–3. 
 172. Hudzik, supra note 142, at 45. 
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water and fishery agencies, as well as nonagency stakeholders. The 
SDFFF formed to develop a policy alternative to the extremely 
expensive fish screening and testing facilities that had been proposed 
by the fisheries agencies as part of the ROD. (The agencies had 
proposed to spend $180 million on a test facility to assess the 
effectiveness of screening technology. The screens needed to be in 
place before more water could be pumped out of the Delta because 
the increased pumping threatened fish populations.) The agencies 
initially took offense at the idea that stakeholders could question 
their judgments. But the stakeholders proposed a detailed plan to 
study, test, and evaluate alternative technologies and practices that 
would provide adequate fish protection at a lower cost. Ultimately, 
the agencies agreed to participate.173 
At times, stakeholders have all but supplanted the agencies. For 
example, the ROD called for developing a water quality plan, but 
none of the responsible agencies, including the EPA, the SWRCB 
and the state Department of Health Services (DHS), was eager to 
take a leadership role. Instead, they remained preoccupied with their 
narrow statutory mandates, which focus on only a small part of the 
larger water quality problem. For example, the SWRCB’s priority is 
source control of water pollution. The Board establishes water quality 
standards, oversees point source regulation and creates programs to 
control nonpoint source runoff. By contrast, DHS and the EPA set 
treatment standards for the water coming from taps. Each of these 
agencies alone can normally address only part of the larger water 
quality problem, but the CalFed process provided an opportunity to 
adopt a more integrated comprehensive approach. According to 
Wright, “no one had assumed responsibility, or was even thinking 
about, how to protect water quality from source to tap in an estuarine 
system, or considered the trade-offs involved.”174 
The Drinking Water Subcommittee of the BDPAC emerged to 
fill this void. It proposed an innovative strategy to set ambient water 
quality targets as either traditional concentration limits or in a 
manner that would achieve an “equivalent level of public health 
[ELPH] protection.”175 The strategy calls for improving water quality 
 
 173. Wright E-mail, supra note 155, at 2; see South Delta Fish Facilities Forum Charge and 
Background Document (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (explaining SDFFF’s mission in 
detail). 
 174. Wright E-mail, supra note 155, at 3. 
 175. Id. 
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in the tributary waters entering the Delta by adopting water 
management measures that will reduce seawater intrusion, improving 
local and regional infrastructure and treatment technology, and 
establishing regional water quality exchanges—all of which is 
designed to ensure improved water quality at the tap.176 This 
approach, which allows managers to prioritize among the different 
measures and make water quality improvements in the most cost-
effective way, was adopted into the ROD. As with the EWA, 
stakeholders were crucial to developing a solution when the 
responsible agencies could or would not do so. Though the agencies 
participated, the subcommittee took the lead.177 
It is difficult to convey the novelty and ambition of the CalFed 
ROD with such a short summary and so few examples. The document 
is remarkable not only for being so broad in scope but for 
approaching implementation in such an integrated fashion.178 This 
may be the ROD’s greatest innovation—transforming how decisions 
regarding the Delta are to be made in the future. The adopted 
approach built on what the four federal agencies (Club-Fed) had 
begun in their 1993 Accord: agencies that were accustomed to acting 
independently, establishing their own priorities, and working on their 
own timelines were now formally committed to jointly coordinating 
 
 176. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, WATER QUALITY PROGRAM MULTI-YEAR PROGRAM 
PLAN (YEARS 6–9) 5–6 (July 2005), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/ProgramPlans_2006/ 
Water_Quality_ Final_Draft.pdf. 
 177.  
So for salts, for example, the most cost effective approach might be to relocate 
agricultural drains and the intakes of the urban agencies that draw supplies from the 
Delta. But for selenium, it might be to emphasize agricultural drainage management. 
The key is to look at each option from source to tap. But because no individual 
agency has the mandate to take this more global approach, stakeholders are 
providing the leadership and direction through the work of the subcommittee. 
E-mail from Patrick Wright to Jody Freeman (May 31, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 178. There is evidence of such joint activity both within the substantive plan and in the many 
joint documents incorporated into the ROD. These included 
Biological Opinions issued contemporaneously by NMFS and FWS pursuant to 
Section 7 of the ESA. As a joint federal-state document, it incorporates findings and a 
certification under the California Environmental Quality Act, as well as the approval 
by the CDFG [California Department of Fish and Game] of CalFed’s Multiple 
Species Conservation Program. The ROD also includes a programmatic consistency 
determination under the Coastal Zone Management Act; agreements addressing 
sections 401 and 404 of the Clean Water Act; operation of the Environmental Water 
Account, and overall Program implementation; and a conservation agreement 
regarding the Multiple Species Conservation Strategy. 
Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 21. 
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their regulatory, permitting, planning, and funding decisions. The 
explicit purpose of this coordination is to enable these agencies to 
achieve not only their own narrow statutory mandates but to 
accomplish comprehensive projectwide goals that none could achieve 
on their own. 
7. Institutional Innovation.  CalFed also embodies innovation in 
institutional form. It began as a loose network of agencies and 
stakeholders and evolved into a comprehensive and coordinated 
multiagency effort with commitments formalized in documents like 
the ROD and the MOU. The ROD anticipated that these 
commitments would be implemented through a combination of 
traditional and nontraditional regulatory strategies by the individual 
agencies using their preexisting authority, with input from 
stakeholders. 
As mentioned, the participants initially created the CalFed 
Policy Group to assist with implementation. It was co-chaired by the 
DOI Assistant Secretary for Water and Science and the California 
Resources Agency Secretary, and it included the heads of the CalFed 
agencies. As the process developed, however, proposals began to 
emerge suggesting the creation of a new regional or joint state-federal 
governance structure. This occurred in response to a general sense 
that implementing the ROD would require a new institutional 
arrangement. 
Settling on the precise governance structure, however, was 
contentious.179 At this point, many stakeholders favored a new 
government agency, created by legislation, in which they would be 
entitled to play an active role. The agencies themselves did not want 
their authority usurped, but each generally acknowledged the need 
for a coordinating entity that would maintain a commitment to the 
“core” CalFed values—interagency coordination, balanced 
implementation, and independent science. This was especially 
necessary to prevent individual agencies from reneging on their 
commitments. Some stakeholders had hoped to create a new entity 
with cross-cutting authority precisely because they feared that 
agencies would resist coordination. Other stakeholders with strong 
working relationships with particular agencies (e.g., water contractors 
and DWR) feared that a new entity would undermine the power of 
 
 179. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 1–3. 
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“their” agency (indeed, their advocate) in the CalFed process. And 
lawyers for both state and federal agencies resisted creating a truly 
new joint federal-state agency because of concerns about the 
constitutionality and legality of federal and state entities having a say 
in each other’s activities. This, of course, demonstrates how existing 
limitations can constrain the options for institutional development. 
And yet, these constraints did not foreclose every creative 
option. The agencies and stakeholders agreed to create the Bay-Delta 
Authority (BDA), which was charged with playing a coordinating and 
supervisory role over all of the CalFed agencies. The BDA would not 
intrude on the “turf” of any of the agencies, impinge on their budgets, 
or usurp their regulatory power. Structuring the BDA in this way 
would be a risk. Without regulatory power, it could not force action 
but instead would need to persuade the agencies to take its advice. It 
would have to manage a variety of stakeholders and agencies in a 
highly contentious and politicized environment, without its own 
constituency of support; if it got into political trouble, who would 
come to its defense? And handling so many different players without 
losing credibility would be challenging. Perhaps developing good 
relationships with some stakeholders or agencies might undermine 
the BDA’s influence with others. Perhaps its rather informal and 
experimental mission would make it appear weak or ineffectual. 
Perhaps it would be seen by some as a useless bureaucratic overlay. 
Its two primary tasks—to supervise and coordinate—could 
conceivably come into conflict. 
Yet the BDA structure had some obvious benefits. First, and 
importantly, it was a pragmatic option simply because of its small 
institutional footprint. No agency had to yield its budgetary authority 
or shrink its regulatory power. Second, it was seen as a priority to 
create a coordinating entity in an environment characterized by an 
almost total lack of coordination. The BDA might accomplish a great 
deal simply by being an honest broker, a source of information, and a 
procurer of science. It could educate agencies about each other’s 
activities, remind them of their commitments, prod them to act or 
explain their inaction, and provide a forum to connect agencies to 
stakeholders to whom those agencies might otherwise not be 
favorably disposed. Moreover, the BDA could help to generate and 
disseminate credible and relevant scientific data that, because of its 
independence, would be difficult for the agencies to ignore. Perhaps 
most importantly, the BDA would uniquely take a projectwide 
perspective. It would have its own independent staff, which would 
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come to develop its own culture. Unlike the agencies, the BDA would 
be unburdened by a historical constituency or client. As a result, it 
would be free to represent CalFed and its programmatic goals. 
In 2002, California passed legislation formally establishing the 
California BDA as a state entity under the California Resources 
Agency and institutionalizing its role in CalFed.180 In its current form, 
the BDA includes twenty-four members: six representatives of state 
agencies; six (nonvoting) representatives from federal agencies;181 five 
public members from different regions of the state; two legislative 
appointees; and a representative from the public advisory committee 
(which had been renamed the Bay-Delta Public Advisory Council 
and formally chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act).182 There are also four nonvoting state members: the Chair and 
Vice Chair of the appropriate legislative committees in both the 
Assembly and the Senate. The BDA appointments are high level. On 
the federal side, they include the Secretary of the Interior; on the 
state side, the Secretary of Resources. The Authority has approval 
power over Annual Workplans and activities of the agencies, and it 
works with the Governor’s Office of Finance to coordinate agency 
spending—an indirect but effective way to influence the traditional 
budgetary independence of the agencies.183 The Authority’s official 
role is to oversee the dozen or more state and federal agencies that 
will implement the ROD by helping to coordinate and integrate their 
activities. It has been charged with providing for balanced 
implementation, tracking and assessing Program progress, and, by 
 
 180. California Bay-Delta Authority Act, CAL. WATER CODE, Div. 26.4, §§ 79,400–79,476 
(West 2004). On January 1, 2003, the Authority assumed responsibility for overseeing 
implementation of the Bay-Delta program. In addition, the Authority includes four ex-officio 
members, two each from the Senate and the House. The Bay-Delta Act calls for the Authority 
to sunset on January 1, 2006, unless federal legislation has been enacted authorizing the 
participation of federal agencies in the Authority (who now cannot formally participate). 
 181. Recently, Congress passed legislation formally authorizing the participation of the 
federal agencies on the Authority. Water Supply, Reliability, & Environmental Improvement 
Act, Pub. L. No. 108–361, 118 Stat. 1681 (2004). 
 182. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92–463, § 3(2)(C), 86 Stat. 770, 770 
(1972), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C) (2000). The Public Advisory Committee is treated as 
a state advisory committee as well. 
 183. See Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 7 (discussing the important role of the 
Department of Finance in maintaining balance in spending). Under the new federal authorizing 
legislation, OMB could play a similar role. Water Supply, Reliability & Environmental 
Improvement Act § 106. 
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directing the independent science board to review all program 
elements, ensuring that agencies use credible science.184 
Remarkably, until this formal institutionalization of the BDA, 
none of the CalFed activities had been authorized by legislation. 
CalFed had evolved as “essentially a creature of inter-agency 
agreements and budget allocations, grounded in its unique ability to 
perform an essential role in addressing the Bay-Delta.”185 Now, 
however, it would become “official.” 
8. How to Account for CalFed.  What, in the end, explains 
CalFed’s emergence? Rieke’s analysis of the 1994 Agreement, which 
first institutionalized the CalFed Program, suggests two key factors: a 
favorable stakeholder environment in which parties not only wanted 
to reach agreement, but had the expertise, resources, and 
relationships necessary to contribute to it; and a federal strategy 
designed to leverage the state into developing a water quality plan. 
Clearly, without the prospect of mutual gains, the stakeholders would 
not have come to agreement. The ESA and CWA were critical in this 
regard because their requirements helped to create a crisislike 
situation in which it became clearer than ever that a long term plan 
was necessary. By the midnineties, it was apparent to every 
stakeholder that, although they could keep blocking one another, 
without a more collaborative process they would never really advance 
their long-term interests.186 The system was clearly broken, and there 
were feelings of exasperation on all sides. This created an opportunity 
for something new. 
Negotiations were helped along, as Rieke says, by stakeholders 
that brought both resources and expertise to the table. Indeed, a few 
local water agencies were as knowledgeable and powerful, in some 
 
 184. Authority members are assisted by a fulltime staff, which is headed by a Director. Nawi 
& Brandt, supra note 39, at 7. 
 185. Id. at 28. The BDPAC consists of nine subcommittees on topics ranging from Delta 
Levees and Habitat to Environmental Justice. Members are drawn from a wide variety of 
stakeholder groups including environmental organizations, water districts, Indian tribes, farm 
groups, and fisherman’s associations. See CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 51–52 
(explaining the role of the BDPAC). 
 186. For example, the ESA is a powerful tool for environmentalists because “listed” species 
trigger a variety of protections including reductions in pumping, see, e.g., Endangered Species 
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (requiring agency consultation to ensure that agencies’ actions are 
not likely to jeopardize listed species), but the statute is ultimately too narrow to address the 
larger water management issues presented by the Delta. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536(a)(4). 
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respects, as state and federal entities.187 In addition, California’s 
business community used its clout and knowledge of water issues to 
help keep the process moving. And environmental groups had 
sufficient legal and technical resources to “get to the table, remain at 
the table, and bring independent proposals to the discussions,” which 
is not always the case in conflicts like this.188 
It is important to remember that it took time for these 
historically adversarial relationships to evolve. The CalFed Program 
benefited from years of informal discussions among key stakeholders, 
which helped to inch them forward and position them for reaching a 
formal agreement. By the time they negotiated the 1994 Accord 
establishing the Bay-Delta Program, these groups were building on 
earlier discussions dating to the eighties.189 Although these earlier 
discussions had not produced a plan for the Delta, they had helped 
stakeholders to understand better their mutual interests and identify 
some initial principles for addressing management of the Delta. These 
earlier discussions provided the “foundation of technical information, 
alternatives and relationships” for ultimate agreement.190 As things 
progressed, stakeholders became more willing to break old alliances 
and form new ones.191 For example, urban and rural water users (not 
usually allies) formed a coalition, in part to balance the pressure from 
environmental groups.192 
 
 187. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 351 (describing the Metropolitan Water District in 
Southern California, one of the state’s biggest wholesalers of water, as having an annual 
operating budget nearly as large as the federal Bureau of Reclamation’s entire budget for the 
American West). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 11. These discussions came to be known as the 
“Three Way Process.” They began after the Peripheral Canal referendum was defeated by 
voters and after the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the state’s water quality standards. 
The discussions first began between urban and agricultural users. Urban users also opened 
discussions with environmentalists. Id. 
 190. Rieke, supra note 97, at 352. 
 191. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 11 (recounting how local agencies like the 
Metropolitan Water District began to work closely with other urban areas like San Francisco, 
weakening their ties to agricultural users who also received their water through the state 
pumping system that diverted it from the north). 
 192. Moreover, many stakeholders took risks. For example, the environmental community 
yielded on some aspects of water quality standards at a crucial moment. A representative from 
the agricultural alliance departed from his constituency’s traditional opposition to water quality 
standards and persuaded irrigation districts to work together with an urban coalition. Rieke, 
supra note 97, at 351. 
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In addition, by 1993, federal agencies had themselves begun to 
cooperate on Bay-Delta issues, which laid the groundwork for later 
cooperation between the federal and state governments the next year. 
During this period, the federal government leveraged its legal 
authority under the CWA and the ESA to force the state to take 
primary responsibility for devising a plan. Without those legal levers, 
the Wilson administration may never have set water quality 
standards, which had become the crucial sticking point. 
Along with the strong sense that the system was broken, the 
promise of increased funding was crucial to brokering the 1994 
Agreement. As Nichols put it, 
[Secretary] Babbitt was able to get the Wilson Administration and 
the ag[ricultural] and urban water agencies to stay at the table by 
insisting, contrary to all expectations, that the [Clinton] 
Administration was willing to request huge funds in new California 
water storage projects, even including dams, if everybody could 
agree on a whole package.193 
This was pivotal because there had been no new money for USBR or 
COE projects in the West for many years. 
The prospect of funding was perhaps even more important to the 
development of the ROD six years later. During this time, 
stakeholders cooperated to support passage of two water-related 
bond measures that together raised $6 billion for water and water-
related open space projects in the state, of which CalFed was 
allocated a substantial share.194 The ROD was adopted at a time when 
both the state and federal budget surpluses were at record levels, 
which was critical to generating support for the program. A final 
 
 193. E-mail from Mary Nichols, former California Secretary of Resources (Oct. 10, 2004) 
(on file with Duke Law Journal). Nichols recounts that “Congress simply hadn’t had the money 
to throw around and environmentalists had joined with Eastern and Midwestern states to define 
all western water projects as bad pork.” Id. 
 194. CalFed supporters were instrumental in passing Propositions 50, 204 and 13, which 
produced respectively $4 billion, $1 billion and $1.97 billion, for a total of $6.97 billion. Nichols 
describes the bond effort this way: 
The Governor wanted to rebuild California’s water infrastructure and the only way to 
get something on the ballot the first year he was in office was to work with The 
Nature Conservancy, the Southern California urban interests, and more enlightened 
water buffalos, so they crafted a bond measure that basically requires a [CalFed]-type 
approach to funding projects—multi-purpose, “green” water projects rise to the top 
and get funded quickly, everything else gets studied and has to meet a “beneficiary 
pays” test. . . . Remember, in California the saying is water runs uphill to money. 
 Id. 
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ingredient for success, which cannot be overstated, is leadership. By 
all accounts, Rieke and her team at Interior, and a variety of 
important local players like Tim Quinn at the MWD, were crucial to 
maintaining momentum in the face of repeated setbacks. As the 
Directors of the Bay-Delta Authority for the last decade, Lester 
Snow and Patrick Wright played key roles in maintaining that 
momentum.195 Thus, though it may be hard to reproduce, CalFed’s 
success is not accidental. It is the product of a potent combination: the 
favorable stakeholder environment and federal hammer identified by 
Rieke, along with a significant amount of money and very talented 
leadership. 
B. Evaluating CalFed 
1. A Favorable View.  Our portrayal of CalFed suggests that it 
has already achieved a unique level of both procedural and 
substantive innovation simply by coming into being. The process by 
which it emerged illustrates how interagency coordination coupled 
with stakeholder participation (lubricated by funding, of course) can 
lead to more comprehensive planning and reshape a zero-sum 
struggle into a more multifaceted problem-focused exercise. And it 
provides a useful example of how informal agreements among actors 
with preexisting regulatory authority, together with an overlay of new 
governance structures, can help to overcome some of the limits 
inherent in a relatively rigid statutory and bureaucratic regime. 
Without leaving a large institutional footprint, these new governance 
structures can potentially have a meaningful long-term impact by 
shepherding agencies that have been historically entrenched in their 
independence toward greater coordination and collaboration. Finally, 
CalFed demonstrates how new policy ideas—like the EWA, the 
SDFFF, and the water quality strategy—can emerge from 
information-rich, joint problem-solving efforts in which parties that 
are normally opposed to each other channel their conflict 
constructively toward generating solutions and alternatives to an 
unsustainable status quo. 
The BDA, while not perfect, has clearly enjoyed some success in 
coordinating the activities of the CalFed agencies. In a sense, the 
 
 195. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it would be useful to investigate whether the 
presence of this strong leadership was sheer coincidence, or whether it was produced by 
processes that could be replicated elsewhere. 
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Authority operates like a building contractor: it determines which 
projects—ecosystem restoration water supply or levee 
reinforcement?—must go first, and tries to link schedules to keep 
progress on track. The Authority crucially provides a forum in which 
implementing agencies can meet. Indeed, deputy directors from the 
agencies meet every other week to discuss their upcoming regulatory 
agenda and to ensure their efforts are in synch. Although this process 
does not guarantee perfect coordination, it would be impossible to 
achieve any coordination at all in its absence. And this kind of forum 
simply did not exist before CalFed.196 
CalFed has also succeeded in delivering concrete benefits to 
every constituency it serves. The Program has funded groundwater, 
recycling, and water use efficiency projects that have produced, in just 
a few years, the water supply benefits of two or three good-sized 
dams at a fraction of the cost. And it has done so, most significantly, 
without any opposition.197 CalFed’s ecosystem restoration efforts can 
be fairly credited with at least some contribution to helping restore 
salmon runs, which are now healthier. The Program has spent over 
half a billion dollars on ecosystem restoration, making it arguably the 
most ambitious such project in the world and laying the foundation 
for future improvements. Though they may take many years to 
materialize, the future health of the Delta requires investment now.198 
Over $3 billion have been spent implementing the range of goals in 
the ROD: ecosystem restoration, water supply, and water quality 
projects. Perhaps most importantly, since the inception of CalFed, 
there have been no pump shutdowns. This stability has been 
particularly important to southern California, which draws about 40 
percent of its supplies from the Delta and which, until the winter of 
2005, had been experiencing one of the worst droughts of the century. 
The benefit of this stability to the state in terms of averted crop 
 
 196. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 5. 
 197. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 8. 
 198. Id. See also Tom Dunne, Integrating Creativity, Science, and Responsibility, SCIENCE IN 
ACTION: NEWS FROM THE CALFED BAY-DELTA SCIENCE PROGRAM, June 2003, at 22, 
available at http://www.science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/SIA_cv_rivers_060103.pdf. Professor Dunne 
observes that: 
CalFed is the most creative, most diverse, most likely to be productive, large-scale 
river restoration program anywhere in the world . . . . This is a giant research 
experiment, all the way from the policymaker down to the person dumping gravel 
into the river. Nobody’s ever done “restoration” on this scale before. . . . [I]t is hard, 
unprecedented, and is going to require patience. 
Id. 
101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC 12/12/2005  3:09 PM 
862 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:795 
damage and other lost revenue, and a healthy bond rating, is 
measurable in the hundreds of millions of dollars. While no 
constituency has received all of its demands, the benefits to each one 
have been substantial. It seems unthinkable, for example, that 
ecosystem restoration could have occurred on the scale it has without 
this collaborative multi-stakeholder approach—why would water 
contractors, who have been historically resistant to every effort to list 
species under the ESA, ever have agreed to support it? 
Implementing the CalFed ROD in a balanced manner has been, 
without question, a constant challenge. At different moments, one 
stakeholder group or another has felt that its interests were getting 
insufficient attention, as when environmentalists object that pumping 
out of the Delta is increasing per commitments in the ROD but 
without sufficient progress on water quality standards or ecosystem 
restoration.199 Overcoming such conflicts requires updated agreements 
and timetables and a recommitment to the promised balanced 
implementation. To address this, in 2004 the Authority adopted a 
Delta Improvements Package (DIP) that includes a plan for 
increasing water exports while simultaneously making progress on 
ecosystem and water quality efforts. The DIP serves two purposes: 
further clarifying what specific measures are necessary to fulfill the 
ROD’s goals in the Delta and formally recommitting participants to 
those goals as time passes.200 And stakeholders generated many of the 
proposals in the package, just as they helped to develop the EWA.201 
The DIP is notable as well because it resulted in more 
coordinated activity between the agencies. In the absence of the DIP, 
the resource agencies (DWR and USBR) would be seeking to 
increase pumping from the Delta to satisfy their contractors, which 
might adversely affect both ecosystem restoration and water quality. 
 
 199. Interview with Christopher Stevens, Counsel for Bay-Delta Authority (June 30, 2004) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 200. Wright points out that it is extremely useful when dealing with reluctant agencies to be 
able to point to a signed document and say, “You agreed to do this.” Wright Notes, supra note 
119. 
 201. Wright E-mail, supra note 155, at 1–2. 
[The DIP] is the best example of . . . how the ROD’s general goals and commitments 
get translated into specific action plans that require stakeholder buy-in, how the 
stakeholders themselves developed many of its key elements, and how the Program 
transformed what was heavily criticized as an insider deal among just a couple of 
agencies and stakeholder groups into a public transparent process. This started as a 
stakeholder-driven process, but was transformed into an Authority and agency-driven 
process. 
Id. 
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The key challenge facing the BDA was to ensure that greater 
pumping would not undermine the program’s other goals. Without 
the CalFed process, DWR and USBR would have proceeded on their 
own, by producing lengthy environmental impact statements to 
explain and defend the effects of more pumping.202 Then they would 
have negotiated mitigation with the fish and wildlife agencies.203 The 
two agencies would have proceeded in a linear and isolated way, 
regardless of what other agencies were planning to do, even if those 
agencies were preparing to take steps in the same area at the same 
time, to address matters like ecosystem health. Because of the CalFed 
process and the DIP specifically, these agencies instead adopted an 
integrated approach to planning that established explicit linkages 
between issues that had to be addressed on a mutually agreeable 
timeline. So, for example, DWR and USBR agreed not to increase 
pumping until a plan was put in place by the Regional Water Quality 
Control Board to ensure that all Delta water quality standards would 
be met.204 Sequencing like this would simply not have happened prior 
to CalFed. 
The BDA developed Annual Program Plans as another 
mechanism for giving additional substance to the ROD. These Plans 
contain the accomplishments, schedules, priorities, and projected 
expenditures for every element of the program.205 They update the 
schedules that were set out in the ROD, explain which projects are 
delayed and why, and account for money spent or not spent. They 
serve as a feedback mechanism for both the BDA and the agencies, 
one that forces the agencies to revisit the principle of balanced 
implementation at regular intervals. The Program plans also help to 
make the CalFed process more transparent because they are 
submitted to public advisory subcommittees for review. This review 
provides an opportunity for regular stakeholder input, which in turn 
 
 202. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21100(a) (“All lead agencies shall prepare, or cause to 
be prepared by contract, and certify the completion of, an environmental impact report on any 
project which they propose to carry out or approve that may have a significant effect on the 
environment.”). 
 203. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 7. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Some of the workplans are developed by the implementing agencies themselves, some 
are written by Authority staff, and others are stakeholder driven. “Not surprisingly,” says 
Wright, “the agency driven plans tend to be those related to traditional agency programs, 
whereas the stakeholder-driven plans tend to be those that are more innovative and cross-
cutting, or where there is no clear lead agency (for example, water quality).” Wright E-mail, 
supra note 155, at 3. 
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generates important feedback that the Authority appointees can then 
use to pressure reluctant agencies to move forward. The annual 
planning process really functions as an accountability mechanism 
because it requires the implementing agencies to provide 
explanations for their actions or failures to act.206 
The ROD’s commitment to balanced implementation has also 
led to an entirely different approach to grant funding by the CalFed 
agencies. Traditionally, each agency funded the projects it favored, 
consistent with its (narrow) statutory agenda. For example, in the 
context of managing the same ecosystem, the state fish and wildlife 
agencies and each of the federal fish and wildlife agencies would 
follow their own established processes, separately setting priorities 
and distributing money. Stakeholders aggressively lobbied agency 
officials. Agencies independently ranked proposals and made funding 
decisions without interagency consultation.  
By contrast, under several CalFed Program elements, agencies 
have now consolidated their grant funding and coordinated 
expenditures of federal and state money in a single process. For 
example, in the ecosystem restoration program, nonprofits, 
universities, local watershed groups, and all other applicants no 
longer send their applications to an individual agency staffer. Instead, 
grant-seekers participate in a year-long process that is increasingly 
Internet-based, highly competitive, transparent, and very selective.207 
In lieu of multiple requests for proposals (RFP), the agencies solicit 
only one. And independent science panels now review the 
applications, which adds rigor to the process.208 This new approach to 
funding improves the quality of applications and helps eliminate pork 
barrel funding.209 Like all aspects of the Program, interagency 
coordination over funding is an ongoing challenge. Some agency 
employees resist it because it reduces their independence and control. 
And legislatures sometimes earmark pots of money to reduce agency 
 
 206. In 2004, several of the plans were not recommended for approval by the BDPAC 
subcommittees, which meant that they went back to the staff for revision. According to Wright, 
this is another example of how stakeholders strongly influence program implementation. Id. 
 207. According to Wright, only 10 percent of a half billion dollars worth of proposals were 
originally funded. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 5. 
 208. For example, the science panels will not approve funding proposals that lack detailed 
conceptual models demonstrating linkages to program objectives and commitments to 
monitoring and assessment. Id. 
 209. Interview with Patrick Wright, Former Director, California Bay-Delta Authority 
[hereinafter Wright Interview] 3 (Feb. 24, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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discretion. Nevertheless, CalFed can credibly claim to have 
transformed the allocation of funding for water resources grants in 
the state. 
The Science Program also appears to be a largely successful 
response to a previously adversarial approach to science, one that 
appeared to entrench positions rather than inform decision making.210 
CalFed seems to be the only initiative of its kind in the nation with a 
governance structure that includes a Lead Scientist and an 
Independent Science Board reporting directly to the appointed 
members of the BDA, rather than to, say, the staff director. The 
Science Program helps lend the BDA credibility in the scientific 
community. The first science chief, Sam Luoma, was, in the words of 
one participant, “utterly committed to creating an agency that would 
both learn and incorporate what it learned into management. The 
systems he set up for outside review, and his attempts to bring rigor to 
agency processes, have been commendable and have had real 
impacts.”211 Panels of independent scientists from universities or 
research institutions help to evaluate every aspect of the CalFed 
Program. And thus far the Science Program seems to have escaped he 
politicization that has come to characterize federal environmental 
regulation in recent years.212 As a result, it retains unusually high 
credibility with stakeholders. This is because CalFed’s Science 
Program is specifically designed not to determine the right answer 
“but rather to focus on areas of uncertainty . . . and to discuss and 
explain them.”213  
The Authority plays an important role, then, in bolstering the use 
of science to illuminate areas of agreement as well as disagreement. 
And this occurs, as frequently as possible, early in the decision 
making process before agency commitments have crystallized. For 
example, BDA staff members conduct science workshops to help 
 
 210. We wish to thank Professor Holly Doremus for helping to focus our attention on this 
aspect of CalFed. See E-mail from Holly Doremus, Professor of Law, University of California, 
Davis, to Daniel A. Farber, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley [hereinafter 
Doremus E-mail] 2 (Sept. 16, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting the importance 
of the science program). 
 211. Id. at 2. 
 212. On February 18, 2004, a group of top U.S. scientists, including numerous Nobel 
laureates, published a report and an open letter accusing the Bush administration of suppressing 
and distorting science for political gain. James Glanz, Scientists Say Administration Distorts 
Facts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A18. 
 213. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39. 
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stakeholders vet scientific data in a neutral forum before regulatory 
decisions have been made. In one instance, when the federal FWS 
appeared headed toward listing an endangered species and the state 
DFG opposed it, the staff arranged a technical workshop on the data 
itself, rather than on whether listing or not listing was a good idea.214 
This helped to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the data on 
which the agencies planned to rely, and it did so in a highly public 
setting.215 
For all of these reasons, CalFed deserves a significant amount of 
credit. The challenges before it were, and still are, immense. 
Everything about the natural and political environment in which the 
BDA operates is precarious: the Delta is a dynamic system, agencies 
remain wary of each other and guard their power jealously, and 
stakeholder groups remain fiercely committed to their interests. Yet 
CalFed has managed to generate an impressive amount of both 
procedural and substantive policy innovation in a relatively short 
time. It provides a useful illustration of many of the features of our 
concept of modularity. 
2. A Critical View.  Nevertheless, CalFed is very much a work in 
progress.216 The ROD, after five years, has only been partially 
implemented. Critics might charge that the CalFed experiment is less 
successful and revolutionary than its supporters think. The history of 
CalFed arguably shows only that if the stresses are high enough, if 
budgets are in surplus, and if there are entrepreneurial people in 
leadership positions, it is possible to develop new, creative institutions 
that cross jurisdictional and functional lines. Conditions such as these 
will coalesce only rarely, one could say. Moreover, critics might claim 
that CalFed’s largely procedural innovations go only part of the 
distance to the ideal of modularity, because modular institutions must 
 
 214. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 11. 
 215. There are other examples as well. When a Delta storage project proposed a feasibility 
study for building a reservoir, the Authority conducted an independent scientific review that 
raised serious questions about its feasibility. When water managers proposed increasing 
pumping from the Delta, and fisheries agencies responded that they ought to build state of the 
art fishscreens at a cost of $200 million, the Authority launched a process to explore less 
expensive options. To do this, the Authority took advantage of expertise in local water districts 
and convinced the wildlife agencies that they could use the help. See supra note 173 and 
accompanying text. 
 216. We thank Professor Doremus for voicing many of the concerns we discuss in this 
section. 
101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC 12/12/2005  3:09 PM 
2005] MODULAR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 867 
improve environmental outcomes in measurable ways. CalFed will 
not be a real success story, one might argue, until there is evidence 
that endangered fish species are in fact doing better than they would 
have without the Program, the water supply for cities and farmers is 
both larger and more reliable than in the past, the delta levee system 
demonstrably improved, and drinking water safer than ever for 
human consumption. 
Critics might also resist the notion that the CalFed process really 
helped stakeholders reconsider their positions. One could say that, on 
the contrary, the legal regime had already established the 
stakeholders’ expectations. For example, the ESA and CWA had 
created entitlements on the environmental side, whereas irrigation 
contracts and municipal water needs established entitlements on the 
extractive side. In this view, CalFed did not strike a new balance 
among stakeholders or encourage them to reconsider their demands 
so much as it tried to implement the balance of power among them 
that had already been struck largely because of background statutes. 
Seen in this way, even CalFed’s procedural innovations seem less 
impressive. Critics might argue as well that CalFed has not really 
reduced conflict—certainly not if the absence of litigation is the 
appropriate criterion. Stakeholders still resort to lawsuits over 
important CalFed-related decisions.217  
How do we respond to criticisms such as these? First, as noted 
above, CalFed has delivered concrete benefits to every constituency it 
serves, including improvements in water storage capacity, water 
reliability, ecosystem restoration, and drinking water quality. And 
this has amounted to billions of dollars in real benefits.218 In addition, 
CalFed’s planning process is based on the notion that investing in the 
future is worthwhile: many of the Program’s benefits require more 
than a few years to come to fruition. For example, ecosystem 
restoration is a complicated and long-term process that cannot be 
evaluated within political cycles of two or four years. There will 
undoubtedly be fits and starts and ups and downs in the ecosystem 
restoration process. This is simply the nature of the enterprise. 
 
 217. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4–5. Litigation is still occurring—over both the 
environmental impact statement prepared for the EWA and over whether the splittail, smelt, or 
sturgeon ought to be on the endangered list. Doremus E-mail, supra note 210, at 1. 
 218. See CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 5 (“Nearly 80 percent of the $2.9 
billion invested in CalFed programs in the first four years has gone to efforts that contribute to 
multiple program objectives.”). 
101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC 12/12/2005  3:09 PM 
868 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:795 
Ecosystems are extremely complex and our knowledge of them 
dramatically incomplete. Salmon runs have been restored in the Bay 
Delta in recent years, but other species, such as the Delta smelt, have 
fared less well. In both cases, CalFed deserves neither all of the credit 
nor all of the blame.219 In truth, the reasons why one species of fish 
improves while another declines are still unclear, even to the best 
scientists. Still, this kind of uncertainty calls for more, not less, 
commitment to studying and experimenting with restoration. 
Second, whether CalFed had a meaningful effect on stakeholder 
perspectives—whether it re-shaped their expectations or simply 
mediated entrenched positions—is somewhat in the eye of the 
beholder. CalFed did, however, force participants to adopt a more 
comprehensive view. The operative question for at least some 
participants shifted from, “What are we alone entitled to take from 
this water resource?” to “What do we need the Bay Delta to provide 
for us collectively?” The answer to the new, larger question was 
daunting: ecosystem restoration and flood control (improving the 
integrity of the levee system); improved water quality (reducing toxic 
contamination and excess nutrients) and a more balanced allocation 
of water resources for residential, agricultural, and wildlife uses. The 
point is not that CalFed led participants to abandon long-held 
interests, but rather that it broadened the basis of discussion and 
forced stakeholders or agencies with only one perspective to take 
seriously the perspectives of others. This may not have changed the 
underlying conflict, but conceivably it changed how people imagined 
and talked about solutions. At a minimum, it led for the first time to 
integrated and coordinated planning. And while this kind of 
innovation can sound procedural, it has real effects on the ground 
once agencies begin to implement their agreements. 
It is undeniable, however, that the existing legal levers can limit 
the ability to think about problems in creative ways. As noted in Part 
I, agency cultures develop pursuant to statutory mandates. They are 
“sticky” and resistant to change. As Wright says, “even when agencies 
 
 219. As Professor Doremus puts it: 
The delta smelt might come off the [endangered species] list, but if it does it will be 
because it has always been a tough fish to understand, not because [CalFed] has made 
conditions noticeably better. (Same story for the splittail, which had a very brief 
tenure on the protected list.) There are attempts to say that the [CalFed] program 
automatically makes the fish better off (I think the FWS may be taking this tack in 
the smelt status review), but that isn’t backed up with either empirical facts or 
regulatory authority. 
Doremus E-mail, supra note 210, at 1. 
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are given a flexible, new tool like EWA, they have great difficulty 
overcoming their instinct to apply that tool in the traditional, 
prescriptive way.”220 By some accounts, for example, the regulatory 
and operational agencies still focus on pumping operations at the 
CVP and SWP as the most important reason why the fish are failing 
when in fact their role in the decline of the fish populations is 
unclear,221 and habitat factors undoubtedly make an important 
contribution to the problem. Yet the pumps remain the focus because 
the regulatory agencies see them as their only mechanism for 
controlling the system. Manipulating the pumps is familiar, and both 
agencies and stakeholders have grown used to the occasional 
shutdown. Some observers believe that the EWA may have had a 
perverse effect in this regard by intensifying the focus on pumping, 
which diverts attention from other factors that may be affecting the 
fish.222  
In addition, EWA managers appear to be fairly risk averse and 
continue to hoard the water, expending it only when they are strongly 
convinced the fish will benefit. And, as we reflected in our 
description, the dominant view of the EWA is that its purpose is to 
compensate, even though it has the potential to do more. For 
example, with the right incentives, managers could be encouraged to 
be more experimental in allocation decisions, using the water to learn 
more about the system. This strongly suggests that one measure of 
success for the process as it moves forward will be the extent to which 
 
 220. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 2. 
 221. Environmentalists charge that record levels of pumping are responsible for the decline 
of several species of fish, including smelt and bass. Yet CalFed’s defenders say that no one really 
knows what is causing the fish to decline and note that the Program has over the same period 
achieved success in restoring salmon populations. See Bettina Boxall, Water Accord Said to Be 
in Peril, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at B1 (discussing the ongoing debate); Editorial, Delta Fish 
Decline Foretells State Water Woes, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 8, 2005, at F4 (noting that “no 
one seems to know why the Delta open-water fish seem to be disappearing”). 
 222.  
They don’t want it known (if in fact it’s true) that killing fish at the pumps isn’t what 
is causing population declines because they fear losing that one handle and not being 
able to replace it with anything else. The operational agencies have learned to live 
with occasional pumping restrictions, are getting better at predicting when those 
restrictions will come (through CalFed and their cooperation with the fish agencies), 
and with the EWA have a way to make their clients the water users whole when they 
must impose those restrictions. In that sense, perhaps CalFed has actually had a 
perverse effect if our goal is to learn about the system and protect the environment. 
Everyone can live with the focus at the pumps, except quite possibly the fish. We 
need to do a better job of structuring institutions that will force a response to the 
problem, rather than just to the levers. 
Doremus E-mail, supra note 210, at 2–3. 
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it can adopt incentives for moving away from the traditional legal 
levers, so that the focus is on learning what fish need, rather than 
what the agencies are used to doing. Nevertheless, despite this 
continuing challenge, the existing legal regime was successfully 
supplemented, finessed, or circumvented at several junctures in the 
CalFed process. Although CalFed has not succeeded in overcoming 
the background legal regime, it appears to have pushed beyond some 
of its limitations. 
The most difficult problem, not surprisingly, may be maintaining 
stakeholder support for the Program over time. While the threat of 
litigation, if used wisely, can help to prompt the CalFed agencies to 
maintain their momentum, that threat can also be destructive. In fact, 
efforts on the part of some stakeholders to circumvent CalFed 
through litigation has exerted a drag on progress. In some instances, 
there has been, in addition, a “wait until November” attitude among 
some who think that developments in state or national politics will 
favor their interests.223 Yet, the process has kept going not because 
most agencies and most stakeholders are deeply committed to it, but 
because there are sufficient numbers of moderates in each of the 
relevant communities who are.224 The ongoing challenge is to maintain 
and build on this broad-based coalition to provide ballast against 
those (on all sides) who think they can do better in the conventional 
regulatory and judicial process.225 
All of this requires commitment over sustained periods of time, 
which can lead to stakeholder fatigue.226 Both stakeholders and 
agencies must stay motivated over a period of years, not months, 
through different budget and political cycles, and as personnel in both 
the agencies and the interest groups change. This weighs especially 
heavily on stakeholders with fewer resources. A shared governance 
approach like this may give a disproportionate advantage to 
 
 223. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4. 
 224. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 5. 
 225. As one example, many in the environmental community still believe that they could do 
better litigating under the ESA. They argue that CalFed has focused on plans that will increase 
storage and exports of water at the expense of ecosystem restoration. The counterargument is 
that the ESA simply cannot accomplish what environmentalists seek and that CalFed has 
supplied hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of acre-feet of water more 
than any regulatory/litigation strategy could ever produce. In any event, it would be surprising 
to hear stakeholders brimming with satisfaction, because they continue to believe that during 
the implementation phase it is in their strategic interest to remain unsatisfied. 
 226. Wright Interview, supra note 139, at 3. 
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stakeholders with the resources not only to keep up, but to hire their 
own technical staff to work with the agencies in developing options 
and recommendations.227 And some agencies, like USBR, have closer 
“client” relationships with their stakeholders which can help those 
stakeholders stay involved; environmental interests may not enjoy the 
same advantage.228 Finally, there may be a tradeoff between 
transparency and speed: more open, deliberative processes like this 
can be slower than traditional top-down approaches and can try the 
patience. 
That the Program is dependent on continued support from 
moderate stakeholders is both a strength and weakness. On the one 
hand, large policy leaps may be less likely in a context in which the 
center must hold. As a result, perhaps more radical, and arguably 
superior, solutions never materialize, or when they do, they might 
quickly be ruled out. For example, in the ecosystem restoration 
program, the Authority has largely abandoned land acquisitions and 
chosen instead to procure easements because opposition to purchases 
is so strong among local governments and agricultural interests.229 At 
the same time, however, the checks and balances among the 
stakeholders and agencies, and between the state legislature and 
Congress, have been absolutely critical to the program’s success. 
Without consistent pressure from all sides forcing the players through 
the CalFed process, the Program’s stability would be threatened. 
Until recently, no major stakeholders had a viable alternative to 
CalFed. Although some groups have pursued litigation on individual 
issues, for the most part, they have been unable to do complete end-
 
 227. Id. According to Wright, the environmental and public interest groups have a hard time 
even keeping track of the program’s activities, and thus tend to be much more reactive. “It’s 
also their culture,” he says, “to expect that the agencies will do their jobs according to the 
traditional model even without their involvement.” Id. 
 228. In the case of CalFed, the issue is compounded by the historically close relationship 
between USBR and DWR and their contractors: “Because they view their contractors as their 
primary customers, they meet frequently to share information and shape policy. This 
relationship generally does not exist between the fisheries agencies and the environmental 
community.” Id. The relative ability of the water users to influence the process erupted into the 
media in the fall of 2004, when environmental groups complained that they were being shut out 
of deals brokered between the users and the agencies. See, e.g., Boxall, supra note 221 
(describing the controversy); Stuart Leavenworth, Major Shift Mapped for Delta Water, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 26, 2004, at A1 (quoting an environmentalist reacting to being shut 
out of recent talks as stating that “[i]t is clear that major agencies are acting outside of Cal-
Fed”). 
 229. Wright Interview, supra note 139, at 3. 
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runs around CalFed through state or federal administrative or 
legislative action.230 
As this Article goes to press, however, the consensus support for 
CalFed has begun to weaken, exposing its political vulnerability. 
CalFed has always enjoyed very strong state and federal support: the 
Wilson and Davis administrations in California provided leadership in 
the face of stakeholder opposition, and the Clinton administration 
signaled its consistent support for the Program through the active 
participation of Secretary Babbitt, who regularly attended high-level 
meetings and helped to broker impasses. Yet times have changed. 
The Bush administration has resisted cooperative efforts with the 
state for reasons that are not entirely clear.231 For example, although 
Congress recently passed legislation authorizing federal agency 
representatives to vote at BDA meetings (giving them authorization 
they previously lacked, which had limited their effectiveness), the 
Bush appointees from these agencies only rarely attend Authority 
meetings. The relative indifference of the Bush administration to 
CalFed, compared to its predecessor, is plain to participants.232 
At the same time, the new Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
does not appear to be as committed to CalFed as previous 
Governors.233 His administration has never thrown its weight behind 
CalFed as a Program or the BDA as a governance structure. The 
reasons for this are a matter of speculation. The Schwarzenegger 
administration seems, as a general matter, to disfavor independent 
boards and commissions like the BDA—the Governor called in 2004 
for a massive state re-organization, called the California Performance 
Review, to eliminate most of these independent entities and integrate 
their functions into existing executive agencies.234 The BDA is even 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. It appears that the administration prefers to settle disputes with water contractors 
privately, through litigation, without engaging a multistakeholder process. See Interview with 
Patrick Wright [hereinafter Wright Interview] (July 19, 2005) (describing the relative 
infrequency with which federal agency officials attend Authority meetings). 
 232. See id. (citing the lack of federal leadership and noting that it’s “not a coincidence that 
under [President] Clinton there was [a] strong presence from [Secretary] Babbitt”). 
 233. See E-mail from Paula Daniels, Regional Member of the Bay-Delta Authority, to Jody 
Freeman [hereinafter Daniels E-mail] (July 28, 2005) (noting the general lack of leadership and 
support from the Governor’s office felt by members of the BDA) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 234. See Jody Freeman, Editorial, Schwarzenegger’s Power Grab: Reform Proposal would 
Hand Many Key Decisions to the Governor’s Appointees, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at B11 
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more unusual in its governance structure and mission than the 
majority of California’s independent agencies, so it is possible that the 
Schwarzenegger administration is simply flexing its executive muscle 
and wishes to integrate the BDA’s functions into an executive agency 
like the DWR. It is also possible that the administration, which 
inherited the BDA and had no political stake in its creation, simply 
does not know what to make of it. 
It is in this context—the context of a relative leadership 
vacuum—that in recent months the Program has come in for a 
scathing round of criticism. Despite substantial investment in species 
recovery, environmentalists have charged that not enough is being 
done to protect endangered species and insist pumping should slow 
until the species recover.235 Water users, meanwhile, complain that no 
new reservoirs have been built and push for a commitment to 
increase pumping capacity, even though CalFed-funded water 
conservation projects have yielded the same benefits as two or three 
good-sized dams at a fraction of the cost. None of these criticisms and 
demands is especially new, but in the past they have been met with 
strong resistance from both the state and the federal governments. 
Individual CalFed agencies knew that they could not circumvent the 
CalFed process and strike private deals with stakeholders without 
being brought up short. At critical moments, attempts by one or the 
other interest group to do such end-runs would be met with a firm 
message that the process to use—the only process—was CalFed.236 
Support from the Schwarzenegger administration and the 
California legislature is particularly necessary in late 2005, as CalFed 
begins to run out of money. It was extremely fortunate that the 
CalFed ROD was adopted at a time when both the state and federal 
budget surpluses were at an all time high.237 CalFed supporters 
managed to pass three water-related bond measures for CalFed in the 
first four years of the program,238 which generated almost $3 billion in 
 
(describing the California Performance Review and criticizing the governor’s attempt to take 
control of independent agencies). 
 235. See supra note 221. 
 236. Interview with Mary Nichols (July 19, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 237. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 3. The CalFed agencies have spent roughly three 
billion dollars in the first four years following the adoption of the ROD. CAL. BAY-DELTA 
PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 5. That money may not have been available if the timing had been 
different. 
 238. Of the $6 billion raised for water projects in the state from Propositions 50, 204, and 13, 
CalFed was allocated approximately $2 billion. The program has thus far spent $400 million 
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funding for CalFed. Most of that funding has already been spent, as 
noted, on program implementation: groundwater, recycling, and 
other water conservation projects designed to shore up water supply 
reliability; ecosystem restoration projects; and water quality 
improvements. Yet the bond money has nearly run out and there is 
now significant disagreement over how, and at what level, to continue 
to fund the Program.239 
In late 2004, the BDA proposed a ten-year, $8 billion financing 
plan. The plan calls for a combination of state and federal monies as 
well as user fees, which are designed to ensure that the farmers and 
cities that benefit from increased water supply reliability pay their fair 
share of the program’s costs. Such fees would help to ensure the 
future financial stability of CalFed in the face of a state budget 
crisis.240 To succeed, however, the finance plan would require the 
political backing of both the state legislature and the Governor, which 
has not been forthcoming.241 Governor Schwarzenegger had originally 
promised to support the BDA’s plan but ultimately reneged and 
instead called for CalFed to be audited and scaled back.242 The 
Governor’s decision sent a powerful message to the Authority, most 
of whose public appointees were not even consulted,243 that its role 
 
from Proposition 50, $385 million from Proposition 204, and $440 million from Proposition 13, 
for a total of approximately $1.2 billion. As a result, just under $1 billion remains from these 
bond funds. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 56. See supra note 194 for a 
description of the bond effort. 
 239. See Jody Freeman, Why is Arnold Afraid of the Water?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at 
M1 (describing the Bay-Delta Authority’s proposal to impose user fees on farmers and cities to 
finance the plan, and describing the Governor’s resistance to user fees).  
 240. The Authority’s financial plan, including user fees, had been painstakingly negotiated 
among all the stakeholders. User fees are contentious but they were envisioned in the original 
ROD. See Wright Interview, supra note 231 (discussing the negotiation of the finance plan).  
 241. See Freeman, supra note 239 (describing Governor Schwarzenegger’s decision to 
renege on a commitment to support user fees and the legislature’s decision to attack the Bay-
Delta Authority’s plan); see also Bruce Babbitt & Douglas Wheeler, The Fluid State of Liquid 
Politics, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at B13 (explaining the contentiousness over user fees and 
providing a rationale for cost sharing among users and the public). 
 242. See Freeman, supra note 239 (“The governor was expected in May [2005] to issue his 
proposals for user fees and defend the water-sharing program. Instead, Schwarzenegger  
further delayed his proposals and called for the program to be audited and scaled back.”); Dana 
Nichols & Hank Shaw, Departure Called ‘Serious Blow,’ STOCKTON RECORD, May 26, 2005 
(citing Governor Schwarzenegger’s “plan to review all of CALFED’s efforts and come up with a 
new, 10-year plan for the program by Nov. 1[, 2005]”); GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2005–06, 3940 
WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD (Jan. 10, 2005) (citing decreased funding for CalFed as 
a “Major Program Change”), at http://govbud.dof.ca.gov/StateAgencyBudgets/3890/3940/ 
department.html (last modified Jan. 7, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 243. Daniels E-mail, supra note 233. 
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would be further reduced.244 Authority Staff Director Patrick Wright 
and Chief Scientist Johnnie Moore resigned.245 For their part, 
legislators attacked the finance plan as totally unrealistic—citing the 
Governor’s lack of support—and threatened to cut funding to CalFed 
to “life support levels,” declining the opportunity to act 
independently to approve user fees legislatively.246 Neither the 
Governor nor the legislature appears to be willing to support user 
fees, which have long been contentious, because they are vulnerable 
to being viewed as a “tax.” 
These recent events have made clear that some of the potential 
strengths of the BDA have turned out to be weaknesses as well. The 
BDA has no powerful client constituency to defend it, but virtually 
every agency and stakeholder has reasons to oppose it. How does one 
defend an entity that no one has heard of, that operates by jawboning 
and cajoling, on grounds that it does things like “make better science 
available” and “improve a complex planning process” when people 
are pointing to dead fish in the Delta? Its dual charges—to coordinate 
agency action but also to supervise the agencies and hold them 
accountable—may be incompatible. In the coming months, the BDA 
may be restructured to address this kind of problem, or simply 
eliminated in favor of allowing the DWR to absorb CalFed. The 
Governor asked the state’s Little Hoover Commission to study the 
 
 244. Some state officials and water contractors have been suggesting that DWR take over 
most of CalFed’s operations. To the delight of the water contractors who stand to gain from this 
move, DWR staff are currently overseeing the Authority staff and the Independent Science 
Program. Subsuming CalFed into an existing agency such as DWR is likely to undermine some 
of its best features: independence, innovation, transparency, and flexibility. DWR has always 
been an agency that serves its water user clients. It is hard to imagine that the agency can 
manage the SWP, which pumps and delivers water to its client users, and simultaneously 
manage the water supply for the wide variety of other goals and interests that are part of the 
CalFed program. Conflicts among the narrow perspectives of the agencies were the driving 
force behind CalFed’s creation in the first place. 
 245. Nichols & Shaw, supra note 242; Press Release, State of California Resources Agency, 
CalFed Director Patrick Wright Reassigned to Resources Agency (May 25, 2005), available at 
http://calwater.ca.gov/Newsroom/NewsReleases_2005/Resources_Agency_Wright_Grindstaff_
Announcement_5-25-05.pdf. 
 246. Mike Taugher, Despite Spending Billions, CalFed Can’t Fix Delta, CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES, May 1, 2005, at F4. See Miller Demands Answers on Delta, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 
7, 2005, at A1 (noting that the BDA released an $8 billon 10-year plan); Hank Shaw, Closing 
down CalFed; Funding for Delta Water Project Likely to Get Yanked, STOCKTON RECORD, 
April 20, 2005 (quoting State Senator Sheila Kuehl as saying, “CALFED is doomed to a pretty 
thin gruel for funding this year”). 
101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC 12/12/2005  3:09 PM 
876 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:795 
program and make recommendations, a process that is ongoing as this 
article goes to press.247 
Still, despite these developments, the CalFed story contains the 
seeds of a truly different approach to complex environmental and 
natural resource management problems. CalFed suggests at least the 
possibility of overcoming the traditional fractured regime. The 
challenge, as with all aspects of such a complex process, is to see 
down the road to what will be necessary at each stage of 
implementation, and to build alliances strong enough to overcome 
inevitable resistance from one quarter or another. It may not be 
possible to insulate experiments like CalFed from political and 
economic swings for long enough to see what they can accomplish. 
Recent events only underscore how fragile these efforts are. Yet 
despite its imperfections, and regardless of its future, CalFed has 
already provided a powerful illustration of what we think of as 
modular environmental regulation. 
III.  TOWARD A THEORY OF MODULARITY 
In this Part, drawing on our CalFed case study, we distill our 
modular theory into its basic building blocks. We also draw on 
promising analogies of modularity from other contexts. In the final 
Part, we consider some obstacles to the more general emergence and 
proliferation of modular environmental regulation. 
A. The Constituent Parts of Modularity 
A key aspect of modularity is flexibility and coordination, both 
within and across agencies and among levels of government. In 
addition, modularity envisions that these agency parts and subparts 
will interact with a host of private actors. Further, modularity requires 
that institutional form follow function wherever possible, meaning 
that the goal of the modular enterprise is first to diagnose problems 
and second to devise solutions and match institutions capable of 
implementing them. Modularity also features agreement-based 
regulation in addition to more traditional regulatory tools. It also 
depends upon and promotes social learning. Modularity requires, in 
addition, adaptive processes capable of generating and incorporating 
 
 247. Letter from Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to California’s Little Hoover 
Commission (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://cpr.ca.gov/pdf/lhc_letter.pdf. 
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new information. Finally, modularity demands multiple avenues for 
stakeholder participation. All of this is well illustrated by CalFed. 
1. Overcoming Regulatory Fracture Through Coordination.  By 
laying the basis for greater interagency coordination, modular 
structures help to overcome the fractured assignment of regulatory 
power that generally characterizes environmental regulation and 
natural resource management. As we have argued, the current 
structure of cooperative federalism and the narrow focus of agencies 
that have an impact on environmental resources impedes attempts to 
engage in integrated environmental planning and implementation. 
The diffusion of authority across agencies at all levels of government 
can result in a vacuum of leadership for larger, systemwide 
problems.248 In the CalFed example, the EPA focuses on water 
quality, fish and wildlife agencies focus on species protection, and 
water agencies deal with supply. There are also procedural aspects of 
the administrative process that can impede collaboration. For 
example, in Rieke’s view, the federal primacy and relatively closed 
nature of the ESA consultation process, which has no public 
participation component, makes stakeholders feel excluded and 
allows states to argue that federal agencies improperly interfere with 
state resource management prerogatives.249 Rieke also recounts how 
other, more generic aspects of the administrative process can polarize 
stakeholders. For example, prior to CalFed, the federal government 
had traditionally conducted oversight of state water quality standards 
primarily through rulemaking, which does not lend itself to 
cooperative engagement with states and stakeholders across multiple 
 
 248. These divisions make it difficult to respond to complex environmental problems. This is 
especially true if the environmental problem itself crosses jurisdictional boundaries (e.g., 
between states), but even when it does not, divided authority over a single resource can lead to 
enormous coordination problems. Things become yet more complicated where the 
environmental problem involves more than one medium, or when a single resource, such as 
water, has multiple environmental effects. Moreover, as we have argued, the interactive and 
second order effects of environmental harms can be very difficult to control with media-specific 
approaches. Frequently, attempts to remediate one environmental problem simply result in 
substitution or transfer of a different problem to another medium, as when scrubbers remove 
toxic air pollutants only to create a toxic sludge by-product, which must be deposited on land; or 
when fuel additives designed to produce cleaner burning fuel contaminate drinking water 
supplies, as with MTBE. See generally Paul Weiland & Robert Vos, Reforming EPA’s 
Organizational Structure: Establishing an Adaptable Agency through Ecostate Regions, 42 NAT. 
RESOURCES. J. 91 (2002) (proposing a more flexible agency approach for the EPA). 
 249. Rieke, supra note 97, at 357–58; see Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C.  
§ 1536 (2000) (explaining the consultation process). 
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issues.250 In describing the rulemaking process, Rieke echoes others 
who criticize rulemaking: “Each side stakes out a public position that 
it tends to defend against all criticism. Both the state and the 
regulated community feel excluded from meaningful participation in 
the policy formulation process.”251 
Interagency coordination can come from transforming a conflict 
into a set of questions about a problem. For example, instead of 
separating water allocation from water quality issues and assigning 
them to different agencies, the CalFed process bundled these matters 
together, which helped to shift things from a zero-sum conflict to a set 
of problems that required an integrated and coordinated approach. 
This is what we mean by adopting a “problem-shed” focus. Instead of 
circumscribing their reach geographically (i.e., by focusing on what 
each agency could physically control) and observing jurisdictional 
boundaries (i.e., by focusing on what each agency was legally 
authorized to control), agencies and stakeholders began to think 
more comprehensively about the collection of problems and activities 
that contributed to the inability of the Bay Delta to perform its 
desired functions. Former Resources Secretary Nichols describes the 
shift in terms of framing: “It focused on who is doing what with the 
water. The wrong question is, ‘Can we regulate them’? The right 
question is, ‘Who is contributing to the problem’? And we worry 
about what to do later.”252 
Similarly, instead of looking at each agency’s narrow statutory 
mandate (e.g., at the federal level, the EPA regulates water quality, 
whereas DOI and DOC manage endangered species protection), 
CalFed adopted a broader approach: “You say to each agency, even if 
this isn’t your responsibility historically, you too should participate in 
the decision.”253 The purpose of this exercise was to explore the 
capacity of the Bay-Delta system, determine the range of demands 
placed on it, and then devise a plan for satisfying those demands. 
Ideally, such an inquiry would proceed without initial regard for 
traditional jurisdictional or legal limitations. And to some extent, for 
 
 250. Rieke, supra note 97, at 357.  
 251. Id. This is by now a familiar criticism of traditional agency rulemaking procedures. See 
Freeman, supra note 6, at 3 (pointing out the shortcomings of the traditional notice and 
comment process); see also Harter, supra note 51, at 7 (proposing negotiations between affected 
parties in lieu of formalized rulemaking procedures). 
 252. Nichols Interview, supra note 165. 
 253. Id. 
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some periods during the CalFed negotiations, these appear to have 
been pushed to the background. Of course the default legal regime 
still affected the participants’ perception of their entitlements. It 
seems fair to say that the nature of the undertaking changed with 
CalFed. No longer could each stakeholder maintain its single-issue 
focus. Neither could agencies ignore aspects of the Delta on the 
theory that it was some other agency’s problem. 
2. Form Following Function.  Modularity requires that form 
follow function. We mean this as both a logical interconnection and 
an evolutionary one. This is exemplified in the CalFed process. The 
first federal attempt to adopt a more integrated regulatory approach 
to Delta issues resulted in an institutional overlay that took the form 
of Club-Fed, the four-agency commitment to coordinate regulatory 
activities. This evolved organically and iteratively in response to 
failures of the background regime embodied in the statutes: 
There was no comprehensive procedural framework agreed upon in 
advance and designed to be implemented in a step-by-step manner. 
Rather, the components of the overlay emerged on an ad hoc basis. 
Whenever it was clear that the existing mechanisms were 
inadequate, a new component was devised to address the unresolved 
problems.254 
This same step-by-step institutional innovation developed during 
negotiation of the ROD, which ultimately resulted in creating the 
Policy Group, which in turn expanded and became formally 
institutionalized as the Bay-Delta Authority. The CalFed process had 
generated a new governance structure, but this occurred only after 
the components of a comprehensive plan made the need for that 
structure clear. The BDA was designed neither to replace agencies 
nor to merge them. It was not created to compete with them for 
funding or intrude too heavily upon their budgetary authority. 
Instead, the BDA was to add value primarily by coordinating and 
facilitating action while taking the long and systemwide view. 
Although the BDA was not given control of member agencies’ 
budgets, in practice, the requirement that the program’s 
implementation activities be balanced among the various program 
objectives arguably established a significant constraint on the 
 
 254. Rieke, supra note 97, at 358–59. 
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agencies’ traditional independence.255 This requirement conceivably 
allows the BDA to point out that some programs are significantly 
underfunded compared to others, which could influence funding 
allocations in the following year.256 With sufficiently expert staff to 
make recommendations credible, sufficiently high-level appointments 
to lend them authority, and carefully tended public input to ensure 
responsiveness and accountability, institutions like the BDA 
represent a promising innovation. 
CalFed offers the best example of form following function in 
environmental and natural resource management contexts that we 
have come across. There are other examples of governance structures 
emerging in a seemingly similar way (the Chesapeake Bay Program 
comes to mind), but none with which we are familiar have managed 
to do this while also accomplishing the other things we have 
identified: interagency coordination, agreement-based regulation, 
social learning, adaptation, and extensive stakeholder participation. 
Most of the initiatives with which CalFed might be compared involve 
one or two of these features, and most remain driven by one key (and 
usually federal) agency.257 
 
 255. See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text. 
 256. For example, in Years 1–4 of CalFed, ecosystem restoration projects received $653 
million and water conservation recycling projects received $486 million. In contrast, levee 
restoration projects received just $83 million and drinking water projects received just $93 
million. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 56. 
 257. While we cannot do a comprehensive comparison here, many other programs, such as 
the Great Lakes National Program and the Everglades Restoration Program, appear to be 
multiagency efforts but are in fact driven largely by a single agency. See Stephen S. Light et al., 
The Everglades: Evolution of Management in a Turbulent Ecosystem, in BARRIERS & BRIDGES 
TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 103, 114 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. 
eds., 1995) (“The federal operations or participation in water management in the Everglades 
has been historically entrusted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers . . . .”); THE 
COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN, THE DEVELOPMENT TEAM (stating that 
“[d]evelopment of the [Everglades] Plan . . . was led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Jacksonville District [while] many other federal, state, tribal and local agencies were active 
partners” in its development), at http://www.evergladesplan.org/about/rest_plan.cfm (updated 
June 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GREAT 
LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION: FACT SHEET ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS 
IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION (identifying the EPA as the lead agency in the Great Lakes 
National Program), at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/collaboration/taskforce/factsheet.html (last 
updated March 22, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Of those initiatives that do 
feature a greater degree of interagency coordination, none appears to cover the multiple 
objectives that CalFed does. For example, they may focus on ecosystems without dealing with 
water supply and reliability. 
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3. Agreement-Based Regulation.  A modular structure’s 
authority is derived from the participants, and it can only operate on 
the basis of their agreement. Throughout the CalFed process, 
agreements, both formal and informal, appear more prevalent than 
rules, limits, and prohibitions. Not that rules are unimportant. As 
agencies turn to implementation, they rely on their traditional 
regulatory authority and will of course employ the conventional tools 
of regulation. But these are not the focus of discussion initially. 
Because modularity amounts to a movement toward agreement-based 
regulation and management, it shifts the regulatory spotlight to a host 
of instruments that do not generally attract much attention in either 
administrative or environmental law. These include RODs, MOUs 
and Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs), Annual Work Plans, and 
even things called “Packages,” which serve to memorialize 
commitments. The range of potentially useful agreement-based 
instruments is quite broad. In addition to those used in the CalFed 
example, one could imagine bilateral interagency agreements, 
interstate compacts, and multistate or regional resolutions. 
How general or specific should these agreements be? Who ought 
to sign them? What are the accountability mechanisms for ensuring 
that commitments are kept? How should they be updated over 
time?258 These are the kinds of questions modularity situates at the 
center of environmental regulation and resource management. Again, 
the focus on agreement does not preclude a further and equally 
important set of questions about which tools to use for 
implementation. Indeed, it lays the groundwork for this second stage. 
One can imagine, for example, an ecosystem restoration plan 
depending in part on traditional standard setting for point sources of 
water pollution, in part on creating an effluent trading program to 
help reduce nonpoint source pollution, and in part on a cooperative 
effort among agencies to divert water in real time in response to the 
demonstrated needs of competing users. 
Sometimes, moreover, a “regulatory” or “management” solution 
will emerge that seems unfamiliar. What, after all, is the EWA? It 
operates like a bank account of water, on which customers can draw, 
 
 258. As we saw with CalFed, agreements require regular updating to recommit participants 
to their agreements and to allow for greater specificity as things change over time. See supra 
note 200 and accompanying text. We imagine a kind of “iterative agreement regime,” in which 
existing agreements provide enough stability for work to move forward, but where, over time, 
they become stale. 
101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC 12/12/2005  3:09 PM 
882 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:795 
yet there is a baseline amount of water that the CalFed agencies have 
agreed to set aside for fish. And these minimum amounts are based, 
in part, upon what statutes and regulations would have required in 
the traditional process.259 The EWA depends, therefore, on the 
background legal regime for its baseline. Yet ultimate allocations will 
depend on competing needs in circumstances that are quite dynamic. 
This is not a conventional prescriptive tool, nor is it a functioning 
market-based instrument.260 
Interestingly, there is not an Administrative Procedure Act 
“agency decision” to be found here: no rulemaking, no adjudication. 
Instead, we find a collection of expert agency staff from different 
(historically opposed) agencies, receiving input from different 
(historically opposed) nongovernmental stakeholders, who are 
themselves neither elected nor appointed, exercising discretion in real 
time based on imperfect and regularly updated data, all answering to 
a coordinating “Authority” comprised of federal and state officials 
together with “public” appointees, which is counseled by a public 
advisory body but which has no independent regulatory power! This 
is not what we are used to in administrative and environmental law. 
This is modularity. 
We would expect, in an agreement-based system, to see a mix of 
implementation tools that are as flexible and problem-derived as the 
initial agreements on project goals. But the choice of tools flows from 
the identification of the key principles, which take the form of mutual 
promises. In the context of negotiating a comprehensive agreement, 
the idea of an abstract preference for “market” versus “prescriptive” 
tools seems both premature and nonsensical. Implementation might 
involve traditional rulemaking and permitting, but also, conceivably, 
market trading schemes and information-forcing mechanisms, all 
deployed in an organized way to implement different aspects of a 
comprehensive plan. Although dimensions of the plan might 
ultimately be promulgated as traditional regulations, other aspects 
may take the form of quasi-contractual and relatively informal 
instruments. Similarly, participants in modular systems need to think 
creatively about funding. They may draw on a variety of financing 
 
 259. Brandt, supra note 161, at 439. 
 260. An economist might propose a market mechanism as an alternative, but we doubt that 
such a market would be feasible because the rapidly shifting information base would make 
stable entitlements difficult to create. It would also be difficult to distribute initial entitlements 
to environmental participants. 
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tools, including federal and state appropriations, user fees, taxes, self-
supporting bonds (which California uses to help support CalFed),261 or 
perhaps in some cases, power revenues. 
Modular regulation relies, therefore, on a broad range of both 
regulatory tools and funding mechanisms to supplement the more 
traditional regulatory tools with which we are relatively familiar. And 
implementing these tools will require parties to negotiate agreements 
that look as much “contractual” as they are regulatory. As we saw 
with CalFed, these agreements have the advantage of flexibility. They 
can be modified more easily than rules. Yet this flexibility also 
presents a challenge because agreements must be updated on a 
regular basis. The revision process can serve important functions, 
however. It can remind parties of their commitments, force them to 
account for their actions, and incorporate new priorities and 
information as it develops over time. 
4. Facilitating Social Learning.  Modularity facilitates learning 
and incorporates useful information into decision making processes. 
Advocates of “adaptive management” routinely call for this kind of 
information-rich process.262 Yet it can be difficult to find good 
examples of it, in part because contemporary environmental 
regulation and natural resource management have been shaped by a 
legal regime that too often promotes the careful hoarding of 
information and fails to build in mechanisms for environmental 
agencies to learn from their actions. 
Modularity both depends upon and promotes “social learning,” 
which usually arises in more deliberative or collaborative processes in 
which participants with different perspectives interact, exchange 
information and arguments, and become open to the reformulation of 
goals and/or strategies.263 When we say “become open,” we do not 
mean anything magical, only that in settings like this, the presentation 
of data and argument can lead people to change their minds, 
especially when the alternative to working together is highly 
 
 261. See Connick & Innes, supra note 170, at 185 (noting that “otherwise opposing 
stakeholders jointly developed and publicly supported two major statewide ballot initiatives to 
raise nearly $3 billion for environmental restoration, water quality improvement, water use 
efficiency and water supply facilities”). 
 262. E.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 8–9 (1993). 
 263. On the concept of social learning, see Daniel Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental 
Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 459–64 (1999). 
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undesirable (e.g., continued stalemate or very costly adversarial 
options with high uncertainty as to outcome). This approach departs 
significantly from the adjudicative model that has long dominated 
environmental regulation and natural resource management. It moves 
away, that is, from a system focused on resolving which party is right, 
in favor of a deliberative model focused on determining what to do 
and how best to do it. 
In settings conducive to social learning, the participants might 
interact in a number of ways—direct and indirect, formal and 
informal—and “not just in the highly structured ways associated with 
conventional rule-making.”264 The purpose here is to move beyond a 
more traditional understanding of agency process, one in which 
interest groups submit their views to an agency charged with receiving 
them—a process that suggests unidirectional information 
transmission with little opportunity for substantive and flexible give 
and take, and in which all of the participants see the agency as 
retaining exclusive ownership over the key matters to be decided. 
To encourage the social learning that is necessary for modularity, 
participants must maximize opportunities for both sharing and 
developing information together.265 Conceivably this information 
would include not only technical and scientific data, but also 
information about industrial processes or agency practices, along with 
background information about assumptions, interests, and 
perspectives. Under the proper circumstances, changes in viewpoint 
within such groups can occur “mainly as a result of processes much 
more like the deliberative model than like the groupthink model 
emphasizing social conformity.”266 The best group decisions seem to 
result when the parties are operating under “flexible rigidity,” with 
high thresholds for acceptable outcomes.267 Ideally, such an approach 
substitutes a problem orientation for the traditional focus on 
competition, while at the same time giving participants “a relatively 
high minimum outcome they should be willing to settle for.”268 
Stringent prescriptive regulations can play an important shadow role 
 
 264. Id. at 460. 
 265. Fiorino, supra note 263, at 460; see also Freeman & Langbein, supra note 7, at 62 
(discussing learning as one of the most frequently reported benefits of regulatory negotiation). 
 266. Steven Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in 
Public Policymaking, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178, 193 (1992). 
 267. Id. at 194. 
 268. Id. 
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by establishing a compelling need for problem solving,269 as the ESA 
listing process and the CWA requirements for water quality standards 
did in the CalFed process. Approaches that facilitate social learning 
increase the chances that agencies and stakeholders will devise 
innovative solutions that none of them individually would have 
conceived, let alone implemented. Although we recognize that this 
kind of exchange, interaction, and information production could 
conceivably occur in a traditional regulatory process such as notice 
and comment rulemaking, we think it fair to say that what we 
describe here would be the exception rather than the rule in the 
traditional context. Modular approaches, by contrast, are self-
consciously designed to foster the kind of information-rich, highly 
interactive joint exercise we have in mind.270 
Empirical evidence suggests that such interactions can have 
positive effects. They can promote a disposition to cooperate, lead to 
new ways of thinking, contribute to the development of new group 
norms,271 improve once-adversarial relationships, and help to build 
trust.272 These positive benefits are likely to accrue, we propose, in 
situations where parties are encouraged to share the data on which 
their judgments are based and defend those judgments directly to 
each other.273 Again, we hasten to add a caveat: participants in 
longstanding environmental and natural resource conflicts will not 
lightly abandon their traditional interests. The point is simply that 
well-designed and effectively managed processes can encourage social 
learning through joint ownership of a problem, information sharing, 
 
 269. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (“We see the primary function of 
contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a 
framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine postdissolution rights and 
responsibilities.”). 
 270. See Kelman, supra note 266, 186–87 (explaining the phenomenon of social learning). 
 271. See id. at 185–86 (identifying how institutions that foster cooperation “encourag[e] 
participants to value and respect others”). 
 272. See Connick & Innes, supra note 170, at 180 (referring to collaborative policymaking 
and arguing that agreements can be important as markers but that “[w]hat are less ephemeral 
are the relationships, practices, norms and behaviours that emerge and persist”). 
 273. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: 
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 13 (1987) (arguing that 
consensual decision making produces public policy that will “avoid stalemate, reduce the need 
for litigation, and restore the credibility of government”); Lawrence Susskind & Merrick 
Hoben, Making Regional Policy Dialogues Work: A Credo for Metro-Scale Consensus Building, 
22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 123, 127–30 (2004) (explaining how a modular approach is 
optimal in addressing a hypothetical intermunicipal conflict). 
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and focused articulation of rationales. In so doing, they can increase 
the prospects for generating useful information. Whether that 
information is in fact incorporated into decision making requires 
another step, of course, but that it be generated in the first instance is 
necessary. 
The EWA illustrates how process design can be so closely linked 
to substantive policy development that the line between the two 
seems to blur. First, recall that the EWA only surfaced once federal 
and state officials, and other stakeholders with relevant expertise, 
began to focus together on how to meet all of the Delta’s competing 
needs at a time of crisis. Although some of the building blocks of the 
EWA were already in place before CalFed—agency coordination on 
the Accord standards and the beginnings of shared expertise—water 
operators could not run the pumps in a “real time way” because they 
were bound to meet the prescriptive standards set under the ESA. 
This, and the preoccupation of the stakeholders with competition 
over the resource, made it difficult for an alternative like the EWA to 
take shape as a policy. It only surfaced, and then developed into an 
option that could be implemented, when key players were asked 
under pressure to find new ways to cooperate. 
The EWA was developed through a yearlong process—begun 
even earlier by the Ops Group—that required intense cooperation 
between the water agencies and the fisheries agencies, but it 
depended to a significant extent on other stakeholders like the 
powerful Metropolitan Water District and knowledgeable 
representatives from the environmental community. Together, the 
participants created technical teams to build and run water supply 
models of water delivery for multiple purposes. These modeling 
games depended on “real data on hydrology, project operations, and 
fish populations from past years, to experiment with different ways of 
managing the system” and represented “a turning point.”274 Quoting 
from an interview published in Estuary magazine, Hudzik recounts 
how one CalFed staff member described the process: 
It’s like playing three-dimensional chess all day long. When we get 
out of the gaming room, we’re all brain dead. But the work that 
follows the game is even more important. For every eight hours of 
gaming it takes another 12 hours to figure out if we did any good. 
 
 274. Hudzik, supra note 142, at 47. Hudzik’s article provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
EWA. Id. at 45–51. 
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Did we do better than a standard? Did we make more water? Did 
we use it more efficiently? How many fish did we lose?275 
According to Wright, this was an innovation that could only have 
been accomplished by challenging the monopoly on expertise claimed 
by agencies like USBR and DWR, agencies that had historically been 
reluctant to try to satisfy multiple demands and which, as a result, 
lacked credibility in the environmental community. Yet water 
districts with no such prior commitments or political baggage 
emerged to offer stakeholders independent expertise on modeling.276 
Similarly, on the environmental side, fish and wildlife agencies were 
no longer the sole experts—the environmental and university 
communities had become equally sophisticated. This 
“democratization of expertise” proved indispensable to devising the 
EWA.277 
The modeling games gave the engineers and scientists who 
conducted them “an understanding of the water system as a whole 
that went well beyond the understanding each of them had brought to 
the process as individuals.”278  
Perhaps most striking, the EWA requires a close working 
alliance among agencies that have been adversaries throughout the 
Bay-Delta conflict. The two groups of agencies have very different 
cultures and represent very different constituencies—constituencies 
that generally prefer to sue each other rather than cooperate. 
Running the EWA now requires that water project managers from 
DWR and USBR (typically trained as engineers) and wildlife officials 
from FWS and DFG (typically trained as biologists) work together to 
operate the two water storage and conveyance facility networks in the 
state. This alliance could produce a great deal of productive learning. 
Engineers will learn more about listed fish species’ sensitivities. 
Biologists will learn more about minimizing water project yield 
costs. All will need to learn how to develop the EWA through 
project reoperation [increased yield from operational adjustments 
during periods when fish do not need water], taking advantage of 
periods when the projects have minimal effect on fish and project 
yield can grow. This deepening relationship between the ESA 
 
 275. Id. at 47–48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 276. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 2. 
 277. See generally WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 6 (providing case studies of 
collaborative efforts). 
 278. Hudzik, supra note 142, at 48. 
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Agencies and the Project Agencies offers one of the most important, 
yet unstated, benefits from the EWA’s development.279 
The EWA illustrates the extent to which policy innovation can 
be deeply dependent on process design. Modular structures are based 
on this understanding. In addition, the example demonstrates that 
something unexpected and productive can arise from a conflict-ridden 
situation when incentives are realigned to promote social learning. 
Remarkably, this can happen even when many of the background 
legal constraints continue to exert a countervailing force on the 
modular structure. 
The learning process in modular initiatives may not look familiar, 
and it may not work in an entirely linear or predictable way. An 
example from the climate change context helps illustrate the way in 
which a seemingly inchoate process can nevertheless be productive: 
“Scientists may start with something they learned about the smoke 
from volcanoes, put it alongside telescopic observations of Venus, 
notice the chemistry of smog in Los Angeles, and plug it all into a 
computer calculation about clouds.”280 This process “doesn’t look like 
an exploring team moving into new territory. It looks more like a 
crowd of people scurrying about, some huddling together to exchange 
notes, others straining to hear a distant voice or shouting criticism 
across the hubbub.”281 Our concept of modular regulation 
contemplates somewhat more structure but shares this sense of 
improvised interconnectivities. 
5. Adaptation.  Modular structures are designed to be adaptive, 
meaning they must be flexible enough to absorb new information as it 
develops.282 Because knowledge of environmental problems is so 
dramatically incomplete, and because environmental systems are so 
dynamic, regulatory and management institutions cannot be static.283 
The challenge is to ensure that the modular structure is responsive 
and nimble enough to engage in dynamic learning, while being stable 
enough to function effectively. We can break this into three 
subproblems: (1) maintaining the necessary collection of information 
 
 279. Brandt, supra note 161, at 448. 
 280. SPENCER WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 193–94 (2003). 
 281. Id. at 194. 
 282. For a definition of adaptive management, see Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 202–04. 
 283. FARBER, supra note 6, at 179. 
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by components of the modular system, (2) obtaining the needed flow 
of information among components of the modular system, and (3) 
keeping the organization flexible enough to respond to changing 
information. 
Consider the challenge posed by CalFed. Even with over twenty 
expert government agencies and a wide variety of experienced 
stakeholders participating in the process, the dearth of knowledge 
about virtually every aspect of the Bay-Delta system is striking. What, 
for example, is really responsible for the failing fish populations in the 
Delta? The CalFed process cries out for scientific and technical 
information. This, we believe, is a key aspect of modularity: modular 
systems create institutions and structures aimed at generating and 
using timely, high quality information while avoiding “battles of the 
experts” that seek a single right answer. As Sam Luoma, CalFed’s 
first Lead Scientist, saw it, the advocacy approach to science that 
informed the pre-CalFed dispute was not very good at helping 
decision makers address the gray areas “where the science is 
uncertain and the decision-makers’ need for objective information is 
the greatest.”284 
The Science Program helps to facilitate information collection 
and processing, which has been a recurrent problem in environmental 
regulation and natural resource management. This is enormously 
expensive and time consuming, and it often lacks a constituency. 
Indeed, interest groups sometimes would prefer to avoid the 
collection of new information that might contradict their own 
positions. By providing timely, useful, and highly credible 
information, modular structures can help to foster a constituency of 
“information consumers” in the form of other agencies and 
stakeholders. This new constituency can then maintain a demand for 
continued information collection. Again, the BDA’s role in 
promoting the use of science across the agencies in every aspect of the 
CalFed implementation process is instructive.  
Even when the relevant information has been collected, 
however, it may not reach the people who really need it, either 
because of organizational reluctance to receive or share it, or both. 
Even when information flows freely, the system may be too inflexible 
to adapt to it, as when a change in direction would require not just a 
new agreement but a new rulemaking process. Ideally, modular 
 
 284. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 26. 
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processes provide mechanisms by which information can be directly 
fed into the system, as the EWA example illustrates with its approach 
to allocating water assets on an as-needed basis. This attitude toward 
information generation and consumption departs significantly from 
the approach that now dominates environmental law and natural 
resource management, an approach exemplified by statutes like the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires agencies 
to disclose impacts or collect data without necessarily requiring that 
agencies put the data to productive use.285 
Processes like CalFed can also spawn what we call 
“submodularity,” a variety of smaller scale teams or components that 
might address pieces of particular problems. These might take the 
form of subcommittees of stakeholders and agencies, as occurs in 
CalFed. Submodular structures like the BDPAC committees helped 
to generate the DIP, the alternative strategy for fish screens and the 
novel approach to water quality standards. Still more submodular 
processes might emerge in CalFed over time. For example, if a 
particular watershed within the larger Bay-Delta ecosystem is 
identified as needing a restoration plan, a team can be assembled 
specifically for that purpose, using staff from a variety of state, 
federal, and local agencies, as well representatives from stakeholder 
groups with relevant expertise. Indeed, submodular structures already 
seem to be proliferating in CalFed. For example, regional and local 
entities are increasingly exercising primary responsibility for 
implementing the key actions in the ROD (e.g., in developing 
watershed plans or integrated water management plans), which frees 
the CalFed agencies to remain focused on systemwide 
improvements.286 The agencies can also increase local knowledge of, 
and support for, programmatic goals by providing financial and 
technical assistance to submodular units. Indeed, Wright reports that 
where CalFed is seen as a source of funding and technical assistance 
for these efforts, local support for CalFed is stronger.287 
Notice that these submodular structures do not permanently 
rearrange existing bureaucracies. Instead, they are provisional units 
 
 285. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (noting that critics 
“bemoan the length and cost of the NEPA process [and] the spottiness and low overall quality 
of the information it generates”). 
 286. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 10. 
 287. Id. 
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focused on a specific task. If they involve local participation, they may 
be especially adept at responding to the needs and perspectives at the 
county, district, or municipal level. And they may have the benefit of 
transmitting that more local experience to higher-ups who may be less 
familiar with how watersheds function locally. Ideally, submodular 
structures provide the vehicle for information to flow in an organized 
way throughout the larger modular system.288 
Submodularity may also enhance flexibility. Being able to 
assemble problem-solving teams from particular agencies and 
stakeholder groups offers a way to meet new challenges without 
creating a rigid bureaucratic structure. The ability of modular and 
submodular components to combine in different ways provides a way 
of matching the right team with each problem. Modularity also helps 
address another barrier to agency flexibility, which is simply the 
inevitable fact that some agency officials are likely to be resistant to 
change. Those officials may be valuable, and their lack of flexibility 
may even be beneficial in tasks requiring central coordination.289 In 
any event, agency employees will necessarily vary in their problem-
solving orientation and ability to adapt to new circumstances. 
Submodularity allows the most flexible individuals to be matched 
with problem-solving tasks requiring flexibility, leaving their more 
rigid colleagues to handle important but more routine tasks.290 These 
personnel issues may seem petty compared with the grand issues of 
regulatory or management reform, but in the end, the ability to 
effectively use personnel is key to the success of any system and 
especially critical when organizations are expected to adapt to 
changing circumstances. 
As we have suggested, modularity is meant to convey this kind of 
institutional provisionalism. Without wishing to eliminate traditional 
bureaucracies, we propose that their component parts can be 
reconfigured into relatively larger and smaller structures for 
particular purposes. This requires thinking about agencies in terms of 
what they have to offer rather than how they usually act. Agencies 
represent a collection of different expertise, perspectives, and tools. 
 
 288. The “No-Name” group played something akin to this role in supplying information to 
the Ops Group and disseminating it back to stakeholders. Connick & Innes, supra note 170, at 
189–90. 
 289. MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING 
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 234 (2000). 
 290. Id. at 233–34. 
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To reconfigure agencies effectively, of course, requires adopting a 
problem solving orientation, in which the “trick is to define the 
problem in the most natural and insightful terms, resisting the 
temptation to force problems into the mold of existing programs or 
bureaucratic structures.”291 
Far from addressing every aspect of a complex problem at the 
same time, then, a modular approach requires careful delineation of 
the matters that are most closely related and capable of being 
addressed simultaneously or through coordinated action, both in the 
short and longer term. Although this can sound abstract, it is in fact 
rather intuitive and sensible. Think of a building contractor planning 
and coordinating the many steps of construction in the context of 
imperfect information: demolition, drywall, wiring, plumbing, and the 
like. Some things must come before others; some must happen 
simultaneously; a few are so interdependent that they must be 
coordinated every step of the way. Some aspects of construction must 
be done immediately, though others can be deferred into the future. 
Unlikely things happen. And of course someone must keep paying 
the bills. A successful modular system will match components and 
subcomponents (teams and groups) with a defined set of tasks that 
represent only part of the larger problem. In doing so, the 
construction of the problems themselves will likely change. This is the 
hallmark of an adaptive system: new information and experience 
should help decision makers reconceptualize the challenges they face. 
CalFed illustrates that this kind of adaptation can take place when, as 
Nichols put it, you put the right people together in a room. 
A related concern is the ability of modular structures to remain 
flexible and responsive as new facts and circumstances arise, while 
providing enough transparency to ensure that discretion is exercised 
in an accountable manner. This is, of course, an exceedingly delicate 
balance to strike. Traditionally in environmental law, as in 
administrative law generally, we add procedures to constrain 
discretion out of concern that too much flexibility will allow 
administrators to operate irrationally or to act out of purely political 
motives. Yet a modular approach requires at least some flexibility—
the process would grind to a halt if every agency decision were 
 
 291. Id. at 147. For example: “Ecosystem management structures (watershed-based 
committees) can tackle ecosystem-shaped problems, but they are the wrong apparatus for 
solving industry problems that straddle multiple watershed areas or for addressing household 
threats.” Id. 
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obligated to go through a cumbersome and relatively formal process. 
Modular structures are characterized by at least as much informality 
as the traditional administrative process (which has considerable 
informality built into it despite the strictures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act), and likely significantly more. Witness the 
proliferation of informal instruments in CalFed, including the MOAs, 
“packages” that require written commitments, and annual workplans 
mentioned earlier. Certainly, these kinds of instruments might permit 
a broader range of discretion than would rules and orders. And they 
are easier to modify than regulations or enabling legislation. 
Indeed, CalFed is a good example of how regulatory tools can 
become more flexible over time, allowing decision makers more 
discretion. Again, the EWA provides an example: 
Before the Accord, . . . virtually all flow standards were expressed as 
mean monthly instream flows. Compliance is easy to measure, but 
otherwise this approach is not very effective in protecting fish that 
may migrate at different times in different years. We now have a 
more flexible set of tools, including the EWA . . ., and we even allow 
some standards to be relaxed to bank the water later for fish. . . . 
Under the old approach, the agencies simply monitored compliance 
with the standards and updated them (usually as a result of 
litigation) every decade or so through the adversarial process 
established by the State Water Resources Control Board. The 
agencies can now do experiments with these blocks of water and 
change how they allocate supplies on a daily, monthly, or annual 
basis, without going through any kind of formal regulatory process, 
and in doing so, immediately take advantage of the scientific work 
underway.292 
Of course, operational flexibility and informal regulatory tools, 
as administrative and environmental law scholars well know, both 
pose significant downside risks. The environmental community 
involved in the CalFed process may worry that the much touted 
“flexibility” of the collaborative process will really amount to a 
consistent preference for, say, farmers over fish, when it comes to 
allocating water. They might suspect that the regulatory baselines 
 
 292. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 6–7 (emphasis in original). Wright explains that “in 
the first year of the EWA, the agencies allocated some of their EWA supplies to protect 
migrating winter-run salmon.” Id. at 7. Then in later years, the scientific data showed little 
evidence that pumping is a major concern for the winter-run, so the agencies allocated their 
supplies to the Delta smelt instead. Id. Wright cites this as a good example of real-time 
management made possible by the flexibility of the regulatory tools. Id. 
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over which they have litigated so fervently will be undermined or 
deferred until later in a highly discretionary and relatively invisible 
process that is not as easy to monitor as lawsuits.293 
Such concerns are perfectly legitimate and they sound an 
important note of caution. Ultimately, modular enterprises will 
depend heavily on the capacity of the institutional framework to 
deliver on its commitments or to offer credible explanations of why 
progress may be slower than expected. This is the only way to build 
trust. Still, in a multistakeholder environment where resources are 
scarce and valuable, parties will always have reason to complain. 
Even when they benefit, it will be simply against their long-term 
interest in gaining even more to claim they have received enough. 
The key, as Wright points out, is to hold the moderate center 
together. Of course, it matters who the decision makers are in such 
systems. If decision making becomes highly politicized, with wild 
swings in orientation as administrations change, stakeholders will 
conclude that the “balance” promised them will never materialize. 
The institutional framework must provide some assurance of stability 
for stakeholders to buy into it. This is why insulating decision makers 
from political winds, to at least some extent, is crucial. The BDA’s 
unique structure as an independent agency with a stakeholder 
advisory group offers one example of an effort to avoid total 
dominance by either the executive or the legislative branch, or by any 
single agency.  
6. Public Participation/Accountability.  Modular structures 
require multiple avenues, formal and informal, for broad stakeholder 
participation. Ideally, this not only improves the quality of decision 
making but also to help provide accountability. The key difference 
between participation in a modular process and the public 
participation provided by traditional administrative process lies in the 
diversity of roles that stakeholders can play; in a modular process 
they both generate policy ideas and perform an accountability 
function. 
As we have already noted, stakeholder participation in the 
CalFed process has been both highly varied and highly valuable. Like 
 
 293. For example, the commitments offered in the DIP, which promises greater flexibility in 
Delta export pumping to make it easier to meet the program’s multiple objectives, could 
conceivably result in excess pumping to the detriment of the fish. Id. The DIP commitments 
have no legal force behind them. Id. 
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most features of CalFed, the format of stakeholder participation has 
evolved over time, but it has always proceeded simultaneously along 
multiple tracks. The BDPAC is the most formalized avenue for 
stakeholder input both to the Authority and the implementing 
agencies, but there are numerous other channels. In some instances, 
as with the EWA, stakeholders participate fairly directly in the sort of 
operational decision making that is normally thought to be the 
exclusive domain of agencies. Modular structures are characterized 
by this kind of deep and broad stakeholder participation. 
Indeed, sometimes stakeholder participation leads to real policy 
shifts and new ideas, as we have seen not only with the development 
and operation of the EWA but with the DIP and the ELPH strategy 
as well. These examples demonstrate that stakeholder expertise can 
be enormously valuable, as can their relative independence. Federal 
and state agencies have no monopoly on the scientific and 
technological knowledge required to address complex environmental 
problems. This is not because average citizens living in local 
watersheds necessarily have engineering degrees. The expertise in 
which we are most interested likely resides in sophisticated local 
institutions or interest groups with training, experience, and track 
records. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not just that agencies can help to 
mediate disputes among historically warring stakeholders but that 
stakeholder involvement can help to overcome impasses between 
historically opposed agencies.  
Nevertheless, the inspirational stories of breakthroughs due to 
stakeholder initiative are frequently enough balanced by more 
depressing accounts of breakdowns, or of less than noble 
participation—as when stakeholders remain active solely to protect 
their interests, threatening all the while to do an end-run around the 
process via litigation—to give us pause.294 And the problems are not 
always caused by stakeholders. There can be instances in which 
decision makers consult stakeholder groups in a pro forma way 
simply to maintain the appearance of public consultation. Such 
behavior can be expected to occur in collaborative processes that 
depend on negotiation and compromise. The hope is that they can be 
minimized. 
Despite these shortcomings, the CalFed process represents an 
improvement over the two most traditional mechanisms of public 
 
 294. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4–5. 
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involvement in agency decision making: the notice and comment 
process for rulemaking and the EIS planning process under NEPA 
and CEQA. These mechanisms provide only relatively infrequent and 
superficial opportunities for consultation. In these processes the 
agency (usually a single one) retains “ownership” over decision 
making, and has relatively few, and often highly structured, 
opportunities to hear from knowledgeable players. Moreover, 
stakeholder participation will be most intense at peak-level moments, 
as when a rule is proposed or an EIS is issued, rather than throughout 
the life of planning and implementation. Stakeholders may find it 
especially valuable to have an opportunity to influence decisions 
made by agencies that are traditionally opposed to their interests. The 
interagency processes and stakeholder fora in the CalFed process 
afford opportunities for environmentalists to make some headway 
with USBR, and for water contractors to have some impact on FWS. 
B. Modular Analogs 
We have tried to give the concept of modularity sufficient 
content in the environmental context to enable someone to discern 
whether a particular initiative can credibly claim to be modular. To 
further illustrate what we have in mind, we draw in this section on 
modular analogs that arise in fields far-removed from environmental 
regulation. 
In the computer industry, for example, modularity “means 
organizing complements (products that work with one another) to 
interoperate through public, nondiscriminatory, and well-understood 
interfaces.”295 This might involve “[a]n open architecture [which] can 
facilitate innovation in individual components” and allow “rapid trial-
and-error learning.”296 Flexibility and the capacity to facilitate 
learning are key features of a modular structure in this context. 
Despite the obvious differences between the two settings, 
designing software and designing organizations to tackle 
environmental problems share some challenges. For example, both 
settings call for systems capable of processing large amounts of 
information and performing complex tasks. Both settings also raise 
 
 295. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access 
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 85, 95 (2004). 
 296. Id. at 95; see also id. at 92 (noting that a modular structure “facilitated innovation in 
ways that had not been matched with an integrated structure”). 
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issues of transparency (needed by the software engineers for error 
correction and later modification of software; needed by 
environmental regulators for both error correction and public 
accountability), and both must pay careful attention to linkages 
between components to ensure they function without discord. Even 
more concretely than in the environmental context, modularity in 
software design refers to the extent to which an entity “can be broken 
down into smaller components, or modules, that can be 
independently and asynchronously produced before they are 
assembled into a whole.”297 This captures the notion of building, 
unbuilding, and rebuilding that we referred to earlier.298 Modularity 
makes possible, among other things, the design of public source 
software by multiple individuals, allowing scattered individuals to 
rival the product of the world’s largest corporation.299  
One of modularity’s key features is the coordination of existing 
agencies for particular purposes, without necessarily creating 
cumbersome new bureaucracies. Recall that the role of the BDA is to 
facilitate and encourage this coordination. A modular system thus 
facilitates the pooling of expertise from many different entities.300 
Transaction cost economics supplies a useful analog for this aspect of 
modularity. Consider, for example, the so-called “make/buy” decision 
that business enterprises confront when choosing whether to 
outsource work to a network of suppliers rather than acquiring those 
suppliers and integrating all operations within a single organization.301 
According to transaction cost economists, there are limits to how 
much activity a single organization can effectively control. For that 
 
 297. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 
369, 435 (2002). 
 298. In software design, for example, “[T]ransparent modularity permits code to be 
modified; it permits one part to be substituted for another. The code then is open; the code is 
modular; chunks could be moved and substituted for something else; many forks, or ways that 
the code could develop, are possible.” Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Value 
of Internet Governance, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1405, 1415 (1999). 
 299. See Benkler, supra note 297, at 434–36 (describing how modularity plays a key role in 
the efficiency of large-scale collaborations); Lessig, supra note 298, at 1410 (noting that some 
believe Linux to be “the single greatest threat” to Microsoft). 
 300. See Sabel et al., supra note 6, at 14–15 (identifying pooling as a means of consolidating 
data to develop more effective regulatory practices). 
 301. For an overview of the elements that factor into such decisions, see Benkler, supra note 
297, at 400–23. 
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reason, it is more efficient to cooperate with other firms rather than 
to perform everything in-house.302  
Eventually, diseconomies of scope and scale catch up with any 
organization. This is as true in the regulatory sphere as in business. 
Thus, it is possible to discern the outlines of a transaction cost 
approach to modularity. Overcoming diseconomies of scale and scope 
can be an important function of regulatory modularity. Where 
agencies have different areas of specialization, configuring them for 
particular purposes can take advantage of the economy of scale 
resulting from their respective strengths. It might be quite difficult 
and costly, by contrast, for a new bureaucratic entity to develop the 
relevant expertise on its own. And, of course, there is the political 
impracticability of eliminating agencies that have become entrenched. 
A modular approach offers an avenue for reform that is less 
wrenching and more pragmatic. 
Yet another example of modularity can be found in the 
international context, in which states come together to create 
differently configured “regimes” (essentially, formal or informal rule 
systems) for solving particular problems.303 Nation states naturally 
have different values and interests, and relatively more or less power, 
yet they frequently coordinate their activities. They do this in myriad 
ways: by signing treaties, building international institutions, entering 
 
 302. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 117 (1975) (“The distinctive powers of internal organization are 
impaired and transactional diseconomies are incurred as firm size and the degree of vertical 
integration are progressively extended.”). 
 303. For examples of such regimes, see the World Trade Organization, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. International law scholars are just beginning to identify and analyze the 
relationships between these different sets of rules. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The 
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6–7 (2004) (analyzing the reasons for and relevance of international regimes 
in the context of international intellectual property law); Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The 
Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, INT’L ORG. 277, 279–81 (2004) (defining a regime 
in the singular as a core international agreement administered by a discrete organization and 
extending the analysis to “regime complexes,” in which interrelated and overlapping regimes 
require broad rules to allow navigation of conflicting legal rules, thereby enabling 
argumentation over interpretation and forum shopping among regime institutions). See 
generally Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from 
Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 933 (2003) (proposing a process of developing an 
international antitrust regime based on lessons learned from the development of international 
intellectual property regimes because of the shared characteristics of the two fields). 
On the conflict between different regimes, see generally Theme Statement: Conflict and 
Coordination Across International Regimes, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 325 (2003). 
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informal agreements, and engaging in episodic ad hoc cooperation. In 
addition to agreements among states, moreover, international 
cooperation and coordination can arise less formally, through 
networks of regulators or other substate actors such as 
nongovernmental organizations.304 
The implicit suggestion of this perspective on international 
relations is that states and their subparts build and then participate in 
a wide variety of arrangements for different purposes. One can 
imagine regimes, therefore, as an example of the kind of institutional 
provisionalism that we think of as modular. These processes allow 
states and networks of actors across states to maintain officially their 
separate identities and voices, while acting in concert in a wide variety 
of ways to advance their interests. It is intriguing to see the 
supposedly hierarchical world of domestic regulation evolving in a 
direction reminiscent of modern international relations. The 
components of the modular structure in each setting provide access 
points—voice opportunities—for a wide variety of groups and 
perspectives. As in the international arena, there is tremendous 
heterogeneity among interest groups in the domestic sphere. A more 
hierarchical organizational form would provide fewer opportunities 
for this kind of cross-cutting input. 
While incomplete, these examples are suggestive, we hope, as 
analogs and metaphors. They highlight some additional benefits of 
modularity that supplement our own case study: the idea that 
modular structures may increase structural transparency and 
flexibility, help to overcome diseconomies of scope and scale, and be 
better able than hierarchical structures to accommodate diverse 
voices. Of course, we recognize that this vision remains a normative 
ideal. Real world modular structures may go some of this distance, 
but they still face serious obstacles. We turn to these in the next 
section. 
 
 304. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 
183–97; see also MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (1998) (describing the emergence of 
“transnational advocacy networks” consisting of state and nonstate actors). 
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IV.  OBSTACLES TO MODULARITY 
A. Resistant Agencies 
One of the greatest obstacles to modularity, as noted, is the 
traditionally narrow mandates, missions, and organizational 
structures of regulatory and management agencies.305 Many agencies 
resist coordinating their activities with other agencies, even when they 
might agree that coordination would be beneficial because they face 
few incentives to do so. This is the product not only of statutory 
mandates, but also of oversight by the three branches. Congress tends 
not only to authorize but to fund agencies on an individual basis. For 
their part, courts have little opportunity to encourage interagency 
coordination; their main function is to ensure that individual agencies 
do not abuse the discretion afforded them by Congress. And 
although, of all the branches, the executive branch may have the 
biggest interest in interagency coordination,306 it nevertheless remains 
elusive.307 Agencies tend to reflexively resist sharing their authority or 
 
 305. This point, and many others like those we make in the rest of this section, were made 
(it has been pointed out to us) in an impressive CEQ Report commissioned by the Clinton 
administration but never acted upon. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS 7 (1997), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/nepa25fn.pdf. Ten years 
ago, the Clinton administration was already thinking along the lines of interagency teams, 
stakeholder partnerships, and cross-cutting budgets—the building blocks for the kind of 
modularity we advocate here. The EPA also published a path-breaking work during the same 
period through its watershed planning and ecosystem restoration programs, which have led to 
increased agency coordination on a watershed basis. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 191–92 
(citing EPA efforts to replicate nationally programs like the Chesapeake Bay Program, which 
use a “watershed approach”). 
 306. See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 1, 11–12 (1994) (arguing that only the President, and not Congress, has the 
incentive to coordinate across agencies); see also id. at 18–19 (discussing how presidents can 
centralize control over policy decision by imposing managerial rules, using the Office of 
Management and Budget, and establishing structures). 
 307. For example, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, both the President and 
Congress have instituted a variety of reforms aimed at increasing interagency coordination over 
national security, including the creation of an entirely new agency:  the Department of 
Homeland Security.  See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101–103, 116 
Stat. 2135, 2142–45 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 111–113 (Supp. 2004)). However, interagency 
coordination is still weak. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-323, U.S. PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION EFFORTS HAMPERED BY THE LACK OF A 
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 2–5 (2005) (describing the need for greater 
interagency coordination for national security), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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constraining their flexibility in any way that might compromise their 
independence and power. Agencies may also erect obstacles to too 
much public involvement—many agency staff likely think the 
traditional public comment period works just fine and have no wish to 
cede decision making power to outsiders. And finally, agencies are 
especially reluctant to yield any of their budgeting authority. They 
can be expected to push for funding for their narrow priorities rather 
than for what’s best for the program as a whole, if it would diminish 
their share.308 
Moreover, the extent to which agency culture can be a significant 
impediment to change cannot be overstated. One of the lessons of the 
CalFed process is that each agency brings different notions of their 
roles and different cultures to the table. Some agencies are motivated 
to improve the quality of their decision making to accomplish their 
statutory mandates, whereas others are more oriented to assisting 
their clients even when doing so conflicts with a larger notion of the 
“public interest.” Some agencies have track records of being more 
open and transparent in decision making, whereas others have 
legacies of being closed. And finally, agency staff tend to have 
relatively narrow job classifications and areas of expertise. Relatively 
few of them can be expected to have been exposed to dispute 
resolution and collaborative processes. 
It is difficult to convey how challenging interagency coordination 
can be, even with committed, strong leadership and a set of key 
players willing to risk political capital with their constituencies.309 
Agency cooperation requires resources in the form of personnel and 
money. Insufficient resources is said to be the most common cause of 
failure in cooperative efforts.310 Yet securing sufficient funding is 
easier said than done. As we saw with CalFed, modular approaches to 
regulation and management will require a substantial commitment of 
resources, sometimes in the billions of dollars, which is especially 
difficult to raise in times of budget shortfall.  
 
 308. See Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 32 (“[A]gencies in general in any area of 
government are resistant to sharing their authorities and to any actions or structures that could 
constrain their independence or normal decision-making process.”). 
 309. As one scholar remarks: “Agencies cooperate? Of course not! As one of my colleagues 
quipped when I told her I was writing a book about interagency cooperation, ‘Short book, 
huh?’” EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND 
THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 4 (1998). 
 310. Id. at 163. “Nothing coordinates like cash,” says one scholar. See id. at 191. 
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Beyond being expensive, modular structures present unique 
problems because they require programmatic funding across issues 
and agencies. As we noted earlier, the legislative process is neither 
organized nor accustomed to funding on this cross-cutting basis.311 In a 
recent effort to secure federal authorization for CalFed, the 
program’s advocates sought precisely this kind of funding in the form 
of a “block grant” intended to cut across agencies, with the idea that 
budgeting decisions among them would be guided by general 
principles like “balanced implementation.”312 This would leave agency 
administrators (presumably advised by the BDA) with the freedom to 
steer funds to those aspects of the larger CalFed Program that needed 
it first or most. The effort to secure such funding failed, however. In 
the end, Congress authorized CalFed but required that the legislation 
describe all of the specific projects and programs in the CalFed ROD. 
As Wright says, key members of Congress needed to assure 
themselves that the program was balanced. They were not prepared 
to leave those judgments to agencies, guided by the BDA.313 Although 
this is hardly surprising from a traditional oversight perspective, it 
reduces the flexibility to adjust the balance of funding as conditions 
change.314 
Thus, modular processes not only require substantial resources, 
they may well require a different approach to funding entirely. The 
federal budget process stymies efforts at cross-cut budgeting at every 
turn, not just in the appropriations process. For example, now that the 
federal authorization bill has passed, OMB has developed an 
 
 311. See Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 6 (stating that attracting support for CalFed in 
Congress is difficult because members must be convinced to accept the plan as a whole, rather 
than picking and choosing elements they want to support). We suspect that fragmentation 
among oversight committees for different agencies could be another contributing factor. 
 312. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 4. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Wright recalls the fateful meeting between Senators Feinstein (D-CA) and Kyl (R-AZ) 
on the CalFed bill this way: “At one point Kyl turned to me and said, ‘Sorry, I understand that 
you have an innovative program out there, and that balance is important but I’m a traditional 
guy, and I need to see things done the traditional way.’” Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 1. 
Convincing members of Congress to fund on a more programmatic basis is especially 
challenging when members had no significant role in shaping CalFed from the start. And the 
fact that CalFed depends on a multiple agency strategy for implementation also complicates the 
process of seeking support in Congress. Instead of focusing lobbying efforts on one agency (e.g., 
the Department of Interior, which funded CalFed in the initial stages) the Program must 
continue to seek funding from many different agencies, which means many different 
congressional committees will need to be persuaded of its merits. Wright Notes, supra note 119, 
at 4. 
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interagency cross-cut budget that shows all expenditures related to 
CalFed.315 This helps to convey to legislators what CalFed as a whole 
requires, and it could help to coordinate what the agencies need 
relative to one another on an ongoing basis. Still, OMB produces the 
interagency budget after agencies submit their requests. There is no 
interagency process on the front end, at the planning stage when it is 
needed most. As Wright says, “There is still no adequate mechanism 
for a truly interagency approach. The agencies involved not only 
don’t share their budget requests that go to OMB, they are prohibited 
from sharing them—and they have separate OMB examiners—
because all budgeting is done on an agency by agency basis.”316 
Beyond funding modular efforts, Congress and state legislatures 
can help to stimulate modularity by creating legislative triggers or 
default rules that force stakeholders to cooperate. We saw this in the 
CalFed process. Strict legal mandates, like ESA-driven limits on 
pumping, or water quality standards under the CWA, can trigger a 
sense of crisis that prompts agencies to overcome traditional ways of 
doing business. Little concentrates the efforts of an agency as much as 
the prospect of an ESA injunction or the anticipation of pump 
shutdowns in the Delta during growing season. Litigation may 
function as a useful background threat, as long as it is not used so 
indiscriminately as to derail the process entirely. One study suggests 
that the perceived threat of litigation is one of the two most important 
factors determining levels of interagency cooperation.317 
The other important factor in promoting cooperation is the 
influence of professionals across agencies who share both a common 
perspective and a professional network.318 To the extent that 
 
 315. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CALFED FY 1998–2006 BUDGET CROSSCUT 
METHODOLOGY (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/ 
ap_cd_rom/calfed_methods.pdf; OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CALFED-RELATED FED. 
FUNDING (2005) (showing federal funding by CalFed category and by agency), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/ap_cd_rom/calfed.pdf. 
 316. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 6; see also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
supra note 305, at 7 (citing interagency coordination as key to successful collaboration). 
 317. THOMAS, supra note 31, at 258–59. Managers particularly feared the loss of autonomy 
that an injunction would cause. Id. at 263. 
 318. Id. at 261. Professor Thomas argues that the influence of ecologists was due in large 
part to their united viewpoint: 
Their influence resulted not from their absolute numbers or line authority within the 
agencies, but rather from their consensual knowledge. The management principles of 
conservation biology offered synergistic possibilities for joint gains that spread 
throughout the larger epistemic community of ecologists, and were gradually 
understood and accepted by line managers and field staff as well. 
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legislators, in structuring agencies, and agency staff themselves in 
coordinating with one another, can promote these connections, they 
can help to lay a foundation for modularity.319 In addition, 
cooperation may work best with agencies whose line managers enjoy 
significant discretion and are not tied down by complicated standard 
operating procedures.320 Again, there is a lesson for legislatures: 
narrowly circumscribed statutory delegations may frustrate 
cooperative problem solving, even as they serve to constrain agency 
discretion.  
B. Accountability 
As with any governmental decision-making structure, we expect 
modular systems to be accountable. But this begs the question, 
Accountable to whom? And what is evidence of sufficient 
accountability? We resist characterizing the accountability challenge 
in this context as a simple version of a principal-agent problem.321 
That characterization can be appropriate in some instances, but it 
seems too formal and simplistic for the environmental and natural 
resource contexts with which we are concerned. For example, the 
traditional principal-agent formulation assumes the existence of a 
principal with well-defined preferences. Yet this fails utterly to 
capture the dynamic in a multiagency, multistakeholder, 
intergovernmental process like CalFed. In these situations, there are 
likely to be numerous principals across different levels of government 
with a variety of sometimes competing preferences. We expect that a 
modular system such as this will raise the same concerns about 
accountability that arise in any networklike arrangement of decision 
makers in which power is diffused.322 
 
Id. As Thomas explains: “In California, agency ecologists had been cooperating for years—
within professional networks, across agency boundaries—trying to develop plans and gather 
agency resources to implement these plans.” Id. at 265. According to Thomas’s study, the Park 
Service did not cooperate well because it was on good terms with environmental groups and 
was, therefore, not worried about being sued. Id. at 267. 
 319. Professor Thomas’s study also revealed that the rotation of personnel could present a 
serious barrier to cooperation, which depends on long-term working relationships. These are 
unlikely to develop in agencies where “success” often leads to transfer. Id. at 271–73. 
 320. Id. at 274–75. 
 321. This is not to say that application of the economic concept of agency slack is not useful; 
only that it provides only a partial understanding. For a thoughtful application of this 
framework in an analogous setting of private firms, see generally Michael J. Trebilcock & 
Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2003). 
 322. Professor Richard Stewart has summarized some of the concerns as follows: 
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Yet modular arrangements can be surprisingly “accountability-
rich.” Recall that in CalFed each agency remains intact. This means 
that as agencies take steps to implement the program, they must, at a 
minimum, adhere to the normal procedural rules that would apply to 
them, including federal or state APA requirements. And, as always, 
each of these agencies is accountable to multiple principals: they must 
obey their statutory mandates, respond to legislative oversight, 
adhere to judicial decisions, and conform to the priorities of their 
executive branch principals. Nothing in the CalFed process supplants 
these traditional checks. Rather, the process supplements them with 
additional accountability measures. 
In a modular structure, the agencies must also respond to one 
another and to stakeholders they have brought into the process. In 
this sense, accountability in modular structures—at least those 
characterized by a significant amount of interagency coordination, 
intergovernmental cooperation, and stakeholder participation—is 
horizontal. This means that although decision makers are 
hierarchically located in relation to a variety of traditional principals, 
they are also horizontally placed in relation to both sister agencies 
and other important constituencies. The CalFed example illustrates 
how horizontal accountability might work. Recall that as part of 
agreeing to the DIP, agencies with historically competing interests 
agreed to link their actions: DWR and USBR’s plans for pumping 
water from the Delta for their clients would be linked to the fish and 
wildlife agencies’ planning process for protecting endangered fish. 
And similar linkages were established through the creation of the 
EWA, which requires traditionally warring agencies and stakeholders 
to make decisions together. In this situation, the implementing 
agencies must respond more often and to more players than they 
 
The network is not a legally accountable entity. In some cases, the network process 
will eventually result in formal legal arrangements involving governmental 
authorities, memoranda of understanding, licenses for regulated entities, even formal 
regulations. These can be reviewed by courts for excess of power . . . . There may, 
however, be many participating governmental entities, from different levels of 
government, subject to review in different courts. . . . [I]t is hard to see how the 
interest representation model, which relies on formal legal procedures for 
decisionmaking, can be successfully applied to network arrangements. Successfully 
subjecting network decisionmaking to a system of regulatory analysis review on the 
OMB model is also quite problematic. 
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 452 
(2003). As to Stewart’s final point about OMB oversight, our view is that economic analysis 
(where appropriate) should be part of the initial decision-making process, not an add-on 
imposed by an external reviewer. 
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would in a traditional principal-agent relationship.323 And with so 
many parties constantly talking to one another, it is harder for any 
party to dominate the process, or to get away with something by 
going off secretly on its own. Although the accountability to 
principles in the traditional APA model can theoretically work to 
block bad rules or projects if they are sufficiently large and visible, 
the CalFed modular structure actually introduces additional 
mechanisms of control that may be more likely to constrain action in 
practice. And beyond providing a check on bad behavior, the 
interpenetration afforded by horizontal relationships can help to 
change longstanding cultures and attitudes. 
In addition to horizontal and vertical accountability, modular 
systems can create additional layers of accountability in the form of 
new institutions. In CalFed, the group of implementing agencies must 
answer to the BDA. One might think the BDA is bound to be a weak 
institutional player because it possesses neither budgetary nor 
rulemaking power; indeed, it wasn’t even legislatively authorized until 
2003. Yet by all accounts the Authority has been quite effective at 
promoting coordination. We suspect this is at least in part because it 
is specifically charged with overseeing the entire program and has no 
single constituency. Without a historical client base, the Authority is 
the only entity that is entirely free to pursue balanced implementation 
in earnest. The BDA has also taken advantage of nontraditional 
oversight tools. For example, notwithstanding its lack of direct 
budgetary power, the Authority has worked with the Governor’s 
Office of Finance to try to ensure that programwide state spending is 
balanced among objectives.324 And even without the power to directly 
alter the agencies’ legislative mandates (as Congress or a state 
legislature might), the BDA can affect the agencies’ implementation 
of their statutory mandates by engaging in a less direct form of 
oversight: making recommendations; rejecting proposals; and 
requiring explanations and plans on a regular basis. 
Nevertheless, there remain reasons to be concerned about 
whether modular systems will, in practice, produce sufficient 
accountability. First, the plural accountability described above has a 
downside: there may be so many vertical and horizontal checks in 
place that observers will not know who is ultimately responsible for 
 
 323. Note that the Bay-Delta Authority influences programwide budgeting, however, 
through the Office of Finance. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 7. 
 324. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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what. In other words, if accountability is too diffuse, it may not be 
meaningful. In addition, the relative informality of modular tools 
(e.g., agreements, packages, plans) may come to displace more 
traditional, visible, and formal agency procedures. In the worst-case 
scenario, so-called modular approaches may serve—as some 
environmentalists fear about CalFed—as a front for unrestricted 
discretion by bureaucrats. 
Selecting the participants in a modular structure also presents 
potential accountability problems. Modular structures depend on a 
delicate balance of agencies and stakeholders. But what determines 
which stakeholders should participate? In the CalFed example, the 
stakeholders with the most influence either have significant political 
power (meaning they have demonstrated the capacity to grind the 
system to a halt through litigation), significant expertise (meaning 
they are valuable in finding solutions), or both. But few stakeholders 
can credibly claim to represent fully the “public interest.” This 
concern arises with all collaborative or multistakeholder initiatives. In 
theory, virtually any group of stakeholders can be disqualified on the 
grounds that it will only pursue its narrow interests or because its 
claims to representing a broader public are dubious. This charge can 
be leveled equally at private firms, local watershed groups, and 
national environmental organizations, none of which is elected by the 
general public. Even participation by local governments can raise 
problems. To the extent that they achieve a dominant role, local 
interests (perhaps captured by industry) might outweigh state or 
national interests. Moreover, local government is often fragmented 
among multiple municipal governments, whose interests and 
incentives may or may not converge with those of the metropolitan 
region as a whole, let alone those of the broader public.325 Meanwhile, 
higher levels of government are often thought to be disconnected 
from the concerns of those most directly impacted by regulatory 
actions. 
If designed poorly, then, intensive collaboration between 
different levels of government and among a variety of agencies and 
stakeholders might diminish political accountability. In New York v. 
United States,326 a case in which state participation in a federal 
environmental program was mandated by federal legislation, Justice 
 
 325. For an extensive discussion of this problem and possible solutions, see David Barron, 
Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003). 
 326. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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O’Connor worried that democratic accountability would suffer 
because of the inability of citizens to identify whether it was state or 
federal officials who had ultimate policy responsibility.327 Modular 
structures are significantly more complex than this simple federal-
state scenario, as we have shown, and it is easy to imagine that they 
could cause much greater citizen confusion. To put a fine point on it, 
if you have a problem concerning the drafting or implementation of 
the Bay-Delta ROD, against whom, precisely, should you vote in the 
next election? 
No governance arrangement can provide perfect accountability, 
and measuring modularity against such an ideal would be unfair. But 
modular approaches must be designed with these concerns in mind. 
So, for example, although it is impossible to specify precisely which 
stakeholders ought to participate in each modular regime, it seems 
appropriate to establish an expectation of balance: balance in 
numbers, across perspectives, and in terms of capacity. And we would 
expect modular structures to aim to give voice to a variety of local, 
regional, and national interests, providing access for a rich and 
diverse set of stakeholders.328 As we have already noted, the various 
participants will provide a menu of political and legal accountability 
mechanisms. If the system is badly designed, these vertical and 
horizontal accountability mechanisms may in effect cancel one 
another out, but in a well-constructed system they should reinforce 
each other. The fact that some participants have direct electoral 
control fosters one form of accountability; the fact that others must be 
prepared to defend the reasonableness of their actions in court may 
provide another; the ready access of some participants to the media 
may provide yet a third. Participants may check and balance one 
another in true Madisonian style. Nongovernmental organizations, 
local governments, state governments, firms, communities, districts, 
and federal agencies have diverging interests. They may, granted, 
collude with one another, but they are at least equally likely to act as 
fire alarms, alerting legislators and the public to malfunctions of the 
regulatory process.  
As we have seen, CalFed is highly, if imperfectly, transparent. It 
features both formal and informal tracks of stakeholder participation 
 
 327. Id. at 168–69. 
 328. Just as the national government includes representation of state populaces (the 
Senate), more localized communities (the House), and the nation as a whole (the president), so 
the modular structure can blend constituencies. 
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(including the Public Advisory Group and many informal 
opportunities for contact with both the Authority members and 
agency staff); a rigorous Science Program that independently reviews 
each aspect of program implementation; Annual Work Plans 
requiring detailed updating by agencies; the DIP, a package of 
commitments to renew balanced implementation of the key elements 
of the plan; and an Authority created to coordinate agency actions, 
which themselves remain subject to the APA and other applicable 
administrative law requirements. In the face of such overlapping and 
complementary features, it would be misleading to suggest that this 
process of checks and balances is “unaccountable.”  
CONCLUSION 
Modular environmental regulation seeks to overcome regulatory 
fracture through inter-agency and inter-stakeholder coordination. It 
requires that institutional form follow function, relies on “agreement 
based” decision making, facilitates “social learning,” and both 
encourages and depends upon an adaptive process in which 
information plays a crucial role. Finally, a modular approach 
promotes accountability by supplementing traditional procedural 
checks with a variety of informal controls and broad stakeholder 
participation. The goal of the modular enterprise is to diagnose 
problems and design solutions first, and then to devise governance 
institutions and regulatory or contractual tools capable of 
implementing them. This requires a willingness on the part of 
decision makers to free themselves, even if temporarily, from the 
narrowness of their own statutory mandates, procedural practices, 
and cultural blinders so that they can participate in systemwide 
problem-solving. Studies show that there are significant benefits to 
adopting a problem-based approach, and innovative agencies often 
do this informally.329 Yet they could do so much more frequently. 
Participants in modular processes must resist the temptation, 
however, to simply fit their definition of the problems to be solved 
 
 329. SPARROW, supra note 289, at 132–34. We recognize that the challenge of problem 
definition remains. To some extent, this process is intuitive. It makes no sense “[t]rying to force, 
through the ecosystem management system, problems that do not coincide with specific 
watershed areas (for example, the problem of pesticide-induced arsenic concentrations on golf 
courses, or threats to manatees from speeding boats, or radon in homes, or asbestos in 
schools).” Id. at 218. 
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into the mold of existing bureaucratic structures.330 The CalFed 
example at the heart of this article, while falling short of our 
theoretical ideal, nevertheless serves as the best example we have 
found of a modular approach to environmental regulation. As we 
learned through CalFed, the background legal regime exerts a 
powerful gravitational pull. It can retard the design of new 
institutions and inhibit the development of innovative policy options. 
The problem-solving focus we advocate is meant to encourage 
participants to look beyond these existing constraints—to finesse and 
channel them—even if it is impossible to overcome them entirely. 
Modularity is not a panacea, but the alternatives are distinctly 
unpromising. One could imagine, for example, the formation of a 
collection of new, autonomous legal entities, correctly geared to the 
scale of a given environmental problem or geographic area and 
designed to replace existing agencies. Unlike a modular structure, 
which is subject to all the existing accountability mechanisms of its 
members, such new entities would need an entirely new 
accountability process. Apart from the potential confusion that could 
be caused by a multitude of such special purpose agencies, we believe 
that in many cases they would be faced with an unmanageable task 
for which they would have to develop their own expertise. The 
political, legal, and economic costs of replacing existing bureaucratic 
structures with such entities seem overwhelming. An alternative 
solution is to consolidate all authority at the highest existing 
applicable level of government, which would normally be the federal 
government. As with all proposals to centralize environmental 
regulation and resource management in the federal government, 
however, the chief problem is that federal decision makers are too 
remote from local conditions to make the day-to-day judgments 
necessary to effectively manage environmental resources. 
It remains tempting, though ultimately impractical, to consider 
integrating the myriad functions of existing environmental agencies, 
whether at the federal or state level. As a thought experiment, 
imagine that everything relevant to environmental protection and 
natural resource management in the United States could be the 
subject of one unified program, coordinated by one agency. In this 
hypothetical universe, water quality issues would never be considered 
independently of water allocation issues, which would always require 
 
 330. Id. at 147. 
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consideration of species conservation and, more generally, ecosystem 
health. But addressing ecosystem health would require addressing 
agricultural practices and resource extraction methods, along with 
tackling air quality that might adversely affect the ecosystem, and so 
on, until there would be one holistic, comprehensive agenda for 
managing a seemingly unlimited set of interconnected resources that 
cross multiple jurisdictions. Presumably, moreover, this hypothetical 
“super” agency would need to have regulatory authority over every 
policy area that affected the health of the environment—including 
transportation policy, energy policy, and land use. Even thinking 
about this is exhausting. Assuming it were politically feasible, an 
agency that tried to cover this much ground would be technically 
overwhelmed and would likely suffocate in its own bureaucracy. 
Creating a mega-agency is fraught with problems. Even when all of 
the agencies in question are part of the same level of government, 
combining them effectively may be much more difficult than one 
might think.331 
Thus, addressing environmental problems and managing 
complex natural resources will necessarily involve multiple agencies 
with a variety of expertise and multiple levels of governments with 
differing capacities. The need to overcome the fragmentation 
inherent in this approach, however, requires looking for opportunities 
for integration, coordination, and information-sharing. This is what 
the idea of modularity is meant to capture. We also contemplate the 
possibility of multiple, overlapping modular structures addressing a 
variety of problems. For example, an agency might participate in a 
variety of collaborative exercises, each of which might have some 
features of modularity: a Habitat Conservation Plan; a basin-based 
water quality and resource management program; a regional air 
pollution plan; and a multi-party negotiation aimed at regulating an 
industry sector.332 This creates the possibility that the agency could 
help cross-fertilize between these projects, adapting successful 
solutions in one context to problems in other contexts. Overlapping 
membership also increases the likelihood of informal cooperation 
among the participants in different modular structures. By preserving 
the individual units rather than transferring authority to some higher-
 
 331. “[I]f there is one proposition on which consensus among students of public 
administration is firm and widespread, it is that reorganization normally produces little of value 
at a very high cost in time, energy, and personal anxiety.” BARDACH, supra note 309, at 16. 
 332. For a description of HCP or XL negotiations, see Freeman, supra note 2, at 191–95. 
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level or consolidated entity, the modular structure creates the 
possibility of useful synergies. 
Given the complex nature of environmental problems and 
natural resource management, there is no alternative to adopting a 
more modular approach, with its emphasis on collaborative processes 
and negotiated solutions. Litigation will always occur, but it is not a 
useful, or even viable, method of planning, coordination, and 
management. This recognition leads, inexorably, to concerns about 
the professional training of those who would lead or work in modular 
institutions. What discipline adequately prepares professionals—
equips them with the necessary skills—to both build and participate 
in modular structures? Certainly not, we are sad to say, law schools. 
Modularity requires a more expansive understanding of the role of 
the environmental lawyer than a traditional legal education, with its 
ongoing emphasis on litigation and inordinate focus on courts, allows. 
In a regime of modular regulation, contests over legality will remain 
important, and being adversarial will sometimes be absolutely 
necessary. We will be the first to point out that litigation campaigns 
by environmental groups are largely responsible for gains in 
environmental protection achieved over the last thirty years, for huge 
losses averted, and for conservation, such as it is, of our natural 
resources. But as in corporate law, much of what lawyers do in the 
future, we propose, will be transaction rather than litigation oriented. 
Increasingly, the emphasis will be on structuring the governance 
arrangements and designing the regulatory tools to implement multi-
party agreements, with litigation mostly functioning as a background 
threat. Thus, modular regulation will, among other things, place new 
demands on law schools to conceptualize these issues as design 
problems and to train students to deal with them creatively. In 
proposing modular environmental regulation as an alternative worth 
pursuing, spelling out its central features, and providing a case study 
as concrete illustration, we hope that this Article has taken a first step 
in that direction. 
